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This case is an appeal of a highly technical decision by the Utah Department
of Environmental Quality (UDEQ) and the Utah Division of Air Quality (UDAQ)
to approve an expansion and modernization project at the Holly Refinery in Davis
County. The agency made this decision in November of 2013 after a rigorous public
comment, with almost 4,000 pages of comments submitted, and a subsequent
administrative appeal. Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of
Great Salt Lake (Petitioners) now seek review of the decision made at the
conclusion of the administrative proceedings, which approved Holly's project.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review a "dispositive action in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding" under Utah Code, Sections 19-1-301.5(14) (2014),
amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 379 (S.B. 282), 630-4-403 (2015), and 78A-4-

103(2)(a)(i)(B) (2014), amended by 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 441 (S.B. 173). The
dispositive action is the Executive Director's Order Adopting Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (Final Order) dated
March 31, 2015. [ADJ0I 1651-53.] 1

1

ADJ refers to the adjudicative portion of the record, as explained in Section II.B.,
infra, pp. 10-11.

©

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Whether Petitioners can meet their burden on appeal where they

decline to challenge the Final Order, as required by Section 19-1-301.5(14) of the
Utah Code.
Standard of review:

Where a lower tribunal could not have ruled on an issue, no standard of
review applies. Cf Simmons Media Grp., LLC v. Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145,
, 13,335 P.3d 885 (where claim does not require review of any district court ruling,
~

no standard of review applies).
Issue 2: Whether the Executive Director abused her discretion or otherwise

erred in evaluating Petitioners' claims challenging UDAQ's determinations relating
to PM25 emissions for the Modernization Project.

2

Standard of review:2

Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14) governs judicial review of the Executive
Director's final decision in a permit review adjudication. Utah Code § 19-1301.5(14)( c) requires a reviewing court to "review all agency determinations in
accordance with Subsection 63G-4-403( 4), under which Petitioners must show that
they have been "substantially prejudiced" by the agency's action. Utah Code Ann.§
63G-4-403(4) (2014). Under Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c), the Court must accept the
2

The Utah Legislature amended Section 19-1-301.5 during 2015 legislative session.
See 2015 Utah Laws Ch. 379 (S.B. 282). The revisions became effective on May
12, 2015. The prior version of the statute applies because the parties' substantive
rights (UDAQ issuance of the approval order on November 28, 2014) and the
parties' procedural rights (the filing of this appeal on April 27, 2015) each vested
before the effective date of the new statute. See State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, 111214, 251 P.3d 829.These revisions affect judicial standard of review. Cf Utah Code
Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(ii) (2015) ("the appellate court shall: (ii) uphold all
factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are not clearly
erroneous based upon the petitioner's marshaling of the evidence") with Utah Code
Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(ii) (2012) ("the appellate court shall: (ii) uphold all
factual, technical and scientific determinations that are supported by substantial
evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole"). Even were this Court to
determine that the new statute applies on appeal, however, the application of the
standard of review under either version of the statute is essentially the same. The
new statutory language includes some changes to the language in the applicable
judicial standards of review, including an express requirement for marshaling and
the imposition of a clearly erroneous standard. However, because the ALJ required
Petitioners to marshal below, and because a clearly erroneous standard of review
still requires a determination on substantial evidence, there is no substantive
difference in the application of the two standards.
3

Executive Director's factual determinations (including technical and scientific
determinations) as long as "they are supported by substantial evidence taken from
the record as a whole." Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14 )(c ). "An administrative
law decision meets the substantial evidence test when 'a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate' the evidence supporting the decision." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus/Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, 135, 164
P.3d 384 (quoting Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. ofReview ofIndus. Comm 'n, 776 P.2d
63, 68 (Utah App. 1989)). The burden of challenging the agency's factual,
scientific, and technical determinations lies with Petitioners. Utah Chapter of the
Sierra Club v. Bd of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2012 UT 73,110,289 P.3d 558
~

[hereinafter Sierra Club] ("the appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating
that the agency's factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence").
This Court reviews legal determinations ofUDAQ's operative statutes and
rules under the "clearly erroneous" standard because Section 19-1-301.5 expressly
vests UDAQ with "substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and
rules." Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(c); see e.g. Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, 110
(holding that where "[t]he Legislature has given the Board explicit authority and
wide latitude in interpreting the operative provisions of the Mining Act," such legal

4

conclusions and interpretations can be set aside only if they are "based upon a
clearly erroneous interpretation ... of the law.").
The power to interpret the agency's governing laws under Section 19-1-301.5
is a clear statutory delegation of discretion, in contrast to a statutory grant of power
to "administer a statute," which most agencies have under their operating statutes. 3
This Court reviews general interpretations of law for correctness, granting little
deference to the Executive Director. See Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ,r 9.
Mixed questions of law and fact arise "when an agency or lower court must
apply 'a legal standard to a set of facts unique to a particular case.'" Murray v. Utah
Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,I 33, 308 P.3d 461 (quoting In re Adoption of Baby
B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 42, 308 P.3d 382). The Executive Director's determinations on

mixed questions "must be rationally based and are set aside only if they are
3

This Court's analysis of the standard of review in Sevier Citizens for Clean Air
and Water, Inc. v. Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, 338 P.3d 831 is
distinguishable. In Sevier Citizens, the issue was whether a petitioner filed a petition
to intervene under Section 19-1-301.5, which is a jurisdictional requirement. See id.
at ,r 4. In ruling on intervention, this Court observed that the statutory grant of
substantial discretion was a grant of authority to administer the statute, as opposed
to authority to interpret the law. Id. at ,r 5 (internal quotation marks omitted)
("[T]his grant of authority does not tum an agency's application or interpretation of
the law into the type of action that would warrant an abuse of discretion standard.").
In this case, the issues are technical and factual questions as opposed to
jurisdictional determinations.
5

imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason."
Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, 118, 38 P.3d

291 (quoting Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Issue 3: Whether the Executive Director abused her discretion in upholding

UDAQ's determination that Holly's approval order met all the applicable
permitting requirements regarding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), National Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources (NSPS),
~

and the applicability of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT).
Standard of review:

The standard of review for Issue 3 is the same as for Issue 2.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

1.

Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(12), (13), (14);

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403; and

3.

Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401 (2015).

~

~
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioners appeal the Final Order,4 dismissing with prejudice each of

Petitioners' claims. [ADJ0l 1652.] Petitioners' Request for Agency Action (RFAA)
challenged an approval order issued by UDAQ under the state's minor source
permitting program, which authorized changes to Holly's Davis County Refinery.
[IR009223-54.]
An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed the RF AA under Section 19-130 l .5 and recommended dismissal of all of Petitioners' claims on multiple
grounds-lack of preservation, failure to marshal the evidence, and failure to meet
the burden of proof on the merits. [ADJ0l 1536-648.] The Executive Director
adopted these findings and conclusions in her Final Order, now subject to this
appeal. [ADJ0l 1651-53]; see also Opening Br. 1, 12.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
By statute, the appellate record includes two sets: ( 1) the administrative

record prepared by UDAQ as it reviewed Holly's permit application (Permitting

4

The Final Order consists of two documents: (1) the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits,
which the Executive Director adopted, [ADJ0l 1536-648], and (2) the Executive
Director's Final Order of March 31, 2015. [ADJ0l 1651-53.]
7

Record), and (2) the adjudicative record prepared as the ALJ and the Executive
~

Director completed their review of UDAQ's permitting decision (Adjudicative
Record). See Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(b).

A.

Permitting Record
In July 2012, Holly submitted a final permit application, or Notice of Intent

(NOi), seeking permission to modernize certain equipment in order to increase the
processing of black and yellow wax crude oil at its Davis County Refinery from
40,000 barrels per day to 60,000 barrels per day. [IR002798-3590.] The upgrades
~

will result in a number of overall emission decreases from the refinery, and are
collectively referred to as the Modernization Project. [IR008482; IR007575;

ADJOI 1540.]
In April 2013, Holly submitted its final netting analysis to UDAQ.
[IR008366-415.] The purpose of the netting analysis was to determine whether the
Modernization Project would be a major or minor modification 5 based on estimated

5

Whether a modification is major or minor is determined on a pollutant-bypollutant basis by ascertaining whether there would be a significant net emissions
increase over a specific threshold. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (2)(i); 40 C.F .R. §
52.2l(b)(23). The pollutants requiring review under the Clean Air Act (CAA)
include Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC), Sulfur Dioxide (S02), Carbon
Monoxide (CO), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Particulate Matter often microns or less
(PM 10), Particulate Matter of 2.5 microns or less (PM25 ), and Greenhouse Gas
8

emissions from the modifications and other emission increases and decreases at the
refinery. The only two pollutants that exceeded the thresholds were Carbon
Monoxide (CO) and Greenhouse Gas emissions (GHGs), which are not at issue in
this appeal. [Id.] The projected emissions for the remaining pollutants (including
PM25 ) were reviewed under Utah's minor source program. [IR008566.]
Additionally, the project is expected to result in significant decreases in various
pollutants, including 150.69 tons per year (tpy) of SO2 , 21.53 tpy ofNOx, and 17.02
tpy of VOCs. [IR007575.]
On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released a draft permit, or Intent to Approve (ITA)
for public comment. [IR008449-79; IR008480-575 (UDAQ's Source Plan
Review).] After the comment period closed, UDAQ consulted with Holly regarding
issues raised in public comments. On November 6, 2013, UDAQ requested that
Holly submit additional information in response to the public comments.
[IR008021.] Holly did so the next day. [IR008022-52.]
Upon evaluation of all permitting materials, public comments, and additional
information submitted by Holly, UDAQ determined that Holly's NOi satisfied all

emissions (GHG). Exceedance of the threshold for any of these pollutants triggers
the more rigorous Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Nonattainment New Source Review (NNSR) programs under the CAA.
9

applicable federal and state requirements. [IR00917 4-222.] On November 18, 2013,
the Director issued approval order DAQE-AN101230041-13. [IR009223-54.]

B.

Adjudicative Record
On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their RF AA, initiating a permit

review adjudicative proceeding. [ADJ009257-373.] On January 16, 2014, the ALJ
issued pre-hearing orders, including a requirement for Petitioners to marshal all
record evidence. [ADJ009612-15.] 6 On January 22, 2014, Petitioners requested a
stay of the approval order. [ADJ009577-96.] The ALJ recommended that the
(i;

Executive Director deny this request, [ADJ0 10798-820], and on May 8, 2014, the
Executive Director adopted the ALJ' s proposed order and denied the request for
stay. [ADJ0l 1035-39.]
The parties briefed the merits of the case; and on February 26, 2014, the ALJ
heard oral argument. [ADJ0l 1655.] As required by Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), the
ALJ issued a proposed dispositive action on March 11, 2015, finding that on each
issue, Petitioners had failed to meet their burden on multiple grounds, including
lack of preservation, lack of marshaling, and lack of meritorious arguments.
[ADJ0l 1536-648.] The proposed action recommended that the Executive Director

6

In a subsequent order, the ALJ waived the page limitation requirements for the
parties' briefing. [ADJ009664-5.]
10

7

dismiss Petitioners' RFAA in its entirety. [ADJ0l 1642.] On March 31, 2015, the
Executive Director 1ssued the Final Order adopting the ALJ' s recommended order,
dismissing Petitioners' RFAA in its entirety. [ADJ0l 1651-53.] On April 27, 2015,
Petitioners filed a petition for review in this Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners cannot meet their burden on appeal because they fail to challenge
the Final Order, which by statute is the only dispositive action subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court. Consequently, their appeal must be dismissed.
Moreover, even if the Court were to look beyond this substantive failure and
address Petitioners' claims on the merits, the Court must still dismiss those claims
because the Executive Director rationally determined that certain issues were not
preserved, that UDAQ properly justified its decisions regarding the Modernization
Project's PM2.5 increases, and that the Executive Director properly determined that
both UDAQ's determinations relating to PM2.5 emissions and its compliance with
the permitting requirements of the Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401-8 were reasonable
and supported by the ~ecord as a whole.

7

Petitioners incorrectly state the date of the Final Order as November 17, 2014. See
Opening Br. 4.
11

ARGUMENT

I.

BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE FINAL ORDER, PETITIONERS
CANNOT MEET THEIR BURDEN ON APPEAL
Under Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), the ALJ prepared a 113-page proposed

~

order for the Executive Director's consideration. [ADJ0 11536-648.] The Executive
Director adopted the ALJ's recommended order in full. [ADJ0I 1651-53.] No party
to this case disputes that the resulting Final Order is a "dispositive action." Utah
Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(1 )(a). Likewise, no party disputes that the only order
subject to judicial review in this case is the Final Order. See Pet. for Review 2
("Petitioners hereby appeal the March 31, 2015 Order Adopting Finding of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits in its entirety." 8
Consequently, because Section 19-1-301.5(14)(a) limits this Court's jurisdiction to
a review of dispositive actions, and because the only dispositive action at issue in

8

The Petition for Review also seeks review of "any final order on Petitioners'
December 20, 2013 Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay of Approval
Order and/or their January 22, 2013 Amended Motion and Memorandum
Requesting a Stay of Approval Order." Pet. for Review 2. However, Petitioners
never appealed the denial of the Motion for Stay within 30 days. See Utah Code
Ann. § 19-1-301.5(15)(e). In addition, despite claiming to challenge the denial of
the stay, Opening Br. 12, at no point in their briefing do Petitioners actually
challenge that decision.
12

this case is the Final Order, Petitioners must limit their arguments to showing that
the Final Order is deficient.
In addition, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (Rule 24(a)(9)),
requires Petitioners to marshal all record evidence in support of the findings they
challenge in the Final Order, with analysis showing how the Executive Director
abused her discretion. Despite acknowledging that the permit review adjudication
proceeded as required by statute, with one minor exception, Petitioners fail to
address the Final Order. 9 Instead, they make superficial references to the Final
Order in footnotes without any context or analysis. Opening Br. 31 n.17; 34 n.19;
40 n.23; 45 n.28.
This Court has held that "[a]n inadequately briefed claim is by definition
insufficient to discharge an appellant's burden to demonstrate trial court error."

Simmons, 2014 UT App 145, ,r 37. The Utah Supreme Court also recently ruled that
"appellants who fail to follow rule 24's substantive requirements will likely fail to
persuade the court of the validity of their position." State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ,r

9

There is one instance in the entire Opening Brief where Petitioners attempt to
address the Final Order. See Opening Br. 46-48 (addressing the Final Order's
conclusions on the modeling issue). The Executive Director addresses that point in
Section III.A, infra, pp. 50-52.
13

18, 345 P.3d 1226. If an appellant that fails to comply with Rule 24 will be unlikely
~

to meet its burden of persuasion, surely an appellant who refuses to address the
most pertinent aspect of the record on appeal cannot meet its burden of persuasion.
In contrast to Roberts and consistent with Simmons, Petitioners' refusal to address
the Final Order represents a substantive failure to meet their burden, and not a
procedural misstep that this Court, in its Rule 24 discretion, may choose to ignore
or tolerate. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 40-41, 326 P.3d 645 (noting Rule
24(a)(9) is essential to a party's ability to meet its burden of persuasion on appeal,
"as a party who fails to identify and deal with supportive evidence will never
persuade an appellate court to reverse under the deferential standard that applies to

Vi}

such issues[]").
Seeking to justify its failure to undertake any meaningful analysis, Petitioners
attempt to dismiss the relevance of the Final Order by claiming that the order is due
no deference from this Court. Opening Br. 4. Petitioners wrongly claim that such
deference is unnecessary because the Court can undertake its own review based on
UDAQ's administrative record and the same standard of review applied by the ALJ.

See id. Petitioners fail to acknowledge that by statute the record on appeal also
contains the Adjudicative Record, which is "the record made by the administrative
law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative
14

proceeding." Utah Code Ann.§ 19-l-301.5(14)(b)(ii). By failing to address the
complete record on review, Petitioners cannot meet their burden of persuasion. See

Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ,r,r 41, 45.
By claiming that the Final Order is due no deference, Petitioners ask this
Court to duplicate the review already undertaken by the Executive Director.
However, such an approach would in effect be a direct appeal to this Court from
UDAQ and would render Section 19-1-301.5's permit review adjudicative process
meaningless. 10 Nothing in Sections 19-1-301.5 or 63G-4-403 permits the Court to
evaluate. de novo the exact claims that Petitioners raised during the permit review
adjudicative proceeding without regard to the lengthy and thorough review
undertaken by the Executive Director.
For these reasons, the Court should reject Petitioners' claims for their failure
to address the Final Order.

10

Utah courts interpret statutory provisions in harmony with other related statutes.
See e.g., Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Robot Aided Mfg. Ctr., 2005 UT App 199, ,r
13, 113 P .3d 1014 ("We also follow the rule that a statute should not be construed
in a piecemeal fashion but as a comprehensive whole ... Thus, we ... interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters.") (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15

II.

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR REASONABLY EXERCISED HER
DISCRETION IN EVALUATING PETITIONERS' CLAIMS
RELATING TO PM2.5 EMISSIONS FOR THE MODERNIZATION
PROJECT
Should the Court decide to reach the merits of Petitioners' claims, those

~

claims also fail on the merits. In Section I, Petitioners argue whether UDAQ
adequately supported its determination that the Modernization Project did not
constitute a major modification for PM2.5• Opening Br. 23-42. Specifically,
Petitioners attack UDAQ's approval ofNEI emissions factors, its allowance of a
2.19 tpy credit for the decommissioning of the propane pit flare, and its estimation
of the FCCU25's 11 PM2.5 emissions. Id. The Executive Director addresses each in

tum.
A.

The Executive Director Properly Upheld UDAQ's Approval of the
NEI Emissions Factors as Adequately Justified and Supported by
Substantial Evidence
Petitioners first contend that UDAQ "improperly adopted a National

Emissions Inventory (NEI) constant ... to estimate PM2.5 [potential to emit] for an
:

:,

arbitrary subset of Holly's heaters and boilers." Id. 24. Petitioners allege that the

..

'o.J!JI

UDAQ Director did so by "deviat[ing] from his prior practice and arriv[ing] at an

11

A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) is a piece of equipment used to break
down crude molecules into different components.
16

emissions rate out-of-sync with sources he deemed reliable." Id. 25. Petitioners also
claim that UDAQ "did not provide a fair or reasonable basis" for the use of the NEI
factor. Id. 31.
These arguments fail because the record on appeal shows that UDAQ did not
abuse its discretion in allowing use of the NEI emission factors in the first instance,
nor did the Executive Director abuse her discretion in affirming UDAQ's reliance
on the NEI emission factors. Further, the record as a whole contains substantial,
technical evidence that Petitioners failed to marshal before the Executive Director
and likewise fail to marshal and address before this Court.
1.

Understanding Potential to Emit, AP-42, and NEI Emission
Factors

As a preliminary matter, UDAQ's approval of the NEI emission factor is a
highly technical issue, requiring a brief foundational discussion of emission factors
and their role in the air permitting process.
"An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released
into the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant."
[ADJOl 1631 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009)).] When

reviewing a permit application, UDAQ employs an emission factor to verify the
"maximum capacity," or potential of a source to emit a pollutant consistent with the
source's "physical and operational design," and impose a corresponding emission
17

r-:·,

"1/)f

limit. [ADJ0l 1637-38]; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(4) (2015); see also Utah
Admin. Code r. 307-403-2( 1)(d) (2015) (incorporating the same definition of PTE
from 40 C.F.R. § 51.165(a)(l)(iii)); Utah Admin. Coder. 307-101-2 (same
definition).
This case addresses the differences between the EPA-published AP-42 12
emission factors and the NEI-derived factors. The AP-42 factor was developed
"using a 'stack test· impinger method,' which draws a gas sample through a heated
filter and then a series of iced 'impingers."' [ADJ0l 1631; IR007240.] By contrast,
viJ

the NEI factors were developed using a newer dilution method "derived by EPA
staff from data contained in GE EER's 13 comprehensive test reports published from

~

2002-2004," together with "detailed supporting test data." [ADJ0l 1635 (quoting
IR008032).]

2.

The Executive Director's Review of UDAQ's Approval of the
NEI Factor

The Executive Director determined that Petitioners' claim that UDAQ
mistakenly relied on the NEI emission factors instead of AP-42 to calculate PTE for

12

"AP-42" is an EPA report number and common shorthand for EPA's Compilation
of Emission Factors. [IR007239.]
13
GE EER stands for the Energy and Environmental Research Corporation (EER)
that was later acquired by General Electric Company (GE).
18

Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presented a mixed question of law and fact,
[ADJ0l 1625], and determined that UDAQ's decision was supported by substantial
evidence. [ADJ0I 1636-37.] Because whether UDAQ is authorized to use an
emission factor other than AP-42 is a question of law and because UDAQ has
statutory discretion to make such an interpretation, Utah Code Ann. § 19-130 l.5(14 )( c )( i), the Executive Director determined that the clearly erroneous
standard of review applied. [ADJ0l 1625-26.]
Just as the question ofUDAQ's use of the NEI factor presents a mixed
question of law and fact, so too does Petitioners' claim on appeal, Opening Br. 24,
that UDAQ deviated from prior practice without an adequate justification when it
approved use of the NEI factor. However, the questions of whether UDAQ deviated

@

from prior practice and whether it was justified are subsumed in the question of
whether UDAQ (and ultimately the Executive Director) reasonably approved the
NEI factor in the first place. This is so because if the record as a whole supports
UDAQ's technical determination~ Petitioners cannot show that they were
C')
~

substantially prejudiced as a factual matter. Additionally, because UDAQ has
substantial discretion to interpret the requirements of the program it administers,
Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-301.5(14)(c )(i), Petitioners cannot show substantial
prejudice unless UDAQ's determination was unreasonable, regardless of any
19

previous agency practice. In both cases, Petitioners fail to show substantial
prejudice.

3.

The Executive Director Properly Found That UDAQ's Approval
of the NEI Emission Factor Was Reasonable

In Subsection I.A.2. of their brief, Petitioners argue that UDAQ has not
justified an alleged deviation from prior practice. Opening Br. 31. However,
Petitioners can only show that they have been substantially prejudiced by a
deviation from prior practice if they demonstrate that UDAQ did not provide "facts
and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis" for its decision. Utah Code
Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii). UDAQ's explanation for its reliance on the NEI
factors must be considered in conjunction with the agency's substantial discretion to
interpret the statues and rules governing the air permitting process. Utah Code Ann.
§ 19-1-301.5(15)(c)(i). The Executive Director determined that regardless of any
~

previous or concurrent use of AP-42, UDAQ had given a thorough explanation for
the exercise of its statutory discretion to rely on the NEI emission factor.
[ADJ0I 1627-38.] Consequently, Petitioners have not been substantially prejudiced
by UDAQ's reliance on the NEI factor.
For the newer heaters and boilers at issue in this case, Holly proposed and
UDAQ ultimately approved the use of a PM2 .5 emission factor derived from more
accurate testing methodology, and imposed a PM2 _5 emission limit based on the use
20

of that emission factor. [IR008558 ("Holly Refinery is proposing to utilize PMIO
and PM25 emission factors for new (NSPS) combustion sources based on the 2006
EPA published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information"); ADJ0 1162238.] The Executive Director determined that the data used to derive the NEI
emission factor was more accurate than the AP-42 emission factor. [ADJ0l 163038; see also ADJ008558, DAQ Source Plan Review ("the NEI documents state that
EPA believes that the current AP-42 factors for condensable emissions are too high
based on some limited data from a pilot-scale dilution sampling method that is
similar to EPA's CTM 39").]
Notwithstanding these findings in the Final Order, Petitioners argue that at
the initial stage of the review process, UDAQ and Holly had fixed upon using the
AP-42 emission factors for the Modernization Project. Opening Br. 27-28 ("Holly
and the Director also decide[d] that EPA's AP-42 emission factor for natural gas
boilers ... is the most appropriate emission rate for all the other Refinery boilers."
Petitioners also point to UDAQ forms and guidance as evidence of what UDAQ
"has long considered appropriate methods for calculating emissions," Opening Br.
25, allegedly "directing" permit applicants to use either manufacturer's
specifications or AP-42 factors. Id.

21

These broad assertions fail to answer the only pertinent question on appealwhether the Executive Director was reasonable in affirming UDAQ's reliance on
the NEI factor. If that determination was reasonable and adequately explained in the
record, then it constitutes a "fair and rational basis" for the agency's decision, Utah
Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii), regardless of any prior or concurrent agency
practice. Although Holly initially proposed use of the AP-42 emission factor,
[IR008558], nothing in the record shows that UDAQ ever finally committed to the
use of AP-42 for the newer NSPS heaters and boilers in this case by issuing the
~

Holly approval order, which is the only evidence of final action by the agency.
Instead, these revisions of the proposed project were part of the normal, evolving
evaluation inherent in the administrative process. [ADJOl 1567-68 (ALJ discussing
generally the dynamic nature of the administrative review process).]
In any event, the choice of emission factors lies solely within the discretion
ofUDAQ. See Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1-301.5(14)(c)(i); Union Pac. R.R. v. Utah
Dep 't o/Transp., 2013 UT 39, ~ 16,310 P.3d 1204 (quoting Murray v. Utah Labor
Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 30,308 P.3d 461) (''the agency ... is free to choose from

among [the] range [of acceptable answers] without regard to what an appellate court
thinks is the 'best' answer"); [ADJOl 1625-26; ADJOl 1629-30.] The Executive
Director found that "nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and
22

nothing in the federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission
factors. In fact, those regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all."
[ADJ0I 1627.] Instead, EPA has merely recognized that AP-42 is one of potentially
many other authorized methods that UDAQ, as a state agency, has discretion to
employ, including emission factors from technical literature. [Id. (quoting EPA's
New Source Review Workshop Manual at c.2).]
Holly submitted two expert reports (collectively England Reports, or England
I and England II) that explain the technical basis for using the NEI emission factors.
[ADJ0I 1622-23; IR007238-58 (England I); IR008024-44 (England II).] UDAQ
reviewed the reports and determined that the NEI emission factors would result in
more accurate estimation of PTE for PM25 • [IR008558; IR009216-18.] On
administrative review, the Executive Director stated that "the NEI emission factors
are 'emissions from technical literature' that Holly used to calculate potential PM25
emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers." [ADJ0I 1627.] EPA has also
acknowledged this state agency discretion because of the variability inherent in
different facilities, "such as the raw materials used, temperature of combustion, and
emission controls."
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/aqmportal/management/emissions_inventory/emissio
n_ factor.htm (last visited October 28, 2015) (emphasis added). These variations
23

"can significantly effect [sic] the emissions at an individual location." Id.
Accordingly, EPA concluded that "[w]henever possible, the development of local
emission factors is highly desirable." Id. Therefore, when appropriate, UDAQ has
discretion to develop emission factors to suit the type of project proposed.
Moreover, despite Petitioners' claim that UDAQ did not provide an adequate
justification for its decision to rely on the NEI factor rather than AP-42, Opening
Br. 31-34, UDAQ explained the basis for using the NEI factors in the Source Plan
Review, [IR008558], and responded to each of the comments Petitioners submitted
~

regarding the proposed use of the NEI factor. [IR009216-18.] Because UDAQ
explained its reasoning both prior to and in response to public comments and

~

because Section 19-1-301.5( 14)( c)(i) grants UbAQ discretion to interpret the
requirements of its own statutes and rules, UDAQ's determination was reasonable
and not arbitrary.

14

The Executive Director further determined that regardless of any

previous or concurrent use of AP-42, both the record evidence and UDAQ's
explanation justified the use of the NEI Factor. [ADJOI 1634-35.] Petitioners do not
rebut this determination in the Final Order.

14

Petitioners' Opening Brief also does not claim that UDAQ did not respond
adequately (or at all) to the comments Petitioners made during the comment period.
24

In addition, Petitioners never address the significant analysis conducted by
the Executive Director. In the Final Order, the Executive Director reviewed the
England Reports and found that the NEI data had been subjected to a rigorous
testing program including "extensive quality assurance measures," whose "results
have been subject to peer review and have been corroborated by other independent
scientific studies." [ADJ0I 1635-369; IR008032 (England II).]
The Executive Director also found that EPA itself had recognized the
problem with the stack test impinger method, which is that once a gas sample is
drawn first through a heated filter and then through a series of iced impingers, the
emissions condense and "particulate out as "pseudo-particulate' matter."
[ADJ0l 1631-32 (quoting England II a{IR008027 and England I at IR007240,
IR007242).] Even though "the gas emissions would not condense to form
partic~late matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM2.5."
[ADJ 0 1163 1-3 2.] The Final Order states that "the NEI factors, by contrast, were
developed using a newer dilution method, which "does not create artificial pseudoparticulate matter" and ''results in much more representative and accurate PM25
measurements." [ADJ0 11633 (citing IR008027 (England II), IR008030-8032;
IR007241 (England I)).] EPA itself has recognized the dilution-based sampling
25

method "for measuring direct PM2.5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation
and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." [ADJ0I 1633 (quoting 72

Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007) (emphasis added in original)).]
.Petitioners also attack the NEI factor by contrasting it with
manufacturer data and Holly's earlier proposals. Opening Br. 26-33.
However, contrasting the forecasted results under AP-42 against the results
obtained by employing the NEI emissions factor does not explain how the
AP-42's stack test impinger method is technically preferable 15 to the dilution(.&)

based NEI emissions factor, and fails to overcome the discretion afforded
UDAQ in the first instance and the Executive Director on review.
4.

The Record Contains Substantial Evidence to Support the
Executive Director's Decision to Uphold UDAQ's Reliance on
the NEI Emissions Factor

Although the record on appeal in this case includes both the Permitting and
Adjudicative Records, Petitioners ignore the Final Order on this issue.
[ADJ0I 1622-38.] This omission is fatal to Petitioners' claim, because the only

15

[ADJ0I 1634 ("In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors,
Petitioners do not defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis.
Nor do they address any of the criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England
Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack test impinger methods on which the
AP-42 factors are based").]
26

question for this Court is whether the Executive Director unreasonably approved
UDAQ's reliance on the NEI emission factor. With no analysis of the Final Order,
Petitioners cannot possibly show that the record does not support UDAQ's use of
the NEI factor.
Moreover, on appeal, Rule 24(a)(9) requires Petitioners to marshal the
evidence supporting the Final Order on this issue. Petitioners omit much of
UDAQ's analysis from the Permitting Record and omit the entire Adjudicative
Record, other than a footnoted list of citations that purports to identify "Pertinent
Record evidence" but is unaccompanied by any analysis. Opening Br. 31 n.17. This
half-measure approach to marshaling violates Section 19-1-301.5(14)(b) and Rule
24(a)(9), and therefore fails to meet Petitioners' burden of persuasion. See Nielsen,
2014 UT 10, ~140-41.
The evidence that Petitioners identify is merely a selective collection of
references to the record that attempts to undermine UDAQ' s decision by pointing
out the different results between the use of AP-42 and the NEI factor. Opening Br.
r.·:·s.

\,g

29-33. In particular, Petitioners point to UDAQ's permitting forms

16

16

and guidance,

Petitioners attach UDAQ NSR Form 19 to their brief as an example of the
agency's alleged "command," Opening Br. 25, that permit applicants use AP-42 or
manufacturer's data. Id. Ex. H, at p. 3. This document is not in the record and
27

manufacturer data, and possible AP-42 emissions scenarios in Holly's NOI and
reviewed by UDAQ early in the permitting process. Id. 25-28. Finally, Petitioners
point to an approval order that UDAQ previously issued to Holly. Id. 27, 29.
However, these examples paint an incomplete picture of the record. The
record contains the England Reports, which provide the technical basis for the NEI
factor. Petitioners fail to address meaningfully the England Reports as a whole, and
deliberately avoid any discussion of England II. Opening Br. 33 n.18.
Not only do Petitioners fail to address the supporting information for the NEI
~

factor, they also fail to acknowledge the record evidence explaining the
considerable vulnerabilities of the AP-42 factors and the manufacturer data on
which Petitioners rely, some of which is irrelevant because it does not apply to the
type of heaters and boilers for which Holly used the NEI factor. [ADJ0 11636 (ALJ
discussing the incomplete and unexplained nature of the boiler sampling and

,'~.\
VB/

manufacturer data Petitioners submitted and the dissimilarity of some of the heaters

Petitioners' use of it is improper for two reasons. First, Petitioners never raised this
argument below, even though the document was reasonably ascertainable during the
time of the public comment period. Second, Form 19 is one guidance document
among others that permit applicants may consult, but is not a permitting
requirement. For example, UDAQ's NOI Guide states that AP-42 "may be used as a
reference when applicable." [ADJ010221.]
28

and boilers).] The Executive Director concluded that "this data does not undermine
use of the NEI emission factors." [Id.]
Finally, the record contains UDAQ's Source Plan Review, [IR008558], and
response to public comments on this issue, [IR0092 l 6-l 8 (responses 89-93)], which
address Petitioners' comments regarding the NEI emission factors. Petitioners
failed to confront thoroughly this evidence in the Permitting Record where the
agency explains the use of NEI factors instead of AP-42 prior to issuing the permit.

See Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ~12 (petitioner bears the burden of marshaling all of
the evidence and "demonstrating that the agency's factual determinations are not
supported by substantial evidence."). Therefore, Petitioners cannot show that the
Executive Director's determination regarding the use of the NEI factors is not
supported by substantial evidence.
To conclude, the Executive Director provided a thorough review of the
evidence in the case (which Petitioners fail to challenge), and determined that the
use ofNEI emission factor was supported by substantial evidence. [ADJOI 1635.]
On the merits, the record in this case supports and adequately explains UDAQ's
decision. Thus, regardless of any previous or concurrent agency use of AP-42,
Petitioners have not been substantially prejudiced by UDAQ's reliance on the NEI
factors.
29

5.

Petitioners' Other Challenges to the NEI Factors Are
Unavailing

Having failed to meet their burden on their earlier arguments,
Petitioners seek to discredit UDAQ's approval of the NEI factors by
~

advancing three final arguments, 17 claiming that I) the stack testing
requirements in the approval order are not enforceable; 2) EPA lacks
confidence in the NEI factors, and 3) UDAQ's reliance on the NEI factor
violates 42 U.S.C. § 7430. See Opening Br. 31-34. All three arguments are
wrong and do not show that the Executive Director erred.

17

In just three sentences of argument, Petitioners also claim that the record does not
support a claim that the "heaters and boilers" subject to the NEI factor are newer,
apparently because FCCU25 had already been used at a refinery in New Mexico.
Opening Br. 33. Petitioners fail to acknowledge that although NEI emission factors
were used for heaters and boilers, the only example they offer is the alleged
previous use of the FCCU25, which is neither a heater nor a boiler. In any event, as
UDAQ explained, whether the heaters and boilers are "new" for purposes of
applying the NEI emission factor is driven by whether the equipment is subject to
the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS), not whether the equipment has
previously been in service elsewhere. [IR008558 ("Holly Refinery is proposing to
utilize PM IO and PM2.5 emission factors for new (NSPS) combustion sources
based on the 2006 EPA published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information.
Older equipment (non NSPS) emissions will still rely on AP-42 emission
factors.").] Petitioners fail to acknowledge this critical distinction.
30

a.

Stack Testing is an Enforcement Tool

Petitioners contend that UDAQ's reliance on stack testing to demonstrate
compliance with the emission limits calculated using the NEI emission factors is
inappropriate because the stack testing will occur after the Modernization Project is
complete. Opening Br. 31-32. However, Petitioners advance an enforcement
argument that is not properly before this Court.
Petitioners' argument is premised on the consequences of Holly's
possible future failure to comply with its approval order, Opening Br. 32, yet
Petitioners also acknowledge that Holly will be held to all limits in its
approval order. [ADJOI 1637 ("[t]he AO imposes an enforceable limit on
PM2.5 emissions from each of the emissions units for which the NEI
emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NEI emission factors";
IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments) ("If the stack testing indicates that
Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of
compliance with its AO .... ").] Petitioners fail to explain how the limits
derived using the NEI factor will not be enforceable when the purpose of
those stack test requirements is to provide an additional tool for UDAQ to
verify compliance. [IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments) ("UDAQ is
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requiring stack testing to verify these emission factors as any regulatory
agency would to verify a BACT level that a source is proposing to meet").]
If Holly fails to meet those limits, it will have to reevaluate its project
for Major NSR applicability. [IR009218 (UDAQ response to comments)
("UDAQ acknowledges emission factors have an effect on PSD/Major NSR
applicability, and imposes stack testing as a way to ensure the source
complies with the terms of the permit").] As the Executive Director
concluded, "UDAQ was reasonable in relying on this limiting factor in its
vi>

determination that Holly's project would only be a minor modification for
PM." [ADJ0I 1638.] Petitioners fail to show that these explanations in the
record are unreasonable, or that they constitute anything other than a
potential enforcement matter between UDAQ and Holly.

b.

Petitioners Erroneously Rely on Statements of EPA Staff

Petitioners argue that the record "explains why EPA lacks faith in the NEI
constants," offering as support two emails from "EPA experts" whose positions
with and authority to speak for EPA are unidentified. 18 Opening Br. 32-33.

18

The Executive Director made the following observation about the two EPA
emails: "EPA staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account
discussing the accuracy of the NEI emission factors and the ability of EPA to
32

Notwithstanding the dubious reliability of this evidence, Petitioners misconstrue its
contents. The email from EPA staff member Ron Meyers does not state that the NEI
factors were unreliable, but rather that if that data were to be used to generate an
updated emission factor, EPA would like to have additional supporting information.
[IR00891 l.] The other email that Petitioners cite, Opening Br. 32-33, does not
discuss the NEI factors, but instead states generally that EPA would not develop an
emission factor without being provided a test report for the underlying data.
[IR009043.] The data underlying the NEI factors was accompanied by test reports.
[IR008032.] Consequently, the emails from EPA do not undermine the quality of
the NEI factors.
In any event, the Executive Director found that "[t]he cautionary statements
regarding the NEI emission factors upon which Petitioners rely, Opening Br. 33
(quoting England Reports), 'do not suggest in any way that those factors are
insufficiently supported by data or should not be used," [ADJ0I 1635-36; quoting
England II at IR008033], and that "[s]uch cautionary language is generally found in
all instances where emission factors are used. [Id.] Such statements therefore do not

approve new emission factors generally. [IR008911-8922; IR009043.] Neither the
attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were included with the
comments. [Id.]"
33

undermine the substantial scientific evidence in the record supporting the accuracy
~

of the factors that relied upon by UDAQ. Moreover, UDAQ provided a reasonable
basis and explanation for its reliance on the NET factors, and this Court should defer
to the agency's expert judgment pursuant to Section 19-1-301.5(14)(c).

c.

42 U.S.C. § 7430 Does Not Apply to This Case

Finally, Petitioners claim, without analysis, that UDAQ's reliance on the NEI
factors violates 42 U.S.C. § 7430. Opening Br. 34. Specifically, in this unpreserved
argument 19 Petitioners insist that Section 7430 requires that EPA approve any
@

emissions factor that EPA itself did not establish, and that because EPA did not
approve the NEI factor used in this case, Petitioners have been denied the noticeand-comment protections required for rulemaking. Id.
The Executive Director rejected this argument because Section 7430 only
applies to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of carbon
monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such

19

Petitioners fail to acknowledge (or rebut) that the Executive Director found that
this legal argument was reasonably ascertainable during the comment period, but
not preserved because it was raised for the first time in their briefing on a motion to
stay the administrative proceedings. The Executive Director dismissed the claim not
only because it was untimely raised, but also because Petitioners did not brief the
issue until they filed their Reply before the ALJ. [ADJ0l 1624.]
34

air pollutants ... " 42 U.S.C. § 7430; see also [ADJOl 1628.] The statute says
nothing about the use of emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM2_5 and
PMrn-the only emissions for which Holly used NEI factors to estimate emissions
from its heaters and boilers. [ADJO 11628.] Petitioners did not then and do not now
show that the Executive Director's legal interpretation of this federal statute is
incorrect.
Moreover, EPA has recognized that a state agency may use other
methods without obtaining approval under Section 7430, provided the agency
supports the method it chooses. [ADJO 11629 (citing Public Participation
Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials at-2 (May
1997)).] The complete record contains substantial evidence in support of the
NEI factors, and UDAQ reasonably determined that the use of such factors
was justified. Petitioners offer no persuasive argument to the contrary.
To conclude, UDAQ's decision to rely on the NEI factors to estimate
PM2_5 emissions for Holly's new gas-fired heaters and boilers is reasonable
and supported by substantial evidence.

35

B.

The Executive Director Reasonably Determined That UDAQ
Properly Calculated the Emission Decreases From the Closure of the
Propane Pit Flare
Petitioners make a number of arguments that the 2.19 tons per year (tpy)

PM2.s credit UDAQ allowed Holly for the decommissioning of the propane pit flare
(PPF) is unsupported. Opening Br. 34. The Executive Director addressed these
arguments and found them unavailing because the emissions credit was based on
actual historical inventory data from the flare, as required by applicable law.
[ADJ0I 1638-42.] On appeal, Petitioners fail to show that the Executive Director's
~

decision is unreasonable.
As part of its claim, Petitioners allege that "the Record is devoid of any
specific emission factors, conversions, equations, calculations, assumptions or
monitoring data to substantiate Holly's claimed PPF emissions, id., and that
"[a]lthough the Director insists that the PPF PM2.5 emissions were based on 'actual
throughput data,' IR009128, neither he nor Holly provides those data." Opening Br.
36. Petitioners fail to mention that they stipulated to the exclusion of the very
calculations and data at issue. [ADJ0I 1642 (citing ADJ0I 1379 (Holly's Surreply);
ADJ0I 1331 (Director's Surreply); ADJ0I 1411-412.]
Petitioners raised this same issue during the adjudication, and the Executive
Director found that "Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review
36

the calculations, that the lack of such evidence supports their claim." [ADJ0 11642;

see also ADJ0 113 74.] This same logic applies on appeal. Petitioners do not explain
why they should be shielded from the consequence of a stipulation to which they
were a party, and therefore contributed to the alleged lack of evidence of which they
complain.
In any event, the Executive Director determined that "for purposes of netting
emissions in permit applications, the regulations expressly provide that historical
inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases
and decreases." [ADJ0I 1641 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)).] Utah Admin.
Coder. 307-150 requires Holly to submit annually to UDAQ an emission inventory
that reports actual emissions from its flares and other emission sources. As
permitted by the applicable regulations, Holly used the 2008-09 emission inventory
reports for the PM2.5 emissions from the propane pit flare when it netted its overall
emissions from the Modernization Project, rather than re-calculating emissions
using AP-42 or any other method, as Petitioners claim. [ADJ0l 1639.]
Petitioners have presented nothing to the agency or on appeal that would
undermine the deference owed to both UDAQ and the Executive Director on such a
highly technical emission calculation, nor have they presented any technical
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evidence to undermine the accuracy of the historical inventory information.
vJ

Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Final Order on this issue.

C.

@

The Executive Director Reasonably Upheld UDAQ's FCCU25 PM2.5
Emissions Estimate
Though partially unpreserved at the agency level, [ADJ0 11612-13 ],

Petitioners continue to assert that Holly's and UDAQ's calculation of a maximum
coke burn rate of 6200 lbs/hr. resulted in a PTE of 8.15 tpy of PM2.s, Opening Br.
39, but that the 8.15 tpy does not reflect the maximum capacity ofFCCU25 to emit

PM2 _5 because the approval order does not contain a limit on the amount of coke
that FCCU25 may burn. Id.
Despite the lack of preservation, the Executive Director determined that
Petitioners had failed to show that UDAQ's emission calculations were flawed
because Holly based its FCCU25 emission estimate on actual test data from a
~

similar-operating FCCU at the Holly Refinery and because the approval order
requires Holly to comply with the estimated limit as part of the PM emission caps in
the Holly approval order. [ADJ0l 1614-15.]
Utah. Admin. Coder. 307-401-2 defines potential to emit or PTE as "the
maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit an air contaminant under its
physical and operational design." Each installation of new equipment requires an
estimate of PTE, and in this case, the installation of FCCU25 triggered the
38

requirement to estimate that FCCU' s PTE. The Executive Director determined that
Holly "based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would bum coke at a rate of
6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current
operation at the refinery." [ADJ0l 1614; IR008052; see also NSR Manual,
ADJ0 I 085 ("Methods of estimating potential to emit may include ... performance
test data on similar units").] This approach resulted in a conservative coke bum
estimate of 6200 lbs/hr for the maximum capacity of 8500 barrels per day, for a
total PM emission level of 8.15 tons per year. [IR008052; IR0028 l l; IR009227.]
UDAQ reviewed Holly's calculation information and found that it justified
the coke bum rate. [R009219, Response to Comments Memo ("Based on UDAQ's
technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke bum in FCC Unit 25. ");
IR008052, November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the
FCC Unit 25).]
Petitioners claim that Holly's PTE estimate is improper because the FCCU25
will allegedly process different crude than the FCCU4, and because that crude may
have a higher coke load, it may mean that a 6200 lbs/hour coke bum rate and
corresponding 0.3 lb PM 10/1000 lbs coke burned estimate is too low. Opening Br.
39-41. However, the Executive Director acknowledged that the highly technical
39

factual nature of this claim required her to give deference to UDAQ's review and
requires Petitioners to show that the record lacks substantial evidence to support
UDAQ's PTE calculation. [ADJ0I 1614.] UDAQ reviewed the record evidence that
supported Holly's calculations, including the information from the test data of the
FCCU4 [IR008052], the maximum crude throughput capacity of the FCCU25
[IR003160], and the fact that the FCCU4 had a larger capacity and emission
potential. [IR009227.] This evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support
UDAQ's reliance on the calculated PTE for the new FCCU25, as well as the
~

Executive Director's determination. 20
Petitioners next complain that "there is no federally and practically
enforceable limitation that restricts the coke-bum rate or the amount of coke/hr that

20

Even though Petitioners now rely on Universal Oil Products data to support their
claim that black wax crude will generate higher coke levels and consequently create
more PM emissions, Opening Br. 3 8, they are foreclosed from doing so on appeal.
The Executive Director determined below that Petitioners "provide[ d] no evidence
contradicting Holly's certification that all of the numbers contained in the NOi were
accurate," and despite having the opportunity during the comment period to provide
technical evidence of alternate coke burn rates that it considered more appropriate,
Petitioners failed to do so. [ADJ0 11613-14; IR009219 (UDAQ noting in response
to public comments that Petitioners referred to Universal Oil Products data but did
not provide "documents or primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if
any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke bum estimates" and did not
provide "any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a higher
value is more appropriate.").]
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Holly may bum" and that ''nothing in the AO constrains Holly from exceeding the
6200-lb/hr coke-bum rate." Opening Br. 39, 40. However, as the Executive Director

@

determined, "[t]he FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is
a finite capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the
amount of PM that can be emitted." [ADJ0 11615.] Petitioners offer no rebuttal to
this practical and physical reality.
Even if FCCU25 's physical capacity allowed greater emissions, "the refinery
is limited to an overall PMw emission cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tpd for combustion
sources. [IR0092 l 9, Response to Comments Memo.] "If these limitations are not
met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits."

[Id.] Neither before the Executive Director nor on appeal do Petitioners provide any
evidence or argument to refute these basic points, and therefore fail to show that the
Executive Director's final determination on this issue is unreasonable.

III.

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DID NOT ABUSE HER DISCRETION
IN FINDING THAT UDAQ COMPLIED WITH ALL THE
APPLICABLE PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS REGARDING THE
NAAQS, NSPS, AND THE APPLICABILITY OF BACT
Petitioners argue that UDAQ failed to comply with the permitting

requirements of Rule 307-401-8 of the Utah Administrative Code when it issued an
approval order for the Modernization Project. See Opening Br. 42-55. Utah
41
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Administrative Coder. 307-401-8 requires that the Director's approval order for a
minor modification must ensure that (I) the proposed installation will meet the
applicable requirements of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS), 21 see Utah Admin. Coder. 307-401-8(l)(b)(vii); (2) the proposed
installation will meet the National Standards of Performance for New Stationary
Sources (NSPS),22 see id. (l)(b)(vi); and (3) the degree of pollution control for
emissions is "at least best available control technology" (BACT), 23 see id. (l)(a).
Petitioners claim that the Holly approval order does not comply with any of these
requirements. Opening Br. 42-55. The Executive Director addresses each argument
below: Section A discusses the NAAQS requirements; Section B addresses NSPS;
I,@

and Section C covers BACT.

21

EPA must establish NAAQS for pollutants considered harmful to public health
and environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409.
22
The NSPS are technology-based standards that apply regardless of the air quality
in any particular area. EPA specifies the NSPS by regulation. See generally 40
C.F.R. §§ 60.1- 60.5483 (July 16, 2015). Subpart Ja applies to refineries
constructed or modified after May 14, 2007. See 40 C.F .R. § 60.1 00a(b ).
23
Rule 307-401-2(1)(d) of the Utah Administrative Code defines BACT as "an
·emissions limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air
contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or
modification .... "
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A.

The Executive Director did not Abuse her Discretion in Finding That
the Modernization Project Meets all the Applicable Requirements of
theNAAQS
1.

Holly Refinery Flare Emission Limitations Comply With
NAAQS

Petitioners claim that the Director's approval order does not protect the shortterm NAAQS because (1) it does not limit emissions from flares, 24 (2) it does not
impose short-term emission limits by failing to account for "unregulated" flare
emissions during upset conditions, and (3) and it is based on faulty modeling that
does not reflect maximum short-term emission rates. See Opening Br. 44-51.
The approval order does impose a number of emission limits regulating the
routine emissions from the flares. [ADJ0I 1574.] This is accomplished by imposing
source-wide caps instead of source-specific emission caps, [ADJ0I 1574], requiring
compliance monitoring (i.e. Continuous Emission Monitoring System for SO2
emission sources), [IR009245; ADJ0I 1583], and mandating tabulating and record
keeping for PMw emissions for all sources based on the amount of fuel combusted
[ADJ0I 1583; ADJ0l 1574-75.] The approval order additionally requires Holly "to

24

"Flaring is a high-temperature oxidation process used to bum combustible
components ... of waste gases from industrial operations." [IR002852.] Emissions
from flaring include unburdened hydrocarbons, CO, NOx, sulfur-containing
material, and SO2 • [See id.]
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install flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the South Flare gas line to
monitor flare combustion efficiency .... " [ADJ0 115 83 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (internal citation omitted).] Petitioners fail to rebut these findings and
conclusions.
Petitioners next argue that the approval order does not protect short-term
NAAQS 25 because it excludes unregulated flare emissions and does not impose

short-term emission limitations. See Opening Br. 44-45. In making these arguments,
Petitioners assume that UDAQ must impose short-term emission limits on Holly's
flares and include all upset conditions in calculating potential to emit (PTE) in order
to impose emission limitations on the facility. See id. Both assumptions are
~

incorrect. JJDAQ's obligation to impose short-term emission limits arises only
when the agency finds there is a risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [ADJ011583.]
Although not required, 26 a modeling analysis prepared by Holly and approved by

25

Petitioners similarly allege that the Director "has neglected his duty to ensure that
the Refinery emissions do not impeded attainment or maintenance of the NAAQS"
because he did not impose short-term source-wide emission limits on the Holly
Refinery. See Opening Br. 51. This argument fails for the same reasons discussed in
this Subsection as applicable to the flares.
26
Holly Refinery performed the modeling analysis even though the governing
regulations did not require it for a minor modification. [ADJ0l 1589; ADJ0l 1589
n.14]; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(a)(2)(ii) ("The requirements of paragraphs G)
through (r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major
44

UDAQ shows no impact on the NAAQS for CO, PMw, NO2, and SO2.
[ADJ0 11584; (quoting IR009190-91, Response to Comment Memo); see also
ADJ0I 1588 (citing IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15)) (demonstrating no
exceedance ofNAAQS).] The Executive Director will address Petitioners'
challenges to the modeling analysis and its accuracy below. See infra, pp.50-52.
Short-term emission limits are also not required for minor modifications. 27
[ADJ0l 1586 (holding that EPA's guidance on implementing the I-hour SO2
NAAQS in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits (major modifications)
does not apply to minor modifications).] Whether a modification is major or minor
is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis by ascertaining whether there would
be a significant net emissions increase over a specific threshold. [ADJ0I 1587.]
Once a regulatory agency makes this determination, the major modification
requirements apply only to those pollutants for which there would be a significant
net emissions increase. [See id.] The Modernization Project "fell into the 'major'
category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2, or PM." [Id.]

stationary source"); Utah Admin. Coder. 307-403-3 ("Every ... major
modification must be reviewed by the director to determine if a source will cause or
contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.").
27
See supra, n.26.
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Turning to the merits of these claims, Holly and UDAQ correctly performed
~

the PTE calculation for the flares by excluding malfunction emissions from the
calculation. [ADJOl 1580.] The Executive Director observed, "[T]he law does not
require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE calculation for flares because such
upset emissions are not considered part of normal operation." [See id.] Potential to
emit does not contemplate the "worst conceivable operation," instead, it refers to
"the maximum emissions that can be generated while operating the source as it is
intended to be operated and as it is normally operated." [See id. (quoting United
States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988)).] The
courts made similar holdings in Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't ofEnvtl. Quality,
251 P.3d 310,314 (Wyo. 2011) and Alabama Power Co. v. Castle, 636 F.2d 323
(D.C. Cir. 1979). [ADJO 11580.]
Further, because Holly assumed (and UDAQ agreed with) a limit of zero tons
per year (tpy) for malfunction emissions when calculating PTE, any exceedances of
the emission caps due to upset or malfunction will be violations of Holly's permit,
and subject to enforcement action by UDAQ. [ADJl 1581.] As UDAQ explained in
its Response to Comments, "All limits of the permit apply at all times, which
includes periods of startup, shutdown and malfunction." [ADJO 11581 (quoting
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IR009196, Response to Comments Memo).] The Executive Director adopted this
statement as part of her findings of fact on the issue. (ADJ0l 1581.]
Petitioners also fail to marshal important findings by the Executive Director
regarding estimated annual emissions from upset conditions at the Holly Refinery.
For example, the 240 tpy of S02 and 8 tpy of NOx projected malfunction emissions
were "a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be-not what they
actually are." [ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR003780).] "In fact, the emission calculation
documentation in the record demonstrates that actual recorded historic malfunction
emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of S0228 from both flares combined."
[ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR003780).] Additionally, even ifUDAQ included 34 tpy
malfunction emissions into its PTE calculation, such addition would not have
changed the netting analysis or made the Modernization Project major for S02 ,
because the netting analysis showed an overall emission reduction in S02 of 150.69
tpy. [ADJ0l 1582 (citing IR007574-75).]

28

The figure of 34 tpy is an average of historic data from the Holly Refinery over a
five-year period from 2005 to 2009. [See ADJ0l 1582, n.12 (citing IR003780).] The
lowest malfunction emissions from both flares were 12. 7 tpy of S02 in 2009 and the
highest were 91.0 tpy of S02 in 2007. The prediction utilized three standard
deviations of the average 34 tpy. [See id.]
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Thus, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Final Order,
~

which affirmed UDAQ's decisions to exclude malfunction flare emissions from the
PTE calculation and not to impose short-term emission limitations on the flares.
This Court should affirm these conclusions.
Petitioners next challenge the modeling analysis, claiming that ( 1) it "omitted
the considerable upset flare emission" (at the same time Petitioners admit that this
may not be required by law), see Opening Br. 46, and (2) it does not reflect
maximum short-term emissions and fails to protect short-term NAAQS, see id. 4648.
As a preliminary matter, the Executive Director found that Petitioners did not

iJ;

satisfy their burden of proof on the modeling issue. [ADJ0l 1585-86.] She
concluded that Petitioners failed to marshal a critical portion of the record-the
actual modeling evidence-that demonstrated short-term emissions calculations and
showed how the NAAQS were being protected, regardless of whether the approval
order imposed short-term emission limits. [See id.] In this appeal, Petitioners again
unsuccessfully attempt to marshal the relevant record evidence through a single
footnote, containing a string of citations to the Executive Director's findings and
other evidence in the Permitting Record. See Opening Br. 45 n.28.

48

Regardless, the record contains substantial evidence supporting the Executive
Director's decision that the "[m]alfunction emissions were not considered in the
modeling analysis because federal and state guidance exclude malfunction
emissions from the modeling protocols." [ADJOl 1584-85; see also 40 C.F.R. 51,
App'x W, § II.B.7.a.l.2(a)n.a (malfunction emissions are not normally included in
modeling).] Malfunction operations are not part of the regular operations of a
facility; they cannot be controlled in most instances (unless resulting from poor
maintenance or careless operations) and cannot be accurately predicted (historical
data is usually used to predict these emissions). [IR0092 l 4, Response to Comments;

see also ADJOl 1591-92.] Additionally, a 2011 EPA guidance document (addressing
modeling for compliance with the I-hour (short-term) NAAQS) supports the
exclusion of malfunction emissions from modeling. [ADJO 11592, referencing
Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling group to Regional Air

Division Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application ofAppendix W
Modeling Guidance for the I-Hour NO2 National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(Fox Memorandum) (March 1, 2011).] EPA explained that the modeling should
only "address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the
annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations based on existing
49

C:.
~

modeling guidelines ...." [ADJ0I 1592 (citing Fox Memorandum at 2).] EPA then
specifically advised to exclude "intermittent emissions from ... startup/shutdown
operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO2 standard ...." [See

id.] The Executive Director found that similar logic applied to the I-hour SO2
standard and the modeling performed by Holly and UDAQ. [See id., n.15.]
Furthermore, the Final Order concluded, "In light of UDAQ's technical conclusion,

it was well within UDAQ's discretion to determine that the malfunction emissions
should not be included in the modeling analysis." [ADJ0I 1593.]
Petitioners' second challenge·is to the modeling itself, claiming that it does
not reflect maximum short-term emissions and, therefore, fails to protect short-term
~

NAAQS. See Opening Br. 46-48. Specifically, Petitioners criticize the Executive
Director's conclusion that because "Holly's emission modeling analysis
contemplated the maximum emissions that Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis,"
any "short-term spikes in emissions were accounted for in the modeling and would
not cause exceedances." See id. 46; see also ADJ0l 1584. Petitioners contend that
"[t]he emission rates Holly modeled do not represent 'maximum emissions' or
'short-term' spikes at all." Opening Br. 46. Petitioners base their argument on a
comparison of two tables from the July 2012 NOI for the Modernization ProjectTable 6-3 "Modeled PTE Emission rates and Stack Parameters for Proposed Holly
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Heavy Crude Processing Project Sources - Short Term," [IR002994], and Table 6-5
"Modeled PTE N02 - Annual Emission Rates and Stack Parameters for Proposed
Holly Heavy Crude Processing Project Sources," [IR002997.] Petitioners compare
the columns from each table listing NOx (g/s) numbers for various sources of NOx
emissions at the Holly Refinery and conclude that "there is no difference between
the NOx values used for the short-term and annual models." Opening Br. 47.
Petitioners claim that this is erroneous because the "short-term model merely
reflects annual emission rates, which smooth out any variability, and not the sharp
increases in emissions that occur on a short-term basis." Id.
Petitioners' arg~ment ignores that both the January 2012 Dispersion
Modeling Protocol (Protocol) and the July 2012 NOi used hourly emission rates in
the modeling, representing the maximum potential of each unit to emit.
[ADJ0l 1584.] The Protocol prepared by Holly and approved by UDAQ modeling
staff [id.], states that "[m]aximum hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for
existing and proposed sources will be input to the model." [IR000041.] Similarly,
the titles of the July 2012 NOi Tables 6-3 and 6-5 indicate that Holly's modeling is
based on PTE. [IR002994; IR002997.] The July 2012 NOi additionally explains,
"The stack parameters and PTE emission rates were used in AERMOD
[atmospheric dispersion modeling system] to insure that emissions from Holly'[sic]
51

proposed crude processing project and existing operations would meet all
applicable air quality standards." [IR002993.]
PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a
pollutant under its physical and operational design." 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )( 4 ). A
source cannot emit any more than its maximum hourly PTE. Therefore, any spikes
in emissions are included in the hourly rate. "Using the maximum capacity of each
unit, MSI [Holly's technical consultant that performed modeling] determined the
total emission the refinery co_uld generate in one hour of operation measured in
terms of lbs/hr." [ADJOI 1589.] The Court should defer to the agency on this highly
technical determination, especially because the record contains substantial evidence
~

demonstrating the accuracy of the modeling analysis.

2.

Holly Refinery's Flares are Subject to the Unavoidable
Breakdown Rule

Petitioners claim that the approval order "allows unlimited 'upset' emissions
from flares" and, therefore, does not set an emission limit for flares. Opening Br.
51. Petitioners then infer that because there is no emission limit for flares, any
malfunction events would not trigger the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule (UBR),29

29

The UBR "sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess malfunction
emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties."
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Utah Admin. Coder. 307-107, and, in essence, such events would be completely
unregulated by the agency, and violate the short-term NAAQS. See Opening Br. 50-

51.
As a threshold matter, Petitioners did not preserve the argument on
"misapplication or noncompliance with the UBR" in the adjudicative proceedings.
[ADJ0l 1577 (citing IR009056-57); IR008453).] Further, Petitioners did not satisfy
the marshaling requirement because they "ignored multiple pieces of evidence that
explain how Holly calculated the PTE for the flares in accordance with ... the
UBR." [ADJ0l 1578.] They do not address these findings in this appeal and,
consequently, have not met their burden of proof.
On the merits of this claim, contrary to Petitioners' assertion that the
approval order contains no emission limit on the flares, "The limit in the Holly AO
for malfunction emission from the flare is zero tpy, which is accounted for in the

overall SO2 and PM emission caps. Any violation of those limits due to an upset
or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ under the

[ADJ0l 1579 (citing Utah Admin. Coder. 307-107-1 to -3).] The UBR "assumes
that malfunction emissions are violations of the applicable approval order but
affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion ... if a source is otherwise in compliance
with the other requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion
practice." [Id.]
53

Gr)

UBR." [ADJ0l 1579 (citing IR002857, July 2012 NOi) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).] Petitioners overlook the fact that the approval order imposes
source-wide SO2 and PM emission caps on the Holly Refinery (and the flares are
subject to these caps), and any exceedance of these caps triggers a violation of the
approval order and may subject Holly to the UBR. [ADJ0l 1581 ("If Holly exceeds
its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in violation of its
permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. The UBR was put in place to deal
with these very kinds of emissions.") (internal citation omitted); see also
ADH0l 1576 ("The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to
malfunctions at the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR.");
~

IR009196, Response to Comments Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all
times, which include periods of startup, shutdown and malfunction. The ITA
contains no exclusion for these events.").] For these reasons, Petitioners' argument
on this issue must fail.

B.

The Executive Director Did Not Abuse Her Discretion in Finding
That UDAQ Properly Applied NSPS Subpart Ja to the Modernization
Project
'

In Subsection 11.C., Petitioners contend that the Holly approval order should
be invalidated because it "does not specify that Subpa~ Ja applies to the flares."
Opening Br. 52. Subpart Ja is a federal regulation that is one of many NSPS EPA
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has promulgated for particular types of new or modified sources. See generally 42
U.S.C. § 7411_. Applicability ofNSPS is determined separately from other Clean
Air Act regulations, such as the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)
program, which is implemented through individual pre-construction permits like the
Holly approval order. See generally id.§§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the preconstruction permitting requirements).
As a threshold matter, no party in this case disputes that NSPS Subpart Ja
applies to Holly, regardless of whether the requirements are specified in the
approval order. [IR009252; IR002866-87; IR002962; IR009183; ADJ0l 1564.] In
fact, Petitioners concede that "[t]here are statements in the Record suggesting the
Subpart Ja applies Refinery emission units, including the flares." Opening Br. 52
n.33. Despite this lack of dispute, Petitioners contend that the approval order is
invalid because "[t]he Director ... refuses to include in the AO the particular
Subpart Ja terms and conditions applicable to the refinery." Id. 53. However,
Petitioners fail to identify any legal requirement that UDAQ must do so. The only
basis offered for such inclusion is that Petitioners are incapable of understanding
the approval order in its current form and therefore believe they can neither
comment effectively on the approval order, nor monitor Holly's compliance for
purposes of filing a citizen suit. See id. 53-54.
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The Executive Director determined that "whether Utah law requires the
~

NSPS provisions to be listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency
has been given discretion to interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard." [ADJ0l 1562.] She found that UDAQ's interpretation of the
requirements of Rule 307-401-8 was not clearly erroneous. 30 On appeal, the same
standard applies under Section 19-1-301.5( 14)( c )(i ). Although they refer to Utah
Admin. Coder. 307-401-8, Petitioners do not explain why UDAQ's (and the
Executive Director's) interpretation of the approval order requirements is clearly
erroneous.
Because Petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence and cannot show that

~

the Final Order is unreasonable, the Final Order should be affirmed.

30

Petitioners never explain what level of specificity would suf4ce. Rule 307-401-8
does not specify th~ final format of an approval order. Accordingly, the agency has
discretion to determine the best format for including the necessary requirements. If
Petitioners desire greater specificity in the rule, they must petition the Utah Air
Quality Board for rulemaking.
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C.

The Executive Director Properly Determined That the North Flare
Was Not Modified and is Subject to Subpart Ja and is Not Subject to
BACT

~I

Petitioners claim that "the record does not support the Director's
determination that the North Flare has not been modified by the expansion or is
exempt from BACT." 31 Opening Br. 54.
As explained, no party disputes that Subpart Ja applies to the North Flare.
[ADJ0l 1567; ADJ0I 1568.] On appeal, Petitioners have now narrowed their
argument to focus on whether a modification of the North Flare has taken place due
to the re-routing of gasses to the North Flare, and if so, whether a BACT analysis is
required. However, Petitioners confuse the definition of "modification" for
purposes of BACT with the broader definition of "modification" for purposes of
NSPS (and Subpart Ja). See e.g., Envt'l Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S.

561, 577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot be
taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS.").
As the Executive Director determined, a modification triggering a BACT
Q

analysis occurs when there is "(I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is
~

31

Rule 307-401-2(1)(d) of the Utah Administrative Code defines BACT as "an
emissions limitation ... based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air
contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or
modification .... "
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reasonably expected to increase the amount or character of the emissions."
tiJ

[ADJ0I 1571 (ALJ summarizing requirements of Utah Admin. Coder. 307-4013(l)(a)'s definition of modification).] Holly's re-routing of gasses to the North
Flare did not constitute a modification, because "[a] shift of emissions from one
flare to the other does not result in increased emissions, only redistributed
emissions." [ADJ0I 1572 (emphasis in original); see also IR009189, Response to
Comments Memo ("Because neither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any
physical change or experience an increase in emissions as a result of Holly
Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject to the BACT
analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").] Consequently, the re-routing of gasses

~

will not result in increased emissions, and therefore no BACT analysis is necessary
for the North Flare.
Rather than directly confront these findings, Petitioners insist that because
the South Flare "will be reconstructed and reconfigured as part of the heavy crude
processing project," [IR002825], the re-routing of gasses to the North Flare must of
necessity result in a modification of the North Flare. Opening Br. 54. However, the
re-routing of gas to the North Flare had occurred prior to the permitting action for
the Modernization Project, so even if the re-routing constituted a change in
operation, "such a change occurred well before Holly initiated the current black
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wax crude project." [ADJ0I 1572; see also ADJ0I 1570; IR08200 (Holly's first
revised netting analysis) ("currently all gases are routed to the north flare").]
Even if such re-routing had required a modification for which Holly had not
sought authorization, such would constitute an enforcement matter for UDAQ, and
is not a proper claim in a challenge to an approval order. Moreover, the Executive
Director determined, "The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with
NSPS requirements." [ADJ0 115 69; see also IR009183, Response to Comments
Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to
both the North and South Flares."); ADJ0l 1566 (ALJ discussing Holly's
compliance with an EPA consent decree that requires compliance with Subpart Ja);
IR004800 (consent decree); IR007946, IR007951 (Holly's report to EPA of
compliance with consent decree).]
Petitioners ignore this critical evidence in the record, and insist that due to the
alleged modification, UDAQ must apply BACT to the North Flare. Opening Br. 55.
The Executive Director addressed this question as well, finding that "UDAQ
determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja." [ADJ0I 1570;
IR008516-l 7 (Source Plan Review) ("The only technically feasible control options
for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (I) equipment design specifications
and good combustion work practices .... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ...
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DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja
as BACT.").] Petitioners fail to acknowledge that regardless of whether a
modification to the North Flare had taken place as part of the Modernization
Project, Subpart Ja represents BACT for the North Flare, and all parties agree that
the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja. [IR009252; IR002866-87;
IR002962; IR009183; ADJ0l 1564.]; see also Opening Br. 52 n.33.
Finally, Petitioners' argument is moot because regardless of whether it is
explicitly stated in the Holly approval order, Utah's PM2.5 State Implementation
Plan 32 (SIP) requires Holly to install flare gas recovery technology at the Refinery, 33
and Petitioners do not dispute that flare gas recovery is the most stringent pollution
~

control device currently available for flares. [ADJ0 11573-74; IR0085 l 6, Source
Plan Review (referring to flare gas recover as "the top control technology").] Thus,
any remand on this issue would be meaningless because it could not change the
result. [Id.]
32

A SIP is a plan that a state creates to reach attainment of EPA-derived NAAQS.
42 u.s.c. §§ 7408, 7409.
33
"Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be
combusted in the flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery
operations." [ADJ0l 1573 n.10.] The SIP requires "all major source petroleum
refineries in or affecting a designated PM2 _5 non-attainment area within the State
shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system." Utah PM2.5 SIP, Section IX,
Part H, p. 43.
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In any event, UDAQ and the Executive Director have substantial discretion
to interpret the regulations governing modifications and BACT requirements, and
any such legal conclusions cannot be invalidated unless clearly erroneous.
Petitioners have not shown that either UDAQ or the Executive Director erred, or
that the Executive Director's determination is unreasonable with respect to the
application of these regulations to the North Flare.
r,
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Consequently, this Court should affirm the Final Order.

.CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss Petitioners' appeal in its entirety because they

/'.:--,

\:Ji/

have failed to address the Final Order. By ignoring the Final Order, Petitioners
failed to carry their burden on any of their claims. Even if the Court were to
disregard this erroneous omission, it should still affirm the Final Order because,
based on the applicable standard of review, the Executive Director rationally and
correctly analyzed all of the Petitioners' claims raised in this appeal.
For these reasons, the Executive Director respectfully requests this Court to
r·,

~

affirm the Executive Director's March 31, 2015 Final Order.
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Respectfully submitted this 28th day of October 2015.
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Utah Attorney General's Office
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ADDENDUM A
Detenninative Statutes. Rules, and Provisions

§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings, U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 19. Environmental Quality Code
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Refs & Annos)
Part 3. Administration
U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5
§ 19-1-301.5.

Permit review adjudicative proceedings
Currentness

( l) As used in this section:

(a) "Dispositive action" means a final agency action that:

(i) the executive director takes as part of a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and

(ii) is subject to judicial review, in accordance with Subsection (14).

(b) "Dispositive motion" means a motion that is equivalent to:

(i) a motion to dismiss under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l2(b)(6);

(ii) a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(c); or

(iii) a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.

(c) "Party" means:

(i) the director who issued the permit order being challenged in the permit review adjudicative proceeding;

(ii) the permittee;

(iii) the person who applied for the permit, if the permit was denied; or

(iv) a person granted intervention by the administrative law judge.

(d) '"Permit" means any of the following issued under this title:
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(i) a pennit;

(ii) a plan;

(iii) a license;

(iv) an approval order; or

(v) another administrative authorization made by a director.

(e)(i) "Pennit order" means an order issued by a director that:

(A) approves a pennit;

(8) renews a pennit;

(C) denies a pennit;

(D) modifies or amends a permit; or

(E) revokes and reissues a permit.

(ii) "Permit order" does not include an order terminating a permit.

(t) "Permit review adjudicative proceeding" means a proceeding to resolve a challenge to a permit order.

(2) This section governs pennit review adjudicative proceedings.

(3) Except as expressly provided in this section, the provisions of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, do not
apply to a pennit review adjudicative proceeding.

(4) If a public comment period was provided during the permit application process, a person who challenges a pennit order,
including the permit applicant, may only raise an issue or argument during the permit review adjudicative proceeding that:

(a) the person raised during the public comment period; and
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(b) was supported with sufficient information or documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and
significance of the issue.

(5) The executive director shall appoint an administrative law judge, in accordance with Subsections 19-1-30 l (5) and (6), to
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding.

(6)(a) Only the following may file a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order:

(i) a party; or

(ii) a person who is seeking to intervene under Subsection (7).

(b) A person who files a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order shall file the request:

(i) within 30 days after the day on which the permit order is issued; and

(ii) in accordance with Subsections 630-4-201(3)(a) through (c).

(c) A person may not raise an issue or argument in a request for agency action unless the issue or argument:

(i) was preserved in accordance with Subsection (4); or

(ii) was not reasonably ascertainable before or during the public comment period.

(d) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (6)(b )(i).

(7)(a) A person who is not a party may not participate in a permit review adjudicative proceeding unless the person is granted
the right to intervene under this Subsection (7).

(b) A person who seeks to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding under this section shall, within 30 days after
the day on which the permit order being challenged was issued, file:

(i) a petition to intervene that:

(A) meets the requirements of Subsection 630-4-207( l ); and
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(8) demonstrates that the person is entitled to intervention under Subsection (7)(c)(ii); and

(ii) a timely request for agency action.

(c) An administrative law judge shall grant a petition to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, if:

(i) the petition to intervene is timely filed; and

(ii) the petitioner:

(A) demonstrates that the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the permit review adjudicative
proceeding;

(8) demonstrates that the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the pefl!}it review adjudicative
proceeding will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention; and

(C) in the petitioner's request for agency action, raises issues or arguments that are preserved in accordance with
Subsection (4 ).

(d) An administrative law judge:

(i) shall issue an order granting or denying a petition to intervene in accordance with Subsection 63G-4-207(3)(a); and

(ii) may impose conditions on intervenors as described in Subsections 63G-4-207(3)(b) and (c).

(e) The department may, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (7)(b ).

(8)(a) An administrative law judge shall conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding based only on the administrative
record and not as a trial de novo.

(b) To the extent relative to the issues and arguments raised in the request for agency action, the administrative record shall
consist of the following items, if they exist:

(i) the permit application, draft permit, and final permit;

(ii) each statement of basis, fact sheet, engineering review, or other substantive explanation designated by the director as
part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order;
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(iii) the notice and record of each public comment period;

(iv) the notice and record of each public hearing, including oral comments made during the public hearing;

(v) written comments submitted during the public comment period;

(vi) responses to comments that are designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit
order;

(vii) any information that is:

(A) requested by and submitted to the director; and

(8) designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order;

(viii) any additional information specified by rule;

(ix) any additional documents agreed to by the parties; and

(x) information supplementing the record under Subsection (8)(c).

(c)(i) There is a rebuttable presumption against supplementing the record.

(ii) A party may move to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical or factual information.

(iii) The administrative law judge may grant a motion to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical
or factual information if the moving party proves that:

(A) good cause exists for supplementing the record;

(8) supplementing the record is in the interest of justice; and

(C) supplementing the record is necessary for resolution of the issues.
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(iv) The administrative law judge may supplement the record with technical or factual infonnation on the administrative
law judge's own motion if the administrative law judge detennines that adequate grounds exist to supplement the record
under Subsections (8)(c)(iii)(A) through (C).

(v) In supplementing the record with testimonial evidence, the administrative law judge may administer an oath or take
testimony as necessary.

(vi) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules
pennitting further supplementation of the record.

(9)(a) The administrative law judge shall review and respond to a request for agency action in accordance with Subsections
630-4-201(3)(d) and (e), following the relevant procedures for fonnal adjudicative proceedings.

(b) The administrative law judge shall require the parties to file responsive pleadings in accordance with Section 630-4-204.

(c) If an administrative law judge enters an order of default against a party, the administrative law jud~e shall enter the order
of default in accordance with Section 630-4-209, following the relevant procedures for fonnal adjudicative proceedings.

(d) The administrative law judge, in conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding:

(i) may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative proceeding regarding
the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded to all
parties; and

(ii) shall, upon receiving an ex parte communication, place the communication in the public record of the proceeding and
afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information.

(e) In conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law judge may take judicial notice of matters
not in the administrative record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 20 I.

(f) An administrative law judge may take any action in a permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action.

( IO)(a) A person who files a request for agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the
request for agency action has been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4).

(b) The administrative law judge shall dismiss, with prejudice, any issue or argument raised in a request for agency action
that has not been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4).
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( 11) In response to a dispositive motion, the administrative law judge may submit a proposed dispositive action to the executive
director recommending full or partial resolution of the permit review adjudicative proceeding, that includes:

(a) written findings of fact;

(b) written conclusions of law; and

(c) a recommended order.

(12) For each issue or argument that is not dismissed or otherwise resolved under Subsection ( l0)(b) or ( 11), the administrative
law judge shall:

(a) provide the parties an opportunity for briefing and oral argument;

(b) conduct a review of the director's determination, based on the record described in Subsections (8)(b ), (8)( c), and (9)(e ); and

(c) submit to the executive director a proposed dispositive action, that includes:

(i) written findings of fact;

(ii) written conclusions of law; and

(iii) a recommended order.

(13)(a) When the administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action to the executive director, the executive director
may:

(i) adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or

(ii) return the prpposed dispositive action to the administrative law judge for further action as directed.

(b) On review of a proposed dispositive action, the executive director shall uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole.

(c)(i) The executive director may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative
proceeding regarding the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard
are afforded to all parties.
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(ii) Upon receiving an ex parte communication, the executive director shall place the communication in the public record
of the proceeding and afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information.

(d) In reviewing a proposed dispositive action during a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the executive director may
take judicial notice of matters not in the record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 20 I.

(e) The executive director may use the executive director's technical expertise in making a determination.

( 14)(a) A party may seek judicial review in the Utah Court of Appeals of a dispositive action in a permit review adjudicative
proceeding, in accordance with Sections 630-4-401, 630-4-403, and 630-4-405.

(b) An appellate court shall limit its review of a dispositive action of a permit review adjudicative proceeding to:

(i) the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), (9)(e), and (13)(d); and

(ii) the record made by the administrative law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative
proceeding.

(c) During judicial review of a dispositive action, the appellate court shall:

(i) review all agency determinations in accordance with Subsection 630-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been
granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules; and

(ii) uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial evidence viewed
in light of the record as a whole.

(15)(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the effective date ofa permit.

(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this Subsection ( 15).

(c) The administrative law judge shall:

(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and

(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director.

(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit,
unless:

;•,,·-:,:t !_,;1 f'•·J~:i:
1

,

'I

§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings, U.C.A. 1953 § 19-1-301.5

(i) all parties agree to the stay; or

(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:

(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued;

(8) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause

the party restrained or enjoined;

(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and

(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or
the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication.

(e) A party may appeal the executive director's decision regarding a stay of a permit to the Utah Court of Appeals, in
accordance with Section 78A-4-l 03.

Credits
Laws 2012, c. 333, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012.

HISTORICAL AND ST ATUTOR Y NOTES
Laws 2012, c. 360, § 115(3), provides:
"Section 115. Coordinating S.B. 21[c. 360] with S.B. 1 l[c. 333]--Substantive and technical amendments.
"If this S.B. 21 and S.B. l l, Department of Environmental Quality Boards Adjudicative Proceedings, both pass and become
law, the Legislature intends that the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel shall prepare the Utah Code database
for publication as follows:"
"(3) amend Section 19-1-301.5 to read as follows:
" '19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings.
"( l) As used in this section:
"(a) "Dispositive action" means a final agency action that:
·'( i) the executive director takes as part of a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and

·-.if)

"(ii) is subject to judicial review, in accordance with Subsection (14).
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..(b) "Dispositive motion" means a motion that is equivalent to:
"(i) a motion to dismiss under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(6);
"(ii) a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule l2(c); or
"(iii) a motion for summary judgment under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.
"(c) 'Party' means:

(.:·:,

"(,;f/;

"(i) the director who issued the permit order being challenged in the permit review adjudicative proceeding;
"(ii) the permittee;
'"(iii) the person who applied for the permit, if the permit was denied; or
"(iv) a person granted intervention by the administrative law judge.
"(d) "Permit" means any of the following issued under this title:
"(i) a permit;
"(ii) a plan;
"( iii) a license;
"(iv) an approval order; or
"(v) another administrative authorization made by a director.
"(e)(i) 'Permit order' means an order issued by a director that:
"(A) approves a permit;
"(8) renews a permit;

"(C) denies a permit;
"(D) modifies or amends a permit; or
"(E) revokes and reissues a permit.
"(ii) 'Permit order' does not include an order terminating a permit.
"(t) 'Permit review adjudicative proceeding' means a proceeding to resolve a challenge to a permit order.

"(2) This section governs permit review adjudicative proceedings.
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"(3) Except as expressly provided in this section, the provisions of Title 630, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, do
not apply to a permit review adjudicative proceeding.
••(4) lf a public comment period was provided during the permit application process, a person who challenges a permit order,
including the permit applicant, may only raise an issue or argument during the permit review adjudicative proceeding that:
'"(a) the person raised during the public comment period; and
"(b) was supported with sufficient information or documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and
significance of the issue.
"(5) The executive director shall appoint an administrative law judge, in accordance with Subsections 19-1-301(5) and (6), to
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding.
"(6)(a) Only the following may file a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order:
"(i) a party; or
'•(ii) a person who is seeking to intervene under Subsection (7).
'·(b) A person who files a request for agency action seeking review of a permit order shall file the request:
•'(i) within 30 days after the day on which the permit order is issued; and
"(ii) in accordance with Subsections 630-4-20 l (3 )(a) through (c ).
••cc) A person may not raise an issue or argument in a request for agency action unless the issue or argument:
'•(i) was preserved in accordance with Subsection (4); or
(ii) was not reasonably ascertainable before or during the public comment period.
"(d) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (6)(b)(i).
'•(?)(a) A person who is not a party may not participate in a permit review adjudicative proceeding unless the person is granted
the right to intervene under this Subsection (7).
"(b) A person who seeks to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding under this section shall, within 30 days after
the day on which the permit order being challenged was issued, file:
"(i) a petition to intervene that:

'•(A) meets the requirements of Subsection 630-4-207( I); and
"(B) demonstrates that the person is entitled to intervention under Subsection (7)(c){ii); and_
"(ii) a timely request for agency action.
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"(c) An administrative law judge shall grant a petition to intervene in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, if:
••(i) the petition to intervene is timely filed; and
"( ii) the petitioner:
"(A) demonstrates that the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the permit review adjudicative proceeding;
"(8) demonstrates that the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the permit review adjudicative proceeding

will not be materially impaired by allowing the intervention; and
"(C) in the petitioner's request for agency action, raises issues or arguments that are preserved in accordance with Subsection (4).

••(d) An administrative law judge:
"(i) shall issue an order granting or denying a petition to intervene in accordance with Subsection 63G-4-207(3)(a); and
"(ii) may impose conditions on intervenors as described in Subsections 63G-4-207(3)(b) and (c).
'"(e) The department may, in accordance with Title 630, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules allowing
the extension of the filing deadline described in Subsection (7)(b).
"(8)(a) An administrative law judge shall conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding based only on the administrative
record and not as a trial de novo.
"(b) To the extent relative to the issues and arguments raised in the request for agency action, the administrative record shall
consist of the following items, if they exist:
"(i) the permit application, draft permit, and final permit;
"(ii) each statement of basis, fact sheet, engineering review, or other substantive explanation designated by the director as part
of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order;
"(iii) the notice and record of each public comment period;
"(iv) the notice and record of each public hearing, including oral comments made during the public hearing;
"(v) written comments submitted during the public comment period;
"(vi) responses to comments that are designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order;
"(vii) any information that is:
••(A) requested by and submitted to the director; and
"(B) designated by the director as part of the basis for the decision relating to the permit order;
"(viii) any additional information specified by rule;
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"(ix) any additional documents agreed to by the parties; and
"(x) information supplementing the record under Subsection (8)(c).
"(c)(i) There is a rebuttable presumption against supplementing the record.
"(ii) A party may move to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical or factual information.
'"(iii) The administrative law judge may grant a motion to supplement the record described in Subsection (8)(b) with technical
or factual information if the moving party proves that:
"(A) good cause exists for supplementing the record;
"(8) supplementing the record is in the interest of justice; and

"(C) supplementing the record is necessary for resolution of the issues.

"(iv) The administrative law judge may supplement the record with technical or factual information on the administrative law
judge's own motion if the administrative law judge determines that adequate grounds exist to supplement the record under
Subsections (8)(c)(iii){A) through (C).
'"(v) In supplementing the record with testimonial evidence, the administrative law judge may administer an oath or take
testimony as necessary.
"(vi) The department may, in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, make rules permitting
further supplementation of the record.
"(9)(a) The administrative law judge shall review and respond to a request for agency action in accordance with Subsections
630-4-201(3)(d) and (e), following the relevant procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings.
"(b) The administrative law judge shall require the parties to file responsive pleadings in accordance with Section 630-4-204.
"(c) If an administrative law judge enters an order of default against a party, the administrative law judge shall enter the order
of default in accordance with Section 630-4-209, following the relevant procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings.
"(d) The administrative law judge, in conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding:
"(i) may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative proceeding regarding the
merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are afforded to all parties; and

~

"(ii) shall, upon receiving an ex parte communication, place the communication in the public record of the proceeding and
afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information.
"(e) In conducting a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the administrative law judge may take judicial notice of matters
not in the administrative record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.
"(f) An administrative law judge may take any action in a permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action.
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"( l 0)(a) A person who files a request for agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the
request for agency action has been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4).
"(b) The administrative law judge shall dismiss, with prejudice, any issue or argument raised in a request for agency action that
has not been preserved in accordance with Subsection (4 ).
"( l I) In response to a dispositive motion, the administrative law judge may submit a proposed dispositive action to the executive
director recommending full or partial resolution of the permit review adjudicative proceeding, that includes:
"(a) written findings of fact;
"(b) written conclusions of law; and
"( c) a recommended order.
"( 12) For each issue or argument that is not dismissed or otherwise resolved under Subsection ( l0)(b) or( 11 ), the administrative
law judge shall:
"(a) provide the parties an opportunity for briefing and oral argument;
"(b) conduct a review of the director's determination, based on the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), and (9)(e); and
"(c) submit to the executive director a proposed dispositive action, that includes:
"(i) written findings of fact;
"(ii) written conclusions of law; and
"(iii) a recommended order.
"(l3)(a) When the administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action to the executive director, the executive
director may:
"(i) adopt, adopt with modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or
"(ii) return the proposed dispositive action to the administrative law judge for further action as directed.
"(b) On review of a proposed dispositive action, the executive director shall uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole.
'"(c)(i) The executive director may not participate in an ex parte communication with a party to the permit review adjudicative
proceeding regarding the merits of the permit review adjudicative proceeding unless notice and an opportunity to be heard are
afforded to all parties.
"(ii) Upon receiving an ex parte communication, the executive director shall place the communication in the public record of
the proceeding and afford all parties an opportunity to comment on the information.
"(d) In reviewing a proposed dispositive action during a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the executive director may take
judicial notice of matters not in the record, in accordance with Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201.

C;

'\ftjl

§ 19-1-301.5. Permit review adjudicative proceedings, U.C.A.1953 § 19-1-301.5

"(e) The executive director may use the executive director's technical expertise in making a determination.
"(14)(a) A party may seek judicial review in the Utah Court of Appeals of a dispositive action in a permit review adjudicative
proceeding, in accordance with Sections 630-4-40 l, 630-4-403, and 630-4-405.
"(b) An appellate court shall limit its review of a dispositive action of a permit review adjudicative proceeding to:
"(i) the record described in Subsections (8)(b), (8)(c), (9)(e), and (13)(d); and
"(ii) the record made by the administrative law judge and the executive director during the permit review adjudicative
proceeding.
"(c) During judicial review of a dispositive action, the appellate court shall:
'"(i) review all agency determinations in accordance with Subsection 630-4-403(4), recognizing that the agency has been granted
substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules; and
'"(ii) uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial evidence viewed in
light of the record as a whole.
'"(15)(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the effective date of a permit.
"(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this Subsection ( 15).
"(c) The administrative law judge shall:
"(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and
'"(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director.
'"(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit,
unless:
'"(i) all parties agree to the stay; or
"(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:
'"(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless the stay is issued;

(.(j)

"(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the
party restrained or enjoined;
"(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest; and
"(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication.
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"(e) A party may appeal the executive director's decision regarding a stay of a permit to the Utah Court of Appeals, in accordance
with Section 78A-4-l03.'."
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West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 63g. General Government
Chapter 4. Administrative Procedures Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 4. Judicial Review (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A 1953 § 63G-4-403
Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-46b-16
§ 63G-4-403.

Judicial review--Formal adjudicative proceedings
Currentness

( 1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting
from formal adjudicative proceedings.

(2)(a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file
a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the
appropriate appellate court.

(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate
court.

(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are
governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that:

(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;

(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:

(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or

(ii) according to any other provision of law.

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:

(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;

(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
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(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;

(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;

(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to
disqualification;

(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court;

(h) the agency action is:

(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;

(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;

(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1393, eff May 5, 2008.

Notes of Decisions (457)
U.C.A. 1953 § 63G-4-403, UT ST§ 63G-4-403
Current through 2015 First Special Session
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Utah Administrative Code Currentness
Environmental Quality
R307. Air Quality.
U.A.C. R307-401
·R307-401. Permit: New and Modified Sources.

R307-401- l. Purpose.
This rule establishes the application and permitting requirements for new installations and modifications to existing installations
throughout the State of Utah. Additional permitting requirements apply to larger installations or installations located in
nonattainment or maintenance areas. These additional requirements can be found in R307-403, R307-405, R307-406, R307-420,
and R307-42l. Modeling requirements in R307-410 may also apply. Each of the permitting rules establishes independent
requirements, and the owner or operator must comply with all of the requirements that apply to the installation. Exemptions
under R307-401 do not affect applicability of the other permitting rules.
R307-401-2. Definitions.

(I) The following additional definitions apply to R307-40 l.
'·Actual emissions" (a) means the actual rate of emissions of an air contaminant from an emissions unit, as determined in
accordance with paragraphs (b) through (d) below.

(b) In general, actual emissions as of a particular date shall equal the average rate, in tons per year, at which the unit
actually emitted the air contaminant during a consecutive 24-month period which precedes the particular date and which is
representative of normal source operation. The director shall allow the use of a different time period upon a determination
that it is more representative of normal source operation. Actual emissions shall be calculated using the unit's actual
operating hours, production rates. and types of materials processed. stored, or combusted during the selected time period.

(c) The director may presume that source-specific allowable emissions for the unit are equivalent to the actual emissions
of the unit.

(d) For any emissions unit that has not begun normal operations on the particular date, actual emissions shall equal the
potential to emit of the unit on that date.
"Best available control technology" means an emissions limitation (including a visible emissions standard) based on the
maximum degree of reduction for each air contaminant which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or
modification which the director, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs, determines is achievable for such source or modification through application of production processes or available
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control
of such pollutant. In no event shall application of best available control technology result in emissions of any pollutant which
would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard under 40 CFR parts 60 and 61. If the director determines that
technological or economic limitations on the application of measurement methodology to a particular emissions unit would make
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the imposition of an emissions standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, operational standard or combination
thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the requirement for the application of best available control technology. Such
standard shall, to the degree possible, set forth the emissions reduction achievable by implementation of such design, equipment,
work practice or operation, and shall provide for compliance by means which achieve equivalent results.
"Building, structure, facility, or installation" means all of the pollutant-emitting activities which belong to the same industrial
grouping, are located on one or more contiguous or adjacent properties, and are under the control of the same person (or persons
under common control) except the activities of any vessel. Pollutant-emitting activities shall be considered as part of the same
industrial grouping if they belong to the same Major Group (i.e., which have the same two-digit code) as described in the
Standard Industrial Classification Manual, 1972, as amended by the 1977 Supplement (U.S. Government Printing Office stock
numbers 4101-0066 and 003-005-00176-0, respectively).
'"Construction" means any physical change or change in the method of operation (including fabrication, erection, installation,
demolition, or modification of an emissions unit) that would result in a change in emissions.
"Emissi.ons unit" means any part of a stationary source that emits or would have the potential to emit any air contaminant.
"Fugitive emissions" means those emissions which could not reasonably pass through a stack, chimney, vent, or other
functionally equivalent opening.
"Indirect source" means a building, structure, facility or installation which attracts or may attract mobile source activity that
results in emission of a pollutant for which there is a national standard.
"Potential to emit" means the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit an air contaminant under its physical and
operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution
control equipment and restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted, stored, or processed,
shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the effect it would have on emissions is enforceable. Secondary emissions
do not count in determining the potential to emit of a stationary source.
"Secondary emissions" means emissions which occur as a result of the construction or operation of a major stationary source
or major modification, but do not come from the major stationary source or major modification itself. Secondary emissions
include emissions from any offsite support facility which would not be constructed or increase its emissions except as a result
of the construction or operation of the major stationary source or major modification. Secondary emissions do not include any
emissions which come directly from a mobile source, such as emissions from the tailpipe of a motor vehicle, from a train, or
from a vessel.
"Stationary source" means any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit an air contaminant.
R307-401-3. Applicability.

( l) R307-40 l applies to any person intending to:

(a) construct a new installation which will or might reasonably be expected to become a source or an indirect source of
air pollution, or
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(b) make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might reasonably be expected to increase the
amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air contaminants discharged, so that such installation may be expected
to become a source or indirect source of air pollution, or

(c) install a control apparatus or other equipment intended to control emissions of air contaminants.

(2) R307-403, R307-405 and R307-406 may establish additional permitting requirements for new or modified sources.

(a) Exemptions contained in R307-40 l do not affect applicability or other requirements under R307-403, R307-405 or
R307-406.

(b) Exemptions contained in R307-403, R307-405 or R307-406 do not affect applicability or other requirements under
R307-40 I, unless specifically authorized in this rule.
R307-401-4. General Requirements.
The general requirements in (I) through (3) below apply to all new and modified installations, including installations that are
exempt from the requirement to obtain an approval order.

(I) Any control apparatus installed on an installation shall be adequately and properly maintained.

(2) If the director determines that an exempted installation is not meeting an approval order or State Implementation Plan
limitation, is creating an adverse impact to the environment, or would be injurious to human health or welfare, then the director
may require the owner or operator to submit a notice of intent and obtain an approval order in accordance with R307-40l-5
through R307-401-8. The director will complete an appropriate analysis and evaluation in consultation with the owner or
operator before determining that an approval order is required.

(3) Low Oxides of Nitrogen Burner Technology.

(a) Except as provided in (b) below, whenever existing fuel combustion burners are replaced, the owner or operator shall
install low oxides of nitrogen burners or equivalent oxides of nitrogen controls, as determined by the director, unless
such equipment is not physically practical or cost effective. The owner or operator shall submit a demonstration that
the equipment is not physically practical or cost effective to the director for review and approval prior to beginning
construction.

(b) The provisions of (a) above do not apply to non-commercial, residential buildings.
R307-401-5. Notice of Intent.
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( l) Except as provided in R307-401-9 through R307-401-17, any person subject to R307-40 I shall submit a notice of intent
to the director and receive an approval order prior to initiation of construction, modification or relocation. The notice of intent
shall be in a format specified by the director.

(2) The notice of intent shall include the following information:

(a) A description of the nature of the processes involved; the nature, procedures for handling and quantities ofraw materials;
the type and quantity of fuels employed; and the nature and quantity of finished product.

(b) Expected composition and physical characteristics of effluent stream both before and after treatment by any control
apparatus, including emission rates, volume, temperature, air contaminant types, and concentration of air contaminants.

(c) Size, type and performance characteristics of any control apparatus.

(d) An analysis of best available control technology for the proposed source or modification. When determining best
available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit
volatile organic compounds or nitrogen oxides, the owner or operator of the source shall consider EPA Control Technique
Guidance (CTG) documents and Alternative Control Technique documents that are applicable to the source. Best available
control technology shall be at least as stringent as any published CTG that is applicable to the source.

(e) Location and elevation of the emission point and other factors relating to dispersion and diffusion of the air contaminant
in relation to nearby structures and window openings, and other information necessary to appraise the possible effects
of the effluent.

(f) The location of planned sampling points and the tests of the completed installation to be made by the owner or operator
when necessary to ascertain compliance.

(g) The typical operating schedule.

(h) A schedule for construction.

(i) Any plans, specifications and related information that are in final form at the time of submission of notice of intent.

(i) Any additional information required by:

(i) R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas and Maintenance Areas;

(ii) R307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas (PSD);
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(iii) R307-406, Visibility;

(iv) R307-410, Emissions Impact Analysis;

(v) R307-420, Permits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake Counties; or

(vi) R307-421, Permits: PMI0 Offset Requirements in Salt Lake County and Utah County.

(k) Any other information necessary to determine if the proposed source or modification will be in compliance with Title
R307.

(3) Notwithstanding the exemption in R307-401-9 through 16, any person that is subject to R307-403, R307-405, or R307-406
shall submit a notice of intent to the director and receive an approval order prior to intiation of construction, modification, or
relocation.
R307-401-6. Review Period.

(I) Completeness Determination. Within 30 days after receipt of a notice of intent, or any additional information necessary to
the review, the director will advise the applicant of any deficiency in the notice of intent or the information submitted.

(2) Within 90 days of receipt of a complete application including all the information described in R307-40 l-5, the director will

(a) issue an approval order for the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation, or establishment pursuant
to the requirements of R307-401-8, or

(b) issue an order prohibiting the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment if it is
deemed that any part of the proposal is inadequate to meet the applicable requirements of R307.

(3) The review period under (2) above may be extended by up to three 30-day extensions if more time is needed to review
the proposal.
R307-401-7. Public Notice.

( 1) Issuing the Notice. Prior to issuing an approval or disapproval order, the director will advertise intent to approve or
disapprove in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality of the proposed construction, installation, modification,
relocation or establishment.

(2) Opportunity for Review and Comment.
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(a) At least one location will be provided where the information submitted by the owner or operator, the director's analysis
of the notice of intent proposal, and the proposed approval order conditions will be available for public inspection.

(b) Public Comment.

(i) A 30-day public comment period will be established.

(ii) A request to extend the length of the comment period, up to 30 days, may be submitted to the director within 15
days of the date the notice in R307-401-7( l) is published.

(iii) Public Hearing. A request for a hearing on the proposed approval or disapproval order may be submitted to the
director within 15 days of the date the notice in R307-40l-7(l) is published.

(iv) The hearing will be held in the area of the proposed construction, installation, modification, relocation or
establishment.
c--.
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(v) The public comment and hearing procedure shall not be required when an order is issued for the purpose of
extending the time required by the director to review plans and specifications.

(3) The director will consider all comments received during the public comment period and at the public hearing and, if
appropriate, will make changes to the proposal in response to comments before issuing an approval order or disapproval order.
R307-401-8. Approval Order.

( l) The director will issue an approval order if the following conditions have been met:

(a) The degree of pollution control for emissions, to include fugitive emissions and fugitive dust, is at least best available
control technology. When determining best available control technology for a new or modified source in an ozone
nonattainment or maintenance area that will emit volatile organic compounds or nitrogen oxides, best available control
technology shall be at least as stringent as any Control Technique Guidance document that has been published by EPA
that is applicable to the source.

(b) The proposed installation will meet the applicable requirements of:

(i) R307-403, Permits: New and Modified Sources in Nonattainment Areas and Maintenance Areas;

(ii) R307-405, Permits: Major Sources in Attainment or Unclassified Areas (PSD);

(iii) R307-406, Visibility;
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(iv) R307-4 l 0, Emissions Impact Analysis;

(v) R307-420, Pennits: Ozone Offset Requirements in Davis and Salt Lake Counties;

(vi) R307-2 l0, National Standards of Perfonnance for New Stationary Sources;

(vii) National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air Quality Standards;

(viii) R307-214, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;

(ix) R307-l l0, Utah State Implementation Plan; and

(x) all other provisions of R307.

(2) The approval order will require that all pollution control equipment be adequately and properly maintained.

(3) Receipt of an approval order does not relieve any owner or operator of the responsibility to comply with the provisions of
R307 or the State Implementation Plan.

(4) To accommodate staged construction of a large source, the director may issue an order authorizing construction of an initial
stage prior to receipt of detailed plans for the entire proposal provided that, through a review of general plans, engineering
reports and other infonnation the proposal is determined feasible by the director under the intent of R307. Subsequent detailed
plans will then be processed as prescribed in this paragraph. For staged construction projects the previous determination under
R307-401-8( 1) and (2) will be reviewed and modified as appropriate at the earliest reasonable time prior to commencement of
construction of each independent phase of the proposed source or modification.

(5) If the director detennines that a proposed stationary source, modification or relocation does not meet the conditions
established in ( 1) above, the director will not issue an approval order.
R307-401-9. Small Source Exemption.

( l) A small stationary source is exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order in R307-401-5 through 8 if the
following conditions are met.

(a) its actual emissions are less than 5 tons per year per air contaminant of any of the following air contaminants: sulfur
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, PM10, ozone, or volatile organic compounds;

.
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(b) its actual emissions are less than 500 pounds per year of any hazardous air pollutant and less than 2000 pounds per
year of any combination of hazardous air poll utan ts;

(c) its actual emissions are less than 500 pounds per year of any air contaminant not listed in (a)( or (b) above and less
than 2000 pounds per year of any combination of air contaminants not listed in (a) or (b) above.

(d) Air contaminants that are drawn from the environment through equipment in intake air and then are released back to the
environment without chemical change, as well as carbon dioxide, nitrogen, oxygen, argon, neon, helium, krypton, xenon
should not be included in emission calculations when determining applicability under (a) through (c) above.

(2) The owner or operator of a source that is exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order under (I) above shall
no longer be exempt if actual emissions in any subsequent year exceed the emission thresholds in ( l) above. The owner or
operator shall submit a notice of intent under R307-40 l-5 no later than 180 days after the end of the calendar year in which
·the source exceeded the emission threshold.

(3) Small Source Exemption-Registration. The director will maintain a registry of sources that are claiming an exemption
under R307-401-9. The owner or operator of a stationary source that is claiming an exemption under R307-40 l-9 may submit
a written registration notice to the director. The notice shall include the following minimum information:

(a) identifying information, _including company name and address, location of source, telephone number, and name of
plant site manager or point of contact;

(b) a description of the nature of the processes involved, equipment, anticipated quantities of materials used, the type and
quantity of fuel employed and nature and quantity of the finished product;

(c) identification of expected emissions;

(d) estimated annual emission rates;

(e) any control apparatus used; and

(0 typical operating schedule.

(4) An exemption under R307-40l-9 does not affect the requirements of R307-40l-l 7, Temporary Relocation.

(5) A stationary source that is not required to obtain a permit under R307-405 for greenhouse gases, as defined in R307-405-3(9)
(a), is not required to obtain an approval order for greenhouse gases under R307-40 I. This exemption does not affect the
requirement to obtain an approval order for any other air contaminant emitted by the stationary source.
R307-401- l 0. Source Category Exemptions.
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The following source categories described in ( l) through (5) below are exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval
order. The general provisions in R307-40l-4 shall apply to these sources.

( l) Fuel-burning equipment in which combustion takes place at no greater pressure than one inch of mercury above ambient
pressure with a rated capacity of less than five million BTU per hour using no other fuel than natur~l gas or LPG or other mixed
gas that meets the standards of gas distributed by a utility in accordance with the rules of the Public Service Commission of the
State of Utah, unless there are emissions other than combustion products.

(2) Comfort heating equipment such as boilers, water heaters, air heaters and steam generators with a rated capacity of less than
one million BTU per hour if fueled only by fuel oil numbers l-6,

(3) Emergency heating equipment, using coal or wood for fuel, with a rated capacity less than 50,000 BTU per hour.

(4) Exhaust systems for controlling steam and heat that do not contain combustion products.
R307-401-l l. Replacement-in-Kind Equipment.

( l) Applicability. Existing process equipment or pollution control equipment that is covered by an existing approval order or
State Implementation Plan requirement may be replaced using the procedures in (2) below if:

(a) the potential to emit of the process equipment is the same or lower;

(b) the number of emission points or emitting units is the same or lower;

(c) no additional types of air contaminants are emitted as a result of the replacement;

(d) the process equipment or pollution control equipment is identical to or functionally equivalent to the replaced
equipment;

(e) the replacement does not change the basic design parameters of the process unit or pollution control equipment;

(f) the replaced process equipment or pollution control equipment is permanently removed from the stationary source,
otherwise permanently disabled, or permanently barred from operation;

(g) the replacement process equipment or pollution control equipment does not trigger New Source Performance Standards
or National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants under 42 U .S.C. 7411 or 74 l 2; and

(h) the replacement of the control apparatus or process equipment does not violate any other provision of Title R307.
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(2) Replacement-in-Kind Procedures.

(a) In lieu of filing a notice of intent under R307-401-5, the owner or operator of a stationary source shall submit a written
notification to the director before replacing the equipment. The notification shall contain a description of the replacementin-kind equipment, including the control capability of any control apparatus and a demonstration that the conditions of
( l ) above are met.

(b) If the replacement-in-kind meets the conditions of (l) above, the director will update the source's approval order and
notify the owner or operator. Public review under R307-401-7 is not required for the update to the approval order.

(3) If the replaced process equipment or pollution control equipment is brought back into operation, it shall constitute a new
emissions unit.
R307-401-12. Reduction in Air Contaminants.

( l) Applicability. The owner or operator of a stationary source of air contaminants that reduces or eliminates air contaminants
is exempt from the requirement to submit a notice of intent and obtain an approval order prior to construction if:

(a) the project does not increase the potential to emit of any air contaminant or cause emissions of any new air contaminant,
and
,:,
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(b) the director is notified of the change and the reduction of air contaminants is made enforceable through an approval
order in accordance with (2) below.

(2) Notification. The owner or operator shall submit a written description of the project to the director no later than 60 days
after the changes are made. The director will update the source's approval order or issue a new approval order to include the
project and to make the emission reductions enforceable. Public review under R307-40 I-7 is not required for the update to
the approval order.
R307-401-13. Plantwide Applicability Limits.
A plantwide applicability limit under R307-405-2 l does not exempt a stationary source from the requirements of R307-40 I.
R307-401-14. Used Oil Fuel Burned for Energy Recovery.

( l) Definitions.
"Boiler" means boiler as defined in R3 l5-l-l(b).
'"Used Oil" is defined as any oil that has been refined from crude oil, used, and, as a result of such use contaminated by physical
or chemical impurities.
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(2) Boilers burning used oil for energy recovery are exempted from the requirement to obtain an approval order in R307-401-5
through 8 if the following requirements are met:

(a) the heat input design is less than one million BTU/hr;

(b) contamination levels of all used oil to be burned do not exceed any of the following values:

(i) arsenic-5 ppm by weight,

(ii) cadmium-2 ppm by weight,

(iii) chromium-IO ppm by weight,

(iv) lead-100 ppm by weight,

(v) total halogens-1,000 ppm by weight,

(vi) Sulfur-0.50% by weight; and

(c) the flash point of all used oil to be burned is at least l 00 degrees Fahrenheit.

(3) Testing. The owner or operator shall test each load of used oil received or generated as directed by the director to ensure it
meets these requirements. Testing may be performed by the owner/operator or documented by test reports from the used fuel
oil vendor. The flash point shall be measured using the appropriate ASTM method as required by the director. Records for
used oil consumption and test reports are to be kept for all periods when fuel-burning equipment is in operation. The records
shall be kept on site and made available to the director or the director's representative upon request. Records must be kept for
a three-year period.
R307-401-15. Air Strippers and Soil Venting Projects.

(I) The owner or operator of an air stripper or soil venting system that is used to remediate contaminated groundwater or soil is
exempt from the notice of intent and approval order requirements of R307-401-5 through 8 if the following conditions are met:

(a) the estimated total air emissions of volatile organic compounds from a given project are less than the de minimis
emissions listed in R307-401-9(l)(a). and

(b) the level of any one hazardous air pollutant or any combination of hazardous air pollutants is below the levels listed
in R307-4 l 0-5( I )(c)(i)(C).
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(2) The owner or operator shall submit documentation that the project meets the exemption requirements in R307-40 l-15( I)
to the director prior to beginning the remediation project.

(3) After beginning the soi I remediation project, the owner or operator shall submit emissions information to the director to verify
that the emission rates of the volatile organic compounds and hazardous air pollutants in R307-401-15( l) are not exceeded.

(a) Emissions estimates of volatile organic compounds shall be based on test data obtained in accordance with the test
method in the EPA document SW-846, Test #8260c or 8261a, or the most recent EPA revision of either test method if
approved by the director.

(b) Emissions estimates of hazardous air pollutants shall be based on test data obtained in accordance with the test method
in EPA document SW-846, Test #8021 B or the most recent EPA revision of the test method if approved by the director.

(c) Results of the test and calculated annual quantity of emissions of volatile organic compounds and hazardous air
pollutants shall be submitted to the director within one month of sampling.

(d) The test samples shall be drawn on intervals of no less than twenty-eight days and no more than thirty-one days (i.e.,
monthly) for the first quarter, quarterly for the first year, and semi-annually thereafter or as determined necessary by the
director.

(4) The following control devices do not require a notice of intent or approval order when used in relation to an air stripper or
soil venting project exempted under R307-401-15:

(a) thermodestruction unit with a rated input capacity of less than five million BTU per hour using no other auxiliary fuel
than natural gas or LPG, or

(b) carbon adsorption unit.
R307-401-16. De minimis Emissions From Soil Aeration Projects.
An owner or operator of a soil remediation project is not subject to the notice of intent and approval order requirements of
R307-401-5 through 8 when soil aeration or land farming is used to conduct a soil remediation, if the owner or operator submits
the following information to the director prior to beginning the remediation project:

( l) documentation that the estimated total air emissions of volatile organic compounds, using an appropriate sampling method,
from the project are less than the de minimis emissions listed in R307-40l-9(l)(a);

(2) documentation that the levels of any one hazardous air pollutant or any combination of hazardous air pollutants are less
than the levels in R307-4 I 0-5( I )(d); and

(3) the location of the remediation and where the remediated material originated.
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R307-40 l-17. Temporary Relocation.
The owner or operator of a stationary source previously approved under R307-40 l may temporarily relocate and operate the
stationary source at any site for up to 180 working days in any calendar year not to exceed 365 consecutive days, starting from
the initial relocation date. The director will evaluate the expected emissions impact at the site and compliance with applicable
Title R307 rules as the bases for determining if approval for temporary relocation may be granted. Records of the working days
at each site, consecutive days at each site, and actual production rate shall be submitted to the director at the end of each 180
calendar days. These records shall also be kept on site by the owner or operator for the entire project, and be made available for
review to the director as requested. R307-40 l-7, Public Notice, does not apply to temporary relocations under R307-401-17.
R307-401-18. Eighteen Month Review.
Approval orders issued by the director in accordance with the provisions of R307-401 will be reviewed eighteen months after the
date of issuance to determine the status of construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment. If a continuous
program of construction, installation, modification, relocation or establishment is not proceeding, the director may revoke the
approval order.
R307-401-1 9. General Approval Order.

{l) The director may issue a general approval order that would establish conditions for similar new or modified sources of the
same type or for specific types of equipment. The general approval order may apply throughout the state or in a specific area.

(a) A major source or major modification as defined in R307-403, R307-405, or R307-420 for each respective area is not
eligible for coverage under a general approval order.

(b) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-403-5 is not eligible for coverage under a general approval order.

(c) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-4 l 0-4 is not eligible for coverage under a general approval order
unless a demonstration that meets the requirements of R307-4 l 0-4 was conducted.

(d) A source that is subject to the requirements of R307-4 l0-5( I )(c)(ii) or (iii) is not eligible for coverage under a general
approval order.

(2) A general approval order shall meet all applicable requirements of R307-401-8.

(3) The public notice requirements in R307-40l-7 shall apply to a general approval order except that the director will advertise
the notice of intent in a newspaper of statewide circulation.

(4) Application.

(a) After a general approval order has been issued, the owner or operator of a proposed new or modified source may apply
to be covered under the conditions of the general approval order.
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(b) The owner or operator shall submit the application on forms provided by the director in lieu of the notice of intent
requirements in R307-40 l-5 for all equipment covered by the general approval order.

(c) The owner or operator may request that an existing, individual approval order for the source be revoked, and that it
be covered by the general approval order.

(d) The owner or operator that has applied to be covered by a general approval order shall not initiate construction,
modification, or relocation until the application has been approved by the director.

(5) Approval.

(a) The director will review the application and approve or deny the request based on criteria specified in the general
approval order for that type of source. If approved, the director will issue an authorization to the applicant to operate under
the general approval order.

(b) The public notice requirements in R307-401-7 do not apply to the approval of an application to be covered under the
general approval order.

(c) The director will maintain a record of all stationary sources that are covered by a specific general approval order and
this record will be available for public review.

(6) Exclusions and Revocation.

(a) The director may require any source that has applied for or is authorized by a general approval order to submit a notice
of intent and obtain an individual approval order under R307-401-8. Cases where an individual approval order will be
required include, but are not limited to, the following:

(i) the director determines that the source does not meet the criteria specified in the general approval order;

(ii) the director determines that the application for the general approval order did not contain all necessary information
to evaluate applicability under the general approval order;

(iii) modifications were made to the source that were not authorized by the general approval order or an individual
approval order;

(iv) the director determines the source may cause a violation of a national ambient air quality standard; or
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(v) the director determines that one is required based on the compliance history and current compliance status of the
source or applicant.

(b)(i) Any source authorized by a general approval order may request to be excluded from the coverage of the general
approval order by submitting a notice of intent under R307-40l-5 and receiving an individual approval order under
R307-401-8.

(ii) When the director issues an individual approval order to a source subject to a general approval order, the
applicability of the general approval order to the individual source is revoked on the effective date of the individual
approval order.

(7) Modification of General Approval Order. The director may modify, replace, or discontinue the general approval order.

(a) Administrative corrections may be made to the existing version of the general approval order. These corrections are to
correct typographical errors or similar minor administrative changes.

(b) All other modifications or the discontinuation of a general approval order shall not apply to any source authorized
under previous versions of the general approval order unless the owner or operator submits an application to be covered
under the new version of the general approval order. Modifications under R307-40 l- l 9(7)(b) shall meet the public notice
requirements in R307-401-l 9(3).

(c) A general approval order shall be reviewed at least every three year. The review of the general approval order shall
follow the public notice requirements of R307-401-19(3 ).

(8) Modifications at a source covered by a general approval order. A source may make modifications only as authorized
by the approved general approval order. Modifications outside the scope authorized by the approved general approval order
shall require a new application for either an individual approval order under R307-401-8 or a general approval order under
R307-401-l 9.

Credits
KEY: air pollution, permits, approval orders, greenhouse gases
August 7, 2014
Notice of Continuation June 6, 2012
19-2-104(3)(q)
19-2-108

Current through January l, 2015.

(·,'::_~.:[..3·.-·~· . . .

,e·1:

R307-401. Permit: New and Modified Sources., UT ADC R307-401

. U.A.C. R307-401, UT ADC R307-401
End of Document

{; 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original L'.S. Govemmt::nt Works.

@

@

@

WestlawNext

,.

..

~

..

..

ADDENDUMB
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order Regarding Petitioners'
Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
In the Matter of:
Approval Order No. DAQE-ANI0l230041-13
Holly Refining & Marketing Company Woods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No. NI 0 I 23-004 I

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND PROPOSED ORDER
REGARDING PETITIONERS'
MOTION REQUESTING ST AY OF
APPROVAL ORDER
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall
March 25, 2014

This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code
Ann.,§ 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7.

Procedural Background
On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality ("Director")
issued approval order DAQE-AN 101230041- I 3 (Project Number N 10123-0041) (the "AO" or
""Permit") to Holly Refining and Marketing Company, Woods Cross LLC ('"Holly"), authorizing
the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude Processing Project ("'Expansion Project").
On December 18, 2013, Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and FRIENDS of
Great Salt Lake (collectively "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action seeking
administrative review of the AO, pursuant to Utah Code§§ 19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b), (3)
and Utah Adm in. Code R305-7-203.
On December 24, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum
requesting a stay of the AO. pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R305-7-2l 7 and Utah Code Ann.§
I 9-1-301.5. However, because Utah Physicians had not been granted party status and no ALJ
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had yet been appointed to this matter, the time for responding to the motion to stay did not begin
to run at that time.
On January 16, 2014, I entered an Order on Petition to Intervene, provisionally granting
intervention to Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of Great Salt Lake
( collectively, "Petitioners"). On the same date, I entered a Notice of Further Proceedings.
Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21,
2014 ("Stay Motion"). I deemed that the date of the filing of the corrected motion for stay
triggered a new response period for Respondents. The Stay Motion is the subject of the present
Proposed Order.
Pursuant to the Utah Code, whenever a motion to stay is filed in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding, "'the administrative law judge shall: (i) consider a party's motion to
stay a permit during a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii) submit a proposed
determination on the stay to the executive director." Section 19-1-301.5(15)(c), Utah Code Ann.
Following briefing on the Stay Motion, I granted Respondents' motion for oral argument,
with oral argument being held on March 6, 2014. All parties appeared and participated in oral
argument, which was of record through a court reporter.
Having heard argument on the Stay Motion, and being fully advised in the premises, and
pursuant to Section 19-1-301.5( 15)(c ), Utah Code Ann., this tribunal enters the following
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and proposed determination that the
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Environmental Quality ('~DEQ") deny Petitioners'
Stay Motion for the reasons set forth herein.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

Regulatory Background

I.

Air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at 009140-

48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.]
2.

In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act. the Utah Legislature declared: "It is

the policy of this state and the purpose of [the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and
' ::.)
vu

maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety, and to the greatest
degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and
convenience of the people. promote the economic and social development of this state, and
facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state:' Section 19-2-10 I (2), Utah Code
Ann.
3.

The Utah Legislature further declared that the ··purpose·' of the Utah Air

Conservation Act is to ··(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution
prevention. abatement. and control; (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities
among the state and local units of government; (c) facilitate cooperation across jurisdictional
lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions~ and (d)
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state." Section 19-2-10 l (4),
Utah Code Ann.

4.

Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act, the Congress found, among other things:
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including
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injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and]
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments ....
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a).
5.

Congress also stated that the "primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to "encourage

or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 740 I (c).

Permit Chronology
6.

In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC

("Holly") submitted a notice of intent ("NOT") to DAQ requesting an approval order to expand
its Woods Cross refinery and modernize certain equipment in a way that allowed Holly to
process an additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern
Utah ('"May NOi"). [May NOi at IR000049-001108.]
7.

In response to DAQ's request to provide additional information, Holly re-

submitted its NOT in July of 2012 ("July NOi"). [July NOi at IR002798-003590.]
8.

Following its technical and legal evaluation of the July NOT and related evidence,

DAQ released for public comment an Intent to Approve ("First ITA"), dated November 28,
2012. The First ITA included a draft Approval Order. [First ITA at IR001967-001996.]
9.

During the initial 60-day public comment period, DAQ received comments from

Western Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment ("UPHE")
and Friends of Great Salt Lake (''Friends") [IR004007-004035], Blaine Rawson on behalf of
Mark J. Hall [IR004202-004217], Alexander Sagady on behalf of UPHE [IR009046-009135],
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the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR004001-004005], and Holly [IR00375700391 O].
l 0.

In April 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis in a revised NOL [Revised

NOi at IR007335-007395.]
11.

In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOi estimated PM2.s emissions

from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA's National Emission Inventory
("NEI") data. [Id]
12.

Following its technical and legal evaluation of the Revised NOi and related

evidence, DAQ released, on June 5, 2013, for a second public comment period an Intent to
Approve document ("Second ITA") and a Source Plan Review C'SPR"). [Second ITA at
IR007498-007499, SPR at IR008480-008575.]
13.

On July 25, 2013, DAQ received comments on the draft approval order from

Western Resource Advocates on behalfUPHE [IR007842-007997], Blaine Rawson on behalf of
Mark J. Hall [IR008579-008602], Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046009135], the EPA [IR007840-00784 I], and Holly [IR007613-007836].
14.

Following its review and evaluation of the foregoing information and comments,

on November 6, 2013, DAQ requested additional information from Holly that DAQ believed
was necessary in order to fully consider the pending comments and evidence. Holly responded
to DAQ' s request for additional information on November 7, 2013. [IR00802 l, IR0080220052.]
15.

After considering the supplemental information provided by Holly, on November

18, 2013, DAQ issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the
Modernization Project C'Holly AO"). [Holly AO at IR009223-009254.]
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16.

Concurrently therewith, DAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum

(""Response Memorandum") that addressed the comments made during the public comment
periods, explained DAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate, described how
the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response Memorandum at IR009 I 74009222.]
17.

On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their Request for Agency Action. On

January 22, 2014, Petitioners filed their Amended Motion and Memorandum Requesting a Stay
of the Approval Order. Oral argument was held on the Stay Motion on March 6, 2014.

DAO's Permit Review
18.

In their Stay Motion, Petitioners challenge three portions of the Holly AO: (I) the

µse of the NEI emission factors to estimate PM 2_5 emissions from Holly's new gas-fired heaters
and boilers; (2) the calculated coke bum rate for Holly's proposed Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit
("FCC Unit 25"), and (3) the calculated reduction of PM 2_5 emissions from the removal of
Holly's existing propane pit flare. [Stay Motion, p. 15-37.]
19.

DAQ determined that use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM2s

emissions from the new heaters and boilers was appropriate because (1) there was substantial
evidence in the record supporting the accuracy of these emission factors to estimate PM
emissions from gas-fired heaters and boilers, as explained in the two reports from Glenn England
[See Glen England Reports at IR007238-007258, IR008024-008044; see also Response

Memorandum at IR009215-0092 l 6]; (2) DAQ had imposed a stack testing requirement in the
Holly AO to verify that the emission factors were an accurate representation of actual emissions
[Response Memorandum at IR008129-008 l 31 ]; and (3) DAQ imposed a limit derived from the
NEI factors into the final Holly AO that is binding on Holly during all operations of the Woods

6

AD.1010803

Cross refinery [Holly AO, Section 11.B.7.a.2 at IR009248; see also Response Memorandum at
IR009217].
20.

DAQ determined that regardless of whether there were other alternative emission

factor calculations for heaters and boilers that yielded higher estimates, Holly would be subject
to an enforceable PM 10 emission limit of 0.00051 lb/MMBtu, derived from the NEI emission
factors. [See Response Memorandum IR008130.] DAQ reasoned that any failure by Holly to
comply with that emission limit would result in compliance violations, which would ensure that
Holly would not contribute a significant increase of PM as a result of the expansion. [Id.]
21.

DAQ determined that 40 C.F.R. § 60.14 did not require the use of the older AP-42

emission factors, as Petitioners argued, to calculate Holly's PM2 5 emissions from the heaters and
boilers because that regulation only applies to determining applicability of the New Source
Performance Standards, "which [is] separate from the New Source Review regulations that are
relevant to this permitting process." [Response Memorandum at IR008l30.] Moreover "EPA
guidance states that sources other than the AP-42 emission factors may be used in determining
emissions for PSD/NSR emissions ... including '[e]mission factors from technical literature."'

[Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual,
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October
1990 at A.22).]
22.

With respect to the PM 2_5 emission reduction of2. I 9 tons per year (""tpy") from

the decommissioning of Holly's propane pit flare, which Petitioners claimed was inaccurately
high, the Revised NOi reflects that Holly and DAQ calculated this emission reduction using the
actual emission inventory data on file at DAQ for the years 2008 and 2009. [Revised NOi at
IR007339; Response Memorandum at IR0092 I 8 ('"flare emissions came from the UDAQ

7

ADJ010804

inventory record for reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and
actual throughput data").]
23.

As to the coke bum rate for Holly's proposed FCC Unit 25, which Petitioners

claimed was inaccurately low, the emission calculations Holly provided to DAQ indicate that the
rate was calculated based on actual emission data from the current FCC Unit 4, a larger unit than
the proposed FCC Unit 25, and thus was a conservatively high estimate of expected emissions
from the FCC Unit 25. [IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4
processes 8,880 barrels per day ("'bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500
bpd.]
24.

Regardless of the coke bum rate, DAQ concluded that the FCC Unit 25 is subject

to a specific PM 10 limit of 0.301b/1000 lb. of coke burned, which is limited by the 8,500 bpd
operating capacity, and is also subject to the overall PM 10 emission cap of 47.5 tpy and 0.13 tons
per day ("tpd") for combustion sources. [Response Memorandum at IR009219.] "If these
limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies the problem with
additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these limits." [Id.]
25.

DAQ rejected Petitioners' calculation of coke bum based on the Universal Oil

Products yield estimates because they "provided no documents or primary data to support or
detail [] which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested range of coke bum estimates."
[Response Memorandum at IR009219.] "Based on UDAQ's technical experience and
expertise," DAQ determined that ""the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the
quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25." [Id.]
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Impacts of Modernization Proiect Construction
26.

The Conrad Jenson Declaration submitted with Holly's opposition to the Stay

Motion C'Jenson Declaration") is the most recent evidence of Holly's present construction
schedule. In light of the procedural history recited above, the earlier construction timetable
estimates are deemed to be updated by the facts as set forth in the Jenson Declaration, which are
credited and treated as true for the purposes of this proposed order.
27.

According to the Jenson Declaration, Holly's first phase of construction will not

be fully installed and operational until the fall of 2015. [Exhibit A to Holly's Opposition to
Petitioners Motion Requesting Stay of Approval Order ,I 9.]
28.

"[D]uring the construction of Phase I, there will not be any increase in emissions

until completion of Phase I in the fall of2015." [Id. ,I 10.]
29.

As confirmed by the parties during oral argument, this permit review adjudicative

proceeding is expected to be fully briefed by July 9, 2014. [See Corrected Stipulated Order
Regarding Response to Request for Agency Action and Subsequent Deadlines, dated February
19.2014.] Oral argument likely will be scheduled before the end of July 2014 and a
recommended order will likely be prepared for the Executive Director as soon as possible after
oral argument, certainly by the end of September 2014. [See Stay Motion Hearing Transcript at
p. 14-16.] During this time, it is undisputed that there will be no increase in emissions from the
Holly refinery due to the Modernization Project, and no emissions for at least a year beyond the
proposed adjudicative proceeding timeline. [Jenson Declaration ,I IO.]
30.

Holly has already incurred approximately $48,000,000 in costs for preliminary

activities in preparation for construction. [Id. ,I 6.]
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31 .

Holly commenced construction on the Expansion Project after receiving the Holly

AO. [Id. 17.]
32.

The overall costs of the Modernization Project are anticipated to be approximately

$700 to $800 million, with approximately $300 million allocated to Phase I and the remaining
approximate $400 to $500 million allocated to Phase II. These estimated costs represent
design/engineering, materials, and construction costs. [Id.
33.

1 11.]

If the Holly AO is stayed and construction stopped, it is undisputed that Holly

'Yould experience significant demobilization and remobilization costs. According to the Jenson
Declaration, the demobilization costs include hourly pay rates for the remaining contract workers
who will need to secure construction equipment and the construction site safely during the stay
period. It also includes costs of equipment storage. Remobilization costs would include similar
expenses for restarting work that had been stopped. If construction is stayed, Holly's main
contractor would charge a minimum of$625,000 per month for such delays. These figures do
not account for lost profits or additional harm of furth~r delay on the overall project schedule.
[Id.

1 13.]
34.

Delays in the Project are directly correlated with lost revenue that Holly would

have generated if it were able to process the increased number of barrels of crude on schedule.
For every month Holly is unable to process additional crude, it anticipates a loss of
approximately $10,000,000. [Id.
35.

1 15.]

During Phase I and Phase II of construction, Holly anticipates up to 500 people at

any given time on site fulfilling construction jobs related to the project. [Id.
36.

1 17.]

After Phase I of the Modernization Project is completed, Holly anticipates a 25%

increase in permanent jobs at the Woods Cross refinery. After completion of Phase II, Holly
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anticipates another 25% increase in permanent jobs. This is a 50% overall increase in permanent
jobs at the refinery. [Id
37.

1 18.]

Overall, the Modernization Project will create a public benefit through job

creation, increased state and local taxes, and capital infusion and investment in Davis County, as
well as benefits from increased crude production within the state of Utah. These benefits will be
delayed or may be lost if Holly is forced to stop construction on the Project. [Id.
38.

1 19.]

The Modernization Project may also result in a number of calculated emission

reductions at the Holly refinery, including a reduction in NOx by 21.53 tpy, a reduction in SO2 by
150.69 tpy, and a reduction in VOC by 17.02 tpy. [IR007575.] DAQ has determined that these
pollutants are precursors to PM 2.5 and major contributors to wintertime inversions in the Salt
Lake Valley. [Utah State Implementation Plan, § IX.A, dated December 4, 2013, § 1.6.]
According to the recent Utah State Implementation Plan for PM 2 .s, reductions in these pollutants
would have the secondary effect ofreducing wintertime PM 2.s levels. [Id.]
39.

Based on the evidence, these emission reductions are the result of voluntary

pollution control strategies that Holly has proposed for the Modernization Project and that are
incorporated in the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also IR007335.]
These reductions fall into five different categories:
a. Holly will install a new wet gas scrubber as part of the new FCC Unit 25 and
will route its existing gas streams that presently are emitted after treatment in
an existing sulfur recovery unit ('"SRU") through that wet gas scrubber,
reducing overall SO2 emissions [See July NOi IR002812, 002821, 002823002824.];
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b. Holly will remove both its propane pit flare and the frozen earth propane pit
storage facility, which will reduce NOx and VOC emissions, respectively [See
July NOi at IR002828, 003035];
c. Holly will replace four gas-driven compressor engines with electric engines,
which will reduce NOx emissions [See Revised NOi at IR007335];
d. Holly will add selective catalytic reduction technology to three current heaters
and boilers, further reducing NOx emissions [See Source Plan Review at
IR00855 l; Holly AO at IR009248]; and
e. Holly will be subject to overall, refinery-wide emissions limitation reductions
for PM10, NOx, and SO2. [See Holly AO at IR009225.]
40.

Based on the evidence of record, if the Holly AO is stayed or remanded, these

emission control strategies will either be delayed or will not be implemented because they are
approved and authorized by the Holly AO. [See SPR at IR008564, IR008568-008569; see also
IR007335.]

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

This is a permit review adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Code § 19-1-

301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7.

2.

The Stay Motion is governed by Section 19-1-301 .5( 15), Utah Code Ann.,

providing:

(a) The filing of a request for agency action does not stay a permit or delay the
effective date of a perm it.

(b) A permit may not be stayed or delayed unless a stay is granted under this
Subsection ( 15).
(c) The administrative law judge shall:
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(i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit during a permit review
adjudicative proceeding~ and
(ii) submit a proposed determination on the stay to the executive director.
(d) The administrative law judge may not recommend to the executive director a
stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless:
(i) all parties agree to the stay; or

(ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm unless
the stay is issued;
(8) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs
whatever damage the proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained
or enjoined;

(C) the stay, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest;
and
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further
adjudication.

3.

In order to prevail on the Stay Motion, Petitioners must satisfy all four of the

statutory elements listed above. Failure to satisfy even one element is fatal to the Stay Motion.

See Utah Med. Prods. Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 231 (Utah 1998).

4.

Petitioners' burden to satisfy the four factors listed above is more stringent under

Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 than under the analogous state (or federal) procedural stay
standards. Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 represents statutory language enacted by the Utah
Legislature. By contrast, the law governing interlocutory relief in state and federal courts is
primarily judge-made common law, guided by procedural rules. In Utah, the rules of civil
procedure do not rise to the level of statutory law but are promulgated and regulated by the Utah
Supreme Court. Section 78A-3-103, Utah Code Ann. The express statutory language provides
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governing stays in permit review adjudicative proceedings states that the ALJ "may not"
recommend a stay of a permit "unless" the moving party establishes all four statutory elements.
By contrast, Rule 65A of the Utah Rule o/Civil Procedure begins with a neutral presumption
and simply provides that a court "may issue" an injunction upon a showing of four elements. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) ("A restraining order or preliminary injunction may issue only upon a
showing that ...."). This permissive language is consistent with the touchstone of interlocutory
relief in state and federal courts: the broad discretion afforded state and federal judges. See

Southwest Stainless, LP v. Sappington, 582 F.3d 1176, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) ('"The district
court's discretion in [granting an injunction] is necessarily broad ...."); Purkey v. Roberts, 2012
UT App 241,121, 285 P.3d 1242 ("Ultimately, the decision of whether to issue an injunction
remains within the discretion of the trial court."). It is also worth noting that the federal courts
of appeals have articulated differing versions of the discretionary, balancing tests applicable to
interlocutory orders. However, these legal tests relate to a trial judge's discretion and are
therefore not directly applicable here in light of the clear and unambiguous requirement in the
Utah Code that the moving party prove the application of all four statutory standards.

5.

Based on the foregoing and without limiting the potential discretion of the

Executive Director in granting preliminary injunctive relief in permit review adjudicative
proceedings, it is clear that the Utah Legislature employed mandatory language that is not found
in the analogous federal and state procedural rules and case law. As a result, the state and federal
cases governing stays and injunctive relief, while important to consider. also apply less stringent
legal standards than the Utah Legislature has directed be applied to the Stay Motion. Analysis of
the following factors is therefore undertaken in light of the more stringent statutory standard
established by the Utah Legislature.
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Irreparable Harm

6.

Irreparable harm being the sine qua non of interlocutory relief, the moving party

has a particularly heavy burden to prove it. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite

Corp., 356 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the irreparable harm factor is the "single
most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction") (internal quotations and
citation omitted); accord, Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983); see also New

York v. NRC, 550 F.2d 745, 753 (2d Cir. 1977). Irreparable harm must be non-speculative and
imminent: there must be evidence supporting a conclusion that irreparable harm will, in fact,
occur if the relief is not granted. See Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Corp., 952 F.2d

8Q2(4 th Cir.1991).
7.

In the context of a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the irreparable harm

must necessarily relate to the period of time between the date of the motion for stay and the final
determination on the merits. This conclusion is particularly important in the instant proceeding,
where no evidentiary hearing or trial is provided. In an analogous situation, Judge Posner wrote:
"When persons harmed by administrative action bring a suit for injunction in a federal district
court, it is not because they want, or are entitled to, a trial." Cronin v. United States Dep 't of

Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990). Rather, he continued, such persons are entitled
to judicial review of the agency action, applying the standard touchstones of administrative law.

Id. After considering the legal standards that might be applied to that case, involving a Forest
Service decision to allow for the cutting of timber on federal land. Judge Posner concluded:
"But all this assumes that the decision whether to grant or deny the preliminary injunction is
preliminary to a full hearing on the plaintiffs claim. If it is not[, then] the two stages are
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collapsed into one because there will never be a fuller hearing .... " Id. at 445. See also

Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F .3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that a
petitioner must show that "the harm ... [is] so imminent as to be irreparable if a court waits until
the end of trial to resolve the harm."). Stated differently, "if a trial on the merits can be
conducted before the injury would occur there is no need for interlocutory relief." 11 A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948. l, at 129
(3d ed. 2013). Such is certainly the case in these proceedings: the decision on the merits will be
rendered prior to the time that the Expansion Project begins operation.
8.

Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that they will suffer

irreparable harm if the Permit is not stayed prior to the time that the review on the merits is
completed in this matter. The record supports the finding that hearing and determination on the
merits in this case will be completed by the end of the summer of 2014, long before the
Expansion Project is operational, being the fall of 2015 at the earliest. [Jenson Declaration ,r 10.]
If Petitioners are successful on their claims on the merits, then the proper remedy would be to
remand to the Director to reconsider the Perm it. In that event, the Petitioner would not have the
Permit necessary to operate the Expansion Project as required by the Utah Air Conservation Act
and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). The requested injunctive relief would therefore be selfenforcing and no claimed irreparable harm could result.' If Petitioners' claims fail on the merits,
then injunctive relief would not be warranted in any event.

1

This conclusion is an important consideration here because the case law cited by Petitioners supporting the Stay
Motion is distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, success on the merits would itself result in a self-enforcing
injunction, inasmuch as the Permit is required in order for Holly to operate the Expansion Project in the first
instance. Thus, this matter is distinguishable from Davis v. Mine ta, 302 F3d 1104 ( I 01h Cir. 2002), where
construction of the highway project in question without proper wetland fill permits under the Clean Water Act may
have caused irreparable harm.
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9.

Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proof that "·bureaucratic

momentum" will result in irreparable harm prior to the time that hearing on the merits is
completed. There is no evidence to support any such conclusion. Moreover, the instant permit
review adjudicative proceeding is easily distinguishable from the cases cited by Petitioners,
supporting their "bureaucratic momentum" argument for irreparable harm. Here, the provisions
of the CAA impose substantive requirements on Holly within the permitting process or upon a
remand. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F .2d 497, 503 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that where a
statute substantively "require[s}the agency to change direction," such as the Clean Water Act at
issue in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 ( 1982), or the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act in Amoco Prod Co. v. Village of Gambell. 480 U.S.531 (I 987),
"bureaucratic commitment to a project" does not constitute irreparable harm). Indeed, the one
case to address the ''bureaucratic commitment" theory in the context of the CAA permitting
process expressly rejected the argument. Sierra Club v. Larsen, 769 F. Supp. 420 (D. Mass.
1991 ), aff'd 2 F.3d 462 ( I st Cir. 1993). The National Environmental Protection Act (""NEPA")
case law upon which Petitioners rely for their ··bureaucratic momentum" argument is simply
inapplicable in this case. See Marsh, 872 F.2d at 503; 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(l) ("No action taken
under the CAA shall be deemed a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act."). Stated
differently, under the CAA, Holly is required to have, maintain, and follow a legal and valid
permit in order to operate the Expansion Project. This scenario is easily distinguishable from a
NEPA situation, where the law requires. and only requires. that full consideration of the
environmental impacts of all applicable options be undertaken and completed before the "federal
action" can be initiated. More specifically, the principle in Sierra Club that a violation of NEPA
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constitutes an irreparable injury rests on NEPA's purpose to foster informed decision-making.

Sierra Club, 872 F.2d at 500. In the context ofNEPA, irreparable harm to the environment,
almost by definition, occurs because uninformed decisionmakers commit themselves to a course
of action that rarely can be undone given "a chain of bureaucratic commitment that will become
progressively harder to undo the longer it continues." Id Such considerations are not applicable
here, where the substantive requirements of the CAA will continue to have prospective
application.

I 0.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to irreparable harm is

dispositive to the Stay Motion. However, analysis of the remaining factors is warranted.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
11.

Petitioners raise three issues in their Stay Motion regarding the merits: (I) the

assertion that DAQ erred in allowing the use of the NEI emission factors to calculate PM 25
emissions from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers; (2) the assertion that Holly overestimated
the PM 2_5 emission reductions that will be realized through the decommissioning of the propane
pit flare; and (3) the assertion that DAQ underestimated the coke bum rate from the FCC Unit
25, which Petitioners argue will result in higher PM 2.5 emissions. [Stay Motion pp. 15-37.]
12.

The merits have not yet been fully briefed and argued by the parties.

13.

DAQ is granted substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules.

See Utah Code § 19-1-3 0 1.5 ( l 4 )(c) (express Iy "'recognizing that [DA Q] has been granted
substantial discretion to interpret its governing statutes and rules"). Moreover, Section 19- 1301.5 instructs that DA Q's factual, technical and scientific determinations should be upheld if
they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( 14 )(c ).
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14.

Solely for purposes of this Recommended Order, I conclude that Petitioners have

failed to carry their burden of showing that they are likely to succeed on the merits, or that the
case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further adjudication.
Carrying this burden here requires a showing that DAQ abused its discretion or lacked
substantial evidence to support its factual, technical and scientific determinations in connection
with the Pennit.
15.

In reaching Conclusion No. 14, I rely in large part on the independent

detennination of EPA that the Permit is acceptable, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections. See
EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-007841]. In Alaska Dep 't of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461. 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state pennitting authorities' BACT
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 7413(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A.
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at 1
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the
objections and issues Petitioners have raised on the merits were deserving of further evaluation,
comment, or reconsideration, EPA had an independent duty and authority to pursue such issues.
EPA declined to do so even after being given the opportunity in connection with the Pennit.
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16.

In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual

situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This
situation provides a second layer ofregulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural
and substantive requirements of the CAA, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air
Conservation Act in the spirit of ~-cooperative federalism," have been met. Solely for purposes
of the Stay Motion, therefore, I conclude that EPA's independent review and acceptance of the
Permit demonstrates that Petitioners do not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
or that the case presents serious issues on the merits, which should be the subject of further
adjudication
17.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden of proof as to success on the merits

should, standing alone, be dispositive of the Stay Motion.

Public Interest
18.

Air pollution is harmful to humans and ecological receptors. Thus, it is self-

evident that the public interest is served by reduction and elimination of air pollution. Under our
system, however, a source's compliance with the requirements set forth in the CAA, as
implemented through the Utah Air Conservation Act and related rules and regulations, satisfies,
as a matter of law, the public policy of protection of human health and the environment from
exposures to air pollution.
19.

Petitioners have failed to make a showing of cognizable harm that will occur

during the pendency of these proceedings unless the Holly AO is stayed. As a result, they have
failed to show that the public interest favors a stay.
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20.

To the extent that a violation of the CAA and other applicable law may have

occurred in connection with the Permit, the instant proceedings will be concluded prior to the
time that the Expansion Project begins operation. And in the event that Petitioners are successful
on the merits, injunctive relief, in a sense, would be self-executing since a valid permit is
required to operate the Expansion Project in the first instance. Hence, I find that the public
interest is adequately protected by compliance with the existing permitting requirements set forth
in the Utah Air Conservation Act and the CAA.
21.

The record also shows that the Holly AO will result in substantial emission

reductions in SO2, NOx, and VOCs, which are precursors to PM pollution along the Wasatch
Front. The Holly AO will also lower refinery-wide emissions limits for PM 10, NOx, and SO2.
Staying the Holly AO will delay implementation of pollution control technologies that will result
in these emission reductions, harming the public interest.

22.

Finally, the public interest also extends to the economic activity, including jobs

the Modernization Project design and construction will generate. This undisputed factor weighs
against the Stay Motion.
23.

Petitioners' failure to establish that the Stay Motion is in the public interest should

be dispositive of the Stay Motion.

Balance of Harms
24.

Petitioners have failed to carry their burden to show that the balance of harms tips

in their favor.
25.

The increased emissions about which Petitioners complain will not occur until

after construction is completed in 2015, long after determination on the merits is completed. By
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contrast, a stay would result in the immediate cessation of design and construction activities for
the Expansion Project, resulting in the undisputed harms that are of record.
26 .

Finally, if Petitioners are successful on the merits, injunctive relief would be self-

executing as discussed above. The balance of the harms, therefore, does not tip in Petitioners'
favor.
27.

Petitioners' failure to carry their burden to demonstrate that the balance of harms

tips in their favor should be dispositive of the Stay Motion.

PROPOSED ORDER
Based on the forgoing, I recommend that the Executive Director deny the Stay Motion.
DA TED this 25th day of March, 2014.

BRET F. RANDALL
Administrative Law Judge
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Christian C. Stephens
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Isl Bret F. Randall, ALJ
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ADDENDUMC
Order Adopting AJL' s Proposed Order and Denying Petitioners' Request for Stay

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

ORDER ADOPTING ALJ'S PROPOSED
ORDER

In the Matter of:

and

Approval Order No.
DAQE-AN101230041-13

DENYINGPETITIONERS'REQUEST
FORSTAY

Holly Refining & Marketing CompanyWoods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project Number: Nl0123-0041

Amanda Smith

Executive Director
Department of Environmental Quality
May8,2014

1bis matter is before me based on the Administrative Law Judge's proposed
determination on a motion for stay in this matter. For the reasons set forth herein, I hereby adopt
the March 25, 2014 Proposed Order regarding Petitioners' Motion Requesting Stay of Approval
Order.
Findings of Fact

1. On November 18, 2013, the Director of the Utah Division of Air Quality issued
Approval Order DAQE-AN101230041-13 (Project Number Nl0123-0041) (hereafter "AO") to
Holly Refining and Marketing Company, for the construction of the Heavy Black Waxy Crude
Processing Project
2. On December 18, 2013, Petitioners Utah Physicians for a Health Environment and
Friends of the Great Salt Lake (hereinafter "Utah Physicians") filed a Request for Agency Action
(RFAA) seeking a review of the AO pursuant to Utah Code §§19-1-301.5 and 63G-4-201(1)(b)
and Utah Admin. Code RJ0S-7-203.
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3. On January 9, 2014, I appointed Bret F. Randall as the Administrative Law Judge
(AIJ) in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(5). I charged the ALJ to conduct

a permit review adjudicative proceeding in accordance with Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5 and
Utah Admin. Code R305-7.
4. On December 21, 2013, Utah Physicians filed a motion and supporting memorandum
requesting a stay of the AO pending a full hearing on the merits pursuant to Utah Code ~ ,
§19-1-301.5(15) and Utah Admin. Code R305-7-217. Petitioners filed a Corrected Motion and
Memorandum Requesting Stay on January 21, 2014.

5. Following extensive briefing on the motion to stay by the Parties, the ALJ heard oral
argument on March 6, 2014. The hearing was transcribed by a comt reporter.
6. On March 25, 2014, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §19-1-301.5(15)(c), the AU
issued proposed findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record)
conclusions of law and a proposed order recommending that the Executive Director deny the
petitioners' motion to stay.
7. The ALJ's findings of fact (including references to the initial administrative record)
address the: regulatory background; permit chronology; DAQ's permit review; and impacts of
modernization project construction. The AL.J's conclusions of law address each of the four
statutory elements required for a stay. The required statutory elements were briefed and argued
by the parties at the March 6, 2014 hearing.
8. On April 8, 2014, Utah Physicians submitted comments on the ALJ's proposed order.
The following memoranda were subsequently filed on April 15, 2014 in response to Utah
Physicians' comments: Holly's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on ALJ's
Recommended Order Re: Petitioners' Request for a Stay of Approval Order; and the Utah
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Division of Air Quality's Response to Utah Physicians' Comments on AU's Recommended
Order Regarding Stay of Approval Order.
9. The points raised by Holly and DAQ in response to Utah Physicians' comments
confirm that the comments repeat points previously briefed and argued at the time of the hearing
on the stay. The AU has addressed each of those points in his proposed order.

Conclusions of Law
10. Whenever a motion to stay is filed in a permit review adjudicative proceeding, the
ALJ shall: (i) consider a party's motion to stay a permit review adjudicative proceeding; and (ii)
submit a proposed determination on the stay to the Executive Director. Utah Code Ann., §19-1,·:.\

ViJI

301.5(15)(C).
11. Utah Code Ann., §191-301.S(lS)(d) provides that the AU may not recommend to
the executive director a stay of a permit, or a portion of a permit, unless: (i) all parties agree to
the stay; or (ii) the party seeking the stay demonstrates that:
(A) the party seeking the stay will suffer irreparable harm ~ess the stay is issued;
(B) the threatened injury to the party seeking the stay outweighs whatever damage the
proposed stay is likely to cause the party restrained or enjoined;

(C) the stay, if issued would not be adverse to the public interest; and
(D) there is a substantial likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the

merits of the underlying cl~ or the case presents serious issues on the merits, which
should be the subject of further adjudication.
The Parties did not stipulate to a stay and the Petitioners must, therefore, demonstrate
compliance with all of the four statutory elements.
12. The AU' s findings of fact and conclusions of law address each of the elements
necessary for a stay and establish that based on the record then before the AU, the Petitioners
have failed to carry their burden of proof on the statutory elements required for a stay.
3
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-Order
I have reviewed the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and proposed
determination. I have also reviewed the comments and responses to comments submitted by the
parties regarding the AU' s proposed determination. Based on the ALJ's review and evaluation, I
am persuaded that the petitioners have failed to meet the statutory elements required for a stay. I
therefore adopt the AIJ's findings of fact, conclusions oflaw and proposed order, and I deny the
Petitioners' motion for stay.
Dated this 8th day of May, 2014

~56

Amanda Smith, Executive Director
Department of Environmental Quality
195 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-4810
amandasmith@utab.gov
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Cheylynn Hayman, Holly Refining
chayman@parrbrown.com
Meg~ Houdeshel, Holly Refining
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com

Christian C. Stephens
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ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL
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Debbie Obemdorfer
Executive Assistant
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ADDENDUMD
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AL QUALITY
In the Matter of:
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13
Holly Refining & Marketing CompanyWoods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No. N 10123-0041

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND RECOMMENDED
ORDER ON THE MERITS
Administrative Law Judge Bret F. Randall
March I 1, 20 15

This matter is before me pursuant to appointment by the Executive Director of the Utah
Department of Environmental Quality dated January 9, 2014. The appointment charges me to
conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code
Ann.,§ 19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Code R305-7. Following are my Findings ofFact, 1
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits.

1

While the Utah Code directs me to provide "findings of fact," I note that my review of this matter is in an appellate
capacity. There was no trial, no witnesses were called, no testimony was heard, and no evidence was presented to
me as a trier of fact. Thus, the legislature's requirement that the ALJ provide "findings of fact" and a proposed
dispositive action should not be read to suggest that I have weighed evidence, except in an appellate-like role,
applying the standards of review as discussed below.
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INTRODUCTION
This matter came before me for oral argument on September 17, 2014 at 9:30 am.
Present at the argument was Joro Walker and Rob Dubuc on behalf of Petitioners; Christian
Stephens for Respondent Division of Air Quality; and Steve Christiansen, David Reymann,
Cheylynn Hayman, and Megan Houdeshel for Respondent Holly. Having reviewed the briefing
in this matter and heard oral argument, I propose that Petitioners' Request for Agency Action
and all claims asserted therein be rejected.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

In May of 2012, Holly Refining & Marketing Company- Woods Cross, LLC

("Holly") submitted a notice of intent ('"May NOi") to the Utah Division of Environmental
Quality ("UDAQ") requesting an approval order to expand its Woods Cross refinery ("Holly
Refinery") and modernize certain equipment in a way that would allow Holly to process an
additional 20,000 barrels per day of black wax crude from the Uintah Basin in eastern Utah
("·Modernization Project"). [May NOi, IR000049-001108].
2.

In July of 2012, Holly re-submitted its May NOi with revisions in response to

UDAQ's request for additional information ("July NOi"). [July NOi, IR002798-003590].
3.

On November 28, 2012, UDAQ released for public comment an Intent to

Approve document ("First IT A") containing a draft approval order. [First IT A, IR00 1967001996].
4.

During the initial 60-day public comment period, UDAQ received comments

from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") [IR00400l-004005]; Western
Resource Advocates on behalf of Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment and Friends of
Great Salt Lake (collectively '"Petitioners") [IR004007-004035]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of
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Mark J. Hall [IR004202-0042 I 7]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners [IR009046009 I 35]; and Holly [IR003757-00391 O].
5.

In February and March of 2013, Holly provided a detailed response to EPA

relating to the EPA's comments referenced above, which objected (among other things) to
Holly's original netting analysis. [IR008245-008259].
6.

In March 2013, Holly submitted a new netting analysis partly in response to a

specific request made by UDAQ in February of2013 and partly in response to EPA's comments
referenced above [IR008198-008259].
7.

In April 2013, Holly formally submitted a revised NOi (''Revised NOi'') to

UDAQ that also included the new netting analysis. [Revised NOi at IR007335-007395].
8.

In addition to certain other changes, the Revised NOi estimated PM2.s emissions

from Holly's gas-fired heaters and boilers based on the EPA 's National Emission Inventory
("NE I") data. [Id.]
9.

On June 5, 2013, UDAQ released for a second public comment period an Intent to

Approve document ('"Second IT A") and a Source Plan Review. [Second IT A, IR00008449008479; SPR, IR008480-008575].
I 0.

On July 25.2013, UDAQ received comments on the draft approval order in the

Second ITA from EPA ("EPA's Second Comment Letter") [IR007840-007841]; Western
Resource Advocates on behalf Petitioners (''Petitioners' Second Comment Letter") [IR007842007997]; Blaine Rawson on behalf of Mark J. Hall ("Rawson's Second Comment Letter")
[IR008579-008602]; Alexander Sagady on behalf of Petitioners ('"Sagady's Second Comment
Letter") [IR009046-009 l 35]; and Holly ("'Holly's Second Comment Letter") [IR0076 l 3007836].
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11.

On November 6, 2013, UDAQ requested additional information from Holly

pertaining to certain comments raising questions about the Second ITA and Holly responded to
this request for supplemental information on November 7, 2013. [IR00802 I, IR008022-0052].
12.

On November 18, 2013, UDAQ issued a Response to Comments Memorandum

("Response to Comments Memo") addressing all of the comments made during the second
public comment period, explained UDAQ's response to those comments, and, where appropriate,
described how the comments had been incorporated into the Holly AO. [Response to Comments
Memo, IR0091 74-009222].
13.

UDAQ, having considered and answered all of the comments received during the

public comment period, issued Holly a new approval order authorizing the construction of the
Modernization Project C~Holly AO"), on November 18, 2013. [Holly AO, IR009223-009254].
14.

On December 18, 2013, Petitioners filed their Request for Agency Action

contesting UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO ("RAA'').
15.

In January 9, 2014, the Executive Director ofUDAQ appointed me as the

administrative law judge ("ALJ") to conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding in this
matter in accordance with Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 and Utah Adm in. Code R305-7.
16.

On January 16, 2014, I issued a Notice of Further Proceedings, in which, among

other things, ordered that the party with the burden of proof on any issue would be held to a
stringent marshaling requirement ('"Marshaling Requirement").
17.

On January 22, 2014, Petitioners filed an Amended Motion and Memorandum

Requesting a Stay of the Approval Order ('"Motion for Stay"). Oral argument was held on the
Motion for Stay on March 6, 2014.
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18.

On March 25, 2014, I recommended to the Executive Director of the Department

of Environmental Quality ("Executive Director") deny the Motion for Stay finding that
Petitioners had not satisfied the four factors required for issuance of a stay of an environmental
permit.
19.

On May 8, 2014, the Executive Director of the Department of Environmental

Quality adopted my proposed order and denied the Motion for Stay.
20.

Prior to briefing the merits, Holly and UDAQ submitted Motions to Dismiss

certain issues in Petitioners' RAA.
21.

On April 2, 2014, I denied without prejudice the Motions to Dismiss, finding at

that time that "preservation issues would be most efficiently addressed in connection with
briefing on the merits," which would afford a reviewing court "a more complete record for
appellate review." [Order on Motions to Dismiss at 6-7].
22.

On April 16, 2014, the Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification Regarding

Notice of Further Proceedings, in which they asked me to clarify the Marshaling Requirement
imposed by the Notice of Further Proceedings.
23.

On April 17, 2014, I issued an Order Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement

(''Clarification Order") reiterating that the Petitioners bear the burden to marshal all of the
evidence in the administrative record, both supportive of and contrary to their claims.
24.

On September 12, 2014, I issued a subsequent Order regarding the Marshaling

Requirement, clarifying further the Petitioners' burden of proof in light of the Utah Supreme
Court decision in State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT I 0, 326 P.3d 645. In that Order, I explained that
Petitioners were required to marshal all of the evidence in the administrative record to carry their
burden of proof on any particular issue.
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25.

On September 17, 2014, after receiving briefs on the merits from all the parties, I

heard oral argument to hear the merits of Petitioners' RAA, as required by the Utah Code. After
reviewing and considering all of the facts and arguments presented in the briefing and at oral
argument and pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(12)(c), I hereby submit to the Executive
Director the following Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Proposed Order
Regarding the Merits.

LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS ADJUDICATION

I.

Standard of Review
1.

This permit review adjudicative proceeding is governed by Utah Code Section 19-

1-301.5, which requires the presiding ALJ to '"conduct a permit review adjudicative proceeding
based only on the administrative record and not as a trial de novo." Utah Code § 19-1301 .5(8)(a). Unlike many other administrative proceedings involving an ALJ, in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding it is clear that the Utah Legislature intended to limit the ALJ's authority
to a review of UDAQ's decision, thereby placing the ALJ in an appellate-like review role. There
is to be no trial. There will be no witnesses. no examination or cross examination, and no
findings of fact where disputed testimony is weighed and where witness credibility is at issue, as
often occurs in other administrative adjudicative proceedings. Rather, all of the weighing of the
evidence has already occurred at the UDAQ level.
2.

UDAQ prepared a written response to public comments in connection with the

issuance of the Holly AO. [IR009174-9222]. The ALJ must "'review ... the director's
determination, based on the record," culminating in a proposed dispositive action that includes
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended order. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( l 2)(b )(c ). Because these proceedings are, by definition, limited to the issues raised during the public
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comment period, UDAQ's written response to public comments plays a central role in evaluating
whether UDAQ's conclusions satisfy applicable legal requirements.
3.

Petitioners have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the Director's

determination to issue the Holly AO was in error. [Clarification Order at 4 ("Petitioners
acknowledge that they have the burden of proof in this proceeding.")]; see also Taylor v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 2005 UT App 121, *1 (unpublished) ('~In the typical challenge to agency action,
the party challenging the action carries the burden of demonstrating its impropriety." (internal
quotations omitted)).

4.

The Director's determination can include factual findings, interpretations of law,

and mixed determinations of law and facts.

5.

To carry their burden of proof with respect to their challenge of factual findings,

the Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ's findings of fact are not supported by substantial
Q

evidence; otherwise, the ALJ must "uphold all factual technical, and scientific agency
determinations that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole."
Utah Code§ 19-I-301.5(13)(b). 2 Under Utah case law relevant to this proceeding, the ALJ's
review on questions of fact is limited to determining if UDAQ's factual findings "were
reasonable and rational," while giving "great deference" to UDAQ's factual findings and not
"reweighing" the evidence. Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2012

2

While subsection (13)(b) expressly applies directly to the Executive Director's review, the standard of
review that the ALJ is to apply to the record is not expressly stated in the Utah Code. Under a fair reading
of the statute, it is clear that the ALJ is to apply the same standard as the Executive Director is required to
apply. This conclusion is based on a reading of the permit review adjudicative proceeding statute as a
whole. In the first instance, the ALJ's express duty and authority is to undertake a permit review
adjudicatory proceeding and not a trial de novo on the merits, resulting in a recommended ruling for the
Executive Director. In other words, the role of the ALJ is to "stand in the shoes" of the Executive
Director and provide her with a recommended ruling on the merits. Thus, the ALJ is to apply the same
standard ofreview to the administrative record as the Executive Director is required to apply. Utah Code
Ann.§ 19-1- 301.5.
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UT 73, ,r 11, 38 P.3d 291 (hereinafter Sierra Club v. BOGM) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3

While reviewing an agency's determination for substantial evidence, the ALJ should ""state the
facts and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's
findings." Id. ,I 12.

6.

With respect to legal interpretations, the ALJ should grant "substantial discretion"

to UDAQ in its interpretation of its governing statutes and rules. See Utah Code § I 9- l30 l.5( 14)(c)(i). In this case, the governing statutes and rules include the Clean Air Act, the Utah
Air Conservation Act, and the applicable regulations under these statutes. UDAQ's legal
interpretation of these statutes and rules may be overturned only if Petitioners show that such
interpretation is a "clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law." See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73,

,r 10; see also Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas &

Mining, 2001 UT 112, ,r 18, 38 P.3d 291 (an agency's ''interpretation of the operative provisions
of the statutory law it is empowered to administer" must be given deference).
7.

By contrast, UDAQ's general interpretations of the law, including constitutional

questions, jurisdiction, and statutes unrelated to the agency, are granted little or no deference and
are simply reviewed for correctness. Sierra Club, 2012 UT 73, ,I 9; see also Sevier Citizens v.
Dept. ofEnvt. Quality, 2014 UT App 257, ,r 6 (where the statute under review was procedural,
and where issue was interpretation of the statute itself that granted agency interpretive discretion,
the court applied a traditional approach to standard ofreview and imposed a correctness standard

3

Section 19-1-301.5, however, also vests the ALJ with the authority to supplement the
administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § I 9-1-30l.5(8)(c)(iv) (providing that the ALJ "'may
supplement the record with technical or factual information."). Based on these statutory
provisions, if the ALJ determines that UDAQ has not addressed an issue or UDAQ's response
to an issue is inadequate, the ALJ may request additional technical or factual information from
the parties as opposed to recommending a remand of the AOs.
II
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to the question of whether the failure to file a petition to intervene strips the agency of
jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(7)).
8.

Finally, when the agency has been granted discretion to interpret the statute or

regulation at issue, mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. See Murray v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38, ~ 39, 308 P.3d 461. Here, Section
19-1-301.5( 14)(c)(i) expressly grants UDAQ "substantial discretion to interpret its governing
statutes and rules." Agency decisions on mixed questions of law and fact must be upheld under
this discretion standard if they are "rationally based" and set aside only "'if they are imposed
arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason." Assoc. Gen.
Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
II.

Petitioners' Burden of Proof
I.

Petitioners, as the parties challenging UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO,

carry the burden of demonstrating UDAQ's determinations were not supported by substantial
evidence, were erroneous, or were an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT
73,

~

31; Associated Gen. Contractors, 200 I UT 112, ~ 34; Taylor, 2005 UT App 121, * 1 (Utah

Ct. App 1993) (unpublished).
2.

A party with the burden of proof must ''fully identify, analyze, and cite its legal

arguments" and "provide meaningful legal analysis" but may not '"dump the burden of
argument and research" on the reviewing authority. W. Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27,
~

29, 135 P.3d 874 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kennon v. Air Quality Bd.,

2009 UT 77,

~

29, 270 P.3d 417 (declining to review a petitioner's challenge to an AO where

the petitioners failed to adequately brief a claim). Moreover, a party's briefing is inadequate
where the briefing "merely contains bald citations to authority without development of that
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authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ~ 9, 194
P.3d 903 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lamb, 2013 UT App 5, ~ 11,294 P.3d
639.

III.

Petitioners' Duty to Marshal All Relevant Evidence
1.

This tribunal's statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5 requires

this tribunal to conduct this proceeding based only on the administrative record and to uphold
"all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations that are supported by substantial
evidence viewed in light of the record as a whole." Utah Code§ l9-l-301.5(14)(c) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, there will never be a '"trial" on the merits. Rather, UDAQ undertook the
adjudication of Holly's NO Is after receiving and considering, among other things, public
comments.
2.

All of the evidentiary information upon which the Director could have relied is

contained in the formal administrative record as defined by Utah Code Section 19-1301.5(8)(b). For every issue raised in public comments, the Director provided a detailed
written response, which also forms part of the administrative record. Utah Code Ann. § 19-1301.5(8)(b).
3.

The Director's det~iled response to comments provides a specific record as to

how the Director considered and resolved each public comment and also, in some instances,
refers to and provides citation to other evidence in the administrative record upon which the
Director has relied in reaching any given conclusion. Thus, while there is no trial on the merits,
the Director's response to public comments provides a rather detailed '•roadmap" as to the
factual and legal basis for the Director's decision to issue the Holly AO.
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4.

Because Petitioners have the burden of persuasion in this proceeding, the only

way they can possibly carry that burden of proof it to convince the ALJ (or, by extension, the
Executive Director, the Utah Court of Appeals, or the Utah Supreme Court) that any disputed
factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is not supported by substantial evidence
taken from the administrative record as a whole. By extension, therefore, they must marshal all
of the evidence relevant to each claim they assert. See, e.g., Nielsen, 2014 UT I 0, 142. In short,
the Marshaling Requirement forms an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof in this
proceeding. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that "'a party who fails to identify
and deal with supportive evidence will never persuade an appellate court to reverse under the
deferential standard ofreview that applies to such issues." Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,140 (emphasis
added).
5.

In their briefing on the merits and at oral argument, Petitioners raised a number of

objections to the Marshaling Requirement. These objections lack merit. 4 The Marshaling
Requirement was properly imposed, either as an inherent part of Petitioners' burden of proof or,
in the alternative, pursuant to the ALJ's statutory grant of authority to manage all non-dispositive
aspects of these proceedings.
6.

The Utah Legislature has granted the ALJ the jurisdi~tion to "take any action in a

permit review adjudicative proceeding that is not a dispositive action." Utah Code § 19-130 I .5(9)(t). Although the Marshaling Requirement is not specifically adopted in the Utah Code
or Utah Administrative Code as applied to these proceedings and Rule 24(a)(9) does not
expressly apply here, an ALJ has the authorization to manage this proceeding in the most efficient

4

The fact that Holly was able to marshal record evidence, point by point, in the manner that I had
requested of Petitioners, provides further support for the conclusion that Petitioners' arguments against
the Marshaling Requirement lack merit and should be rejected.
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and effective way appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 5 All of the policy reasons
underlying Rule 24(a)(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure apply with full force to a pennit
review adjudicative proceeding.
7.

In an analogous situation, the Utah Court of Appeals declined to undertake an

independent review of a large record. Wright v. Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2
(Utah App. 1990). There, the court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to spare
appellate courts such an onerous burden." Id Hence, the court continued, ''[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the
legal questions before us." Id. The court noted that Rule 24(a)(9) was intended precisely "to
spare appellate courts such an onerous burden." Hence, the court continued, "[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, our review of the record is limited to those specific portions of the
record which have been drawn to our attention by the parties and which are relevant to the
legal questions properly before us." Id. I have applied this same standard to my review of the
administrative record in this proceeding, for the same reasons as stated by the Utah Court of
Appeals. If this rule were not applied to the administrative record in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding, an appellant on future appeal could potentially argue that the
administrative law judge overlooked or failed to consider, under his or her independent review
of the record, certain evidence ofrecord even though that evidence was not specifically drawn

5

It is undisputed that should Petitioners appeal any issue arising from this proceeding to the Utah Court
of Appeals~ Rule 24(a)(9) would apply to their briefs on appeal. Because the administrative law judge
and the Executive Director are called upon to apply the same standard of review to the agency
determinations as the Utah Court of Appeals, it stands to reason that the marshaling requirement should
also apply at the ALJ and Executive Director levels of review. Moreover, Petitioners have been on notice
of this procedural requirement from the outset of this proceeding and did not appeal the ALJ's Order
Clarifying the Marshaling Requirement to the Executive Director. They cannot therefore show undue
burden or prejudice.
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to the attention of the administrative law judge. I find and conclude that the types of
''exceptional circumstances" that may warrant deviation from this rule, as stated in Wright, do
not apply to the present proceedings.6

8.

This conclusion finds further support in Utah case law in the cases cited below,

subject to the clarification that in these cases, the potential for a procedural default upon
failure to marshal the record is not an appropriate result, as held in State v. Nielsen. supra.
However, to the extent that Utah case law regarding the burden of proof and marshaling does
not deal with the procedural default issue rejected in State v. Nelson, it is still good law and
should be considered as being relevant here.

See, e.g., Simmons Media Group, LLC v.

Waykar, LLC, 2014 UT App 145, ~~ 46, 763 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (dismissing a claim where the
appellant "does not identify and deal with the supportive evidence" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Nebeker v. Summit County. 2014 UT App 137, ~ 46, 762 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 ("To
prevail on such a challenge, the County must acknowledge the evidence that supports the
findings and demonstrate 'a basis for overcoming the healthy dose of deference owed to factual
findings"' (quoting Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 ~~ 41-42); Wachocki v. Luna, 2014 UT 139, ~ 11, n.
6, 330 P.3d 717 (holding that because appellants failed to marshal the evidence, appellants did
not carry their burden on appeal); W. Jordan City. 2006 UT 27,

~

29; Heinecke v. Dep 't of

Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that parties fail to meet their
burden to marshal the evidence when they leave "it to the court to sort out what evidence

6

There is simply nothing in the Utah Code to suggest that the administrative law judge in a permit review
adjudicative proceeding has an independent duty to comb through the entire Administrative Record to identify all
relevant facts in support of a disputed factual, technical, and scientific agency determination. particularly where, as
here, Petitioners are represented by experienced and competent legal counsel. To be sure, a more generous standard
of briefing may apply to a permit review adjudicative proceeding where parties appear prose. Because no prose
parties are involved in the instant proceeding, I will not speculate as to the potential applicability of the Marshaling
Requirement in cases where parties are not represented by legal counsel.
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actually supported the finding" and instead argued their "own position without regard for the
evidence supporting the ... findings").
9.

The duty to carry the burden of proof through marshaling must fall to Petitioners

in this permit review adjudicative proceeding, because as a matter of longstanding
administrative law, the party challenging any factual finding underlying an agency's
determination is required to marshal "all" evidence supporting the agency's determination.
Sierra Club v. BOGM, 2012 UT 73, ,r 12; see also Kennon, 2009 UT 77, ,r 27 ("When
challenging factual findings, a party is obligated to marshal 'all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding."' (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9))); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County. 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (In an
appeal of an agency action, "'the party challenging the finding ... must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the finding .").
10.

The duty to marshal the evidence in administrative appeals also applies to

parties challenging an agency's determination on mixed questions of fact and law. Peterson
Hunting v. Labor Comm'n, 2012 UT App 14, ,r 15, 269 P.3d 998; see also United Park City
Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ,r 25, 140 P.3d 1200 ("Even
where the defendants purport to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of
the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the
[appellants] also have a duty to marshal the evidence." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A party obligated to marshal the evidence must do so for each claim that the marshaling
mandate applies. Sierra Club 2012, 2012 UT 73, ,r 30 & n.3 (holding that Petitioners
failed to marshal one claim while determining that the same Petitioners marshaled
another claim). At its core, the marshaling requirement demands that a party "marshal
all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts,
the ... findings are not support by substantial evidence." Id. ,r 30. To do so, the party
may not ''"simply attack [the agency's] credibility."'
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Associated Gen. Contractors. 200 I UT I 12, ~ 34 (quoting Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande W.
R.R., 200 I UT 77, ~ 36, 31 P.3d 557).

11.

In light of the Marshaling Requirement, the ALJ has ordered that Petitioners

were not subject to a page limitation in their briefing on the merits. Rather, the only
requirement has been that the briefing be of reasonable length. Thus, Petitioners have been
afforded every opportunity to carry their burden of proof in this proceeding to convince the
ALJ that any disputed factual, technical, or scientific agency determination is llJJ1. supported by
C,
'1/iil

substantial evidence taken from the administrative record as a whole. In order to meet that
burden of proof, it will be necessary for Petitioners to bring to the tribunal" s attention all
evidence from the administrative record that relates to any such disputed issue.

IV.

Preservation Standard

I.

Pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5( 10), "(a] person who files a request for

agency action has the burden of demonstrating that an issue or argument raised in the requ_est for
agency action has been preserved." Lacking such demonstration, the ALJ "shall dismiss, with
prejudice, any issue or argum-ent in a request for agency action that has not been preserved." Id
2.

An issue or argument has been preserved for appeal if (a) the person raised it

during the public comment period and it was supported with sufficient information or
documentation to enable the director to fully consider the substance and significance of the issue,
Utah Code § 19-1-301.5(4)(a)-(b ); or (b) the issue was not reasonably ascertainable during the
public comment period, id.§ 19-1-30l.5(6)(c).

3.

The failure to raise reasonably ascertainable issues or arguments relating to the

proposed permit during the public comment period deprives UDAQ from considering all
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possible issues prior to any issuance of an approval order and results in less effective agency
process.
4.

The demonstration that each issue has been properly preserved must be found in

the Petitioners' RAA at the outset of the case. See id; see also Utah Adm in. Code R305-7203(3)(h) (mandating that an RAA provide a showing on preservation).
5.

The failure to raise issues in the RAA frustrates the goals of the permit review

adjudicative process by failing to place the respondents on notice of the specific claims. Such
failure prevents UDAQ and Holly from assessing whether it should have supplemented the
record in response to newly presented claims in the RAA. Moreover, by not raising issues in the
RAA and waiting to reveal claims until the briefing, Petitioners prevented Holly from assessing
the full risks of proceeding with construction under an AO subject to a permit challenge.
6.

Any claims not preserved in accordance with the statutory standard set forth

above will be dismissed.
7.

Petitioners raised concerns in their RAA and then again in their Reply Brief about

whether due process had been satisfied where Holly submitted additional information to UDAQ
after the close of the public comment period and Petitioners were not given a second opportunity
to submit comments on this additional material.
8.

First, Petitioners have waived this claim by not briefing it in their opening brief.

Petitioners may not raise claims in their RAA and then wait to address such claims until their
Reply brief. See e.g., Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,

~

9, 17 P.3d 1122

(refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief).
9.

Even if Petitioners' claims regarding procedural due process were not waived and

had merit, which is unclear in light of the fact that Petitioners do not adequately brief this issue,
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fail to cite any case law, or quote from the due process clause of the Utah or United States
Constitution, it is clear that Petitioners were afforded an opportunity to supplement the record
and raise issues in the RAA relating to any new information submitted after the close of the
public comment period.

I 0.

Petitioners were on notice that additional information had been submitted, as it

was referenced multiple times in the response to comments document UDAQ issued in
conjunction with the final Holly AO. Petitioners also had access to UDAQ's permitting file after
the Holly AO was issued before the deadline for filing their RAA.
11.

Moreover, this tribunal has allowed arguments that were not reasonably

ascertainable to be raised in the RAA, for the first time, in accordance with Utah Code Section
19-l-30l.5(6)(c)(ii). and allowed the parties to supplement the record via motion in accordance
with Section 19-1-301.5(8)(c). This tribunal has also waived any page limits to allow the parties
the opportunity to fully develop any claims that arose either during the public comment period,
or after.
12.
case.

7

Petitioners are incorrect that their due process rights have been implicated in this

Any claims or issues that were reasonably ascertainable during the public comment period

must have been raised in Petitioners' comments. Any claims that were not reasonably
ascertainable during the public comment period could be included for the first time in the
Petitioners' RAA but may not appear for the first time in Petitioners' briefing on the merits.
· Petitioners have failed to demonstrate how, in light of this tribunal's treatment of the claims in
accordance with 19-1-301.5, any procedural due process rights have been violated.
7

To the extent Petitioners claim that permit review adjudication statute and rules violate the due
process protections of the Utah and United States Constitutions, such claims are beyond the
jurisdiction of the ALJ to decide in this permit review proceeding. See e.g., Nebeker v. Utah
State Tax Comm 'n, 200 I UT 74, ~ 23, 34 P.3d 180.
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V.

Scope of Proceedings; Regulatory Background; and EPA Role

I.

The evidence Petitioners presented in this matter stands for the self-evident,

general proposition that air pollution is harmful to human health and to the environment. [IR at
009140-48; IR at 009139-45; IR at 009144-45; IR at 009145-47.] On that point, there is no
disagreement.
2.

In enacting the Utah Air Conservation Act. the Utah Legislature declared: ''It is

the policy of this state and the purpose of[the Utah Air Conservation Act] to achieve and
maintain levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety. and to the greatest
degree practicable. prevent injury to plant and animal life and property, foster the comfort and
convenience of the people, promote the economic and social development of this state. and
facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of this state.'' Section 19-2-10 l (2). Utah Code
Ann.

3.

The Utah Legislature further declared that the ··purpose·• of the Utah Air

Conservation Act is to ·"(a) provide for a coordinated statewide program of air pollution
prevention. abatement, and control: (b) provide for an appropriate distribution of responsibilities
among the state and local units of government; (c) facilitate cooperation across jurisdictional
lines in dealing with problems of air pollution not confined within single jurisdictions; and (d)
provide a framework within which air quality may be protected and consideration given to the
public interest at all levels of planning and development within the state.'' Section 19-2-101 (4),
Utah Code Ann.

4.

Similarly, in enacting the Clean Air Act. the Congress found, among other things:
(2) that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by
urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor vehicles,
has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare, including
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injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of
property, and hazards to air and ground transportation; [and]
(3) that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction or elimination, through any
measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the source) and air
pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments ....
42 U.S.C. § 740l(a).
5.

Congress also stated that the 44 primary goal" of the Clean Air Act is to 44 encourage

or otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental actions ... for pollution
prevention." 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (c).
6.

In these proceedings, I am charged to conduct a permit review adjudicative

proceeding in this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann., § 19-1-301.5 and Utah Adm in.
Code R305-7.
7.

As a matter of law, any source's compliance with the permitting requirements set

forth in the Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act satisfies the public policy of
protecting the public and the environment from the harms of air po11ution.
8.

The question before me in these proceedings is not whether air pollution is

harmful but rather whether the Holly AO is in compliance with applicable laws, rules, and
regulations. Based on the evidence in this record. the unavoidable conclusion is that the Holly
AO is in compliance with the law, all as explained in more detail below.
9.

The conclusions reached in these proposed Findings and Fact and Conclusions of

Law, to the effect that the Holly AO is in compliance with all applicable laws, rules, and
regulations, notwithstanding Petitioners' objections, find additional support in the EPA 's
independent review of the Holly AO and that agency's conclusion that the Holly AO may be
issued. See EPA Comment Letters [IR004001-004005; IR007840-007841 ]. In Alaska Dep 't of
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Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 124 S. Ct. 983 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that EPA is entitled to review the reasonableness of state permitting authorities' BACT
determinations under the PSD program and has authority to issue stop construction orders if it
reasonably believes that a BACT designation is erroneous or unreasonable. The CAA also
provides EPA with concurrent enforcement authority that is directly applicable to the present
proceeding. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7477, 74 I 3(a)(5)(A) (describing the enforcement options available to
the EPA when it finds that a state is not complying with any requirement of the CAA with
respect to construction of a new source or modification of an existing source). See Jennifer A.
Davis Foster, Note, EPA Oversight in Determining Best Available Control Technology: The
Supreme Court Determines the Proper Scope of Enforcement, 69 Missouri L. Rev., Issue 4, at I
(Fall 2004). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that if in EPA's independent judgment, any of the
objections and issues Petitioners have briefed on the merits were meritorious, EPA had an
independent duty and authority to pursue such issues. EPA declined to do so even after being
given the opportunity in connection with the Holly AO.
10.

In this permit review adjudicative proceeding, we have a somewhat unusual

situation in administrative law where not one but two regulatory agencies with significant
technical expertise and concurrent (and somewhat overlapping) legal jurisdiction have been
involved in the procedural and substantive process that led to the issuance of the Permit. This
situation provides a second layer of regulatory oversight to ensure that the applicable procedural
and substantive requirements of the Clean Air Act, as adopted and enforced through the Utah Air
Conservation Act in the spirit of" cooperative federalism," have been met.
4
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS
FAILED TO BRIEF ON THE MERITS
I.

Petitioners' RAA contains a number of claims that Petitioners did not raise in

their briefing on the merits. Those claims are listed in a Table of Waived Claims attached hereto
as Appendix A, incorporated herein by th is reference.
2.

Both Holly and UDAQ pointed out in their briefing and at oral argument that

Petitioners failed to brief these claims and therefore waived such claims. Petitioners did not
rebut this argument and at oral argument conceded that this tribunal need not address claims they
did not brief.
3.

Because Petitioners failed to brief these claims, they should be dismissed with

prejudice on two separate and independent grounds: (a) waiver; and (b) failure to carry
Petitioners' burden of proof. See, e.g., See Sierra Club v. BOGM, 20 I 2 UT 73,

~

31; Kennon,

2009 UT 77, ~ 29; W Jordan City, 2006 UT 27, ~ 29; Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, *2
n.3 C'[A]rguments not raised in an appellant's initial brief; are waived."); Brown v. Glover, 2000
UT 89,

~

23, 16 P.3d 540 ("Generally, issues raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were

not presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court.").

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOR CLAIMS PETITIONERS
BRIEFED ON THE MERITS
Petitioners' remaining claims can be grouped into eleven independent claims, each of
which will be addressed below. Before addressing the specific claims, I would like to make the
following general findings of fact relating to the regulatory context, inasmuch as the general aim
of many of Petitioners' comments go to the issue of the harms caused by air pollution.

[',
\:ti,'
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I.

UDAO Is Properly Regulating the Holly Refining Flares as Required by Subpart
Ja.
Petitioners' first specific argument on the merits goes to the interplay between the

regulation of the Holly flares, as required by law, and the Holly AO at issue in this matter.
Petitioners argue that the Holly AO is invalid because UDAQ did not "'properly regulate" the
refining flares by explicitly listing and explaining every applicable provision of the regulation
governing the flares (New Source Performance Standards ('"NSPS"), 40 C.F.R. Part 60, Subpart
Ja ("Subpart Ja"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-12.] More specifically, Petitioners argue that
"the Director has failed to specify in the AO - or elsewhere - the exact conditions of Subpart Ja
that apply to the Holly Refining Flares and has failed to impose these conditions on the facility.
Without particular AO terms and conditions that reflect the relevant Supbart Ja standards on the
flares, the Heavy Crude Project will not meet the requirements of Utah Admin Code R307-4018(l)(b)(vi), Rule 307-401-8(l)(a) and Rule R307-401-8(5)." [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 4-5.]
For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact

I.

Holly's NOi acknowledges that Subpart Ja applies to the refinery generally and to

the flares specifically. [See IR002866-87, Holly's July 2012 NOi ("The following Subparts are
applicable to the proposed project ... Subpart Ja - Standards of Performance for Petroleum
Refineries"); IR002868-69 ("The provisions of [40 C.F .R. Part 60 Subpart Ja] apply to the new
FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and process heaters."); 8 IR002962

8

When Holly submitted its NOi, Subpart Ja included all flares in its definition of "'fuel gas
combustion device." See 40 C.F.R. § 60.I0la (2012). However, during Holly's permit review
process, the regulation was revised to separate fuel gas combustion devices from flares. 40
C.F.R. § 60.l0la (2013). Despite this change in the regulations, in Holly's NOi and the Source
Plan Review, flares were grouped together with other fuel gas combustion devices and subject to
the same emission requirements. See IR005871-72.
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("Because the flare is located at a petroleum refinery, the flare must comply with the
requirements and limitations presented in 40 C.F.R. Part 60 Subpart Ja.")].
2.

Holly's NOT also incorporated emission limits derived from Subpart Ja for

combustion devices. [IR002868-69, Holly's July 2012 NOI ('~Holly will comply with the
following emission limitations ... Holly shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any
fuel gas that contains H2S in excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling
average basis and H2S in excess of 60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day

Q
rolling average basis.").]
3.

UDAQ independently recognized in the Source Plan Review that Subpart Ja

applies to the Holly Refinery and that Holly is subject to the emission limitations contained in
Subpart Ja. [IR00857 l-8572, Source Plan Review ("40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja: The provisions of
this subpart apply to the new FCCU and fuel gas combustion devices, including flares and
process heaters. Holly Refinery will comply with the following emission limitations ... Holly
Refinery shall not burn in any new fuel gas combustion device any fuel gas that contains H2 S in
excess of 162 ppmv determined hourly on a three-hour rolling average basis and H 2S in excess of
60 ppmv determined daily on a 365 successive calendar day rolling average basis.").] UDAQ
also made clear that Subpart Ja applies to the flares in its Response to Comments Memo.
[IR009 I 83, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.")].
4.

UDAQ determined that Holly is required to comply with Subpart Ja whether or

not such emission limits were contained in the Holly AO. [See IR0091'83, Response to
Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the AO, Holly
Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any
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federal limits."); IR009252, Holly AO (listing Subpart Ja in Section III, "Applicable Federal
Requirements").]
5.

The EPA made no comments regarding issues with the applicability or

enforcement of Subpart Ja as to the Holly Refinery generally or as to the AO specifically. [See
IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 l, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

6.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858-7860, Petitioners' Second Comment
Letter.]

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
7.

Petitioners assert that this issue is purely a question of law-whether UDAQ is

required to explicitly outline and explain every applicable provision of Subpart Ja in the Holly
AO. Petitioners concede that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's flares and other combustion sources,
but argue that the AO is deficient because each applicable provision is not explained in detail in
the Holly AO.
8.

The question of whether Utah law requires applicable NSPS provisions to· be

listed in approval orders is a question of law that the agency has been given discretion to
interpret and so shall be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Whether UDAQ correctly
applied a particular NSPS provision and whether Holly is in compliance with NSPS are mixed
questions of law and fact that are reviewed for reasonableness and whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support the determinations. Whether Holly is in compliance with
subpart Ja is a question that is specifically handled by DAQ's enforcement section and therefore
beyond the scope of these proceedings.
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9.

In their briefing, Petitioners failed to reference any of the specific evidence in

Holly's NOi in which Holly recognized it was subject to Subpart Ja.

I 0.

Additionally, Petitioners' reference to other evidence in the record is relegated to

footnotes and lacks any" description of the document being referenced.
11.

Because Petitioners have omitted multiple pieces of evidence from their analysis

that show Subpart Ja does apply to the Holly Refinery, they have failed to meet their burden of
proof on this~issue for the reasons described in more detail above.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
12.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' arguments should fail on
the merits for the independent reasons discussed below.
13.

Subpart Ja is one of many NSPS the EPA has promulgated for particular types of

new or modified sources that EPA has determined are major emitters of criteria air pollutants,
such as petroleum refineries. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7411, Standards of Performance for
New Stationary Sources (granting the administrator of EPA the authority to regulate certain
sources). The applicability of a particular NSPS to a particular source is often specifically
outlined in the text of the regulation applicable to that source category. See e.g., 40 C.F.R. §
60.1 00a (defining modification for purposes of Subpart Ja applicability). The applicability of
NSPS is evaluated separately from other Clean Air Act regulations such as the Prevention of
Significant Deterioration Program ('"PSD"), which is implemented through individual preconstruction permits like the Holly AO. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503 (setting forth the
pre-construction permitting requirements).
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14.

Unlike the PSD program, the NSPS regulations apply to a source whether or not

that source is undergoing a modification requiring pre-construction approval. See, e.g., 40
C.F .R. § 60.1 (a) (defining NSPS applicability); id. § 60.2 (defining when Construction" or
44

"modification" takes places for purposes ofNSPS applicability); Envt'l Defense v. Duke Energy
Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577-78 (2007) (recognizing the distinction between the NSPS and PSD
regulations). Therefore, NSPS compliance and/or applicability determinations are not dependent
upon inclusion of the NSPS regulation's language in the pre-construction permit. Compliance or
non-compliance with NSPS is entirely separate from the PSD permitting process.
15.

The oversight of Holly's compliance with Subpart Ja is a matter for UDAQ's

enforcement section. This is true regardless of whether the provisions of Subpart Ja are in the
permit or not. [IR009 I 83, Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the
requirements [of NS PS] are in the AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable
subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation of any federal limits.").]
16.

If Holly were in violation of Subpart Ja, contrary to UDAQ's determination, the

Clean Air Act provides Petitioners with a separate remedy in the form of a citizen suit under
Section 304 of the Clean Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act citizen suit
provision). Challenging compliance with Subpart Ja in this permit review proceeding is
therefore misplaced.
17.

Petitioners also are incorrect in their assertion that R307-415 of the Utah

Administrative Code requires all federally-applicable NSPS requirements to be included in the
Holly AO. The regulations Petitioners cite apply only to Title V operating permits-not
approval orders. The Title V operating perm it regulations are independent of the approval order
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pre-construction permit regulations. Compare Utah Admin. Code R307-4 l 5 (Title V operating
permit regulations), with id R307-401 (pre-construction approval order permit regulations).
18.

The purpose of Title Vis to consolidate all applicable federal and state regulatory

requirements into one permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 71.l(b) ("'All sources subject to the operating
permit requirements of title V and this part shall have a permit to operate that assures compliance
by the source with all applicable requirements."). Thus, there is no legal requirement to include
all applicable NSPS regulations in an approval order.
19.

Accordingly, Petitioners' arguments that the applicable provisions of Subpart Ja

must be included in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed.

II.

The North Flare is Subject to Subpart Ja.
1.

The Petitioners next contend that the Director erred in reversing his position

regarding the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. [Petitoners' Opening Brief at 1215.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

The Director determined that Holly must comply with all applicable subparts of

the NSPS regulations and that Holly was not in violation of any federal limits. [IR009 l 83,
Response to Comments Memo ("Regardless of whether the requirements [ofNSPS] are in the
AO, Holly Refinery must comply with all applicable subparts ... Holly Refinery is not in violation
of any federal limits.").]
3.

The Director determined that the North Flare was not being modified as part of

this project and therefore was outside the scope of the permitting action. [IR009 I 83, Response
to Comments Memo ("The North Flare is not being modified as part of the project proposed by
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Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja
applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.'").)
4.

According to undisputed evidence in the record, Holly's North Flare was subject

to and in compliance with Subpart J and A of the NSPS regulations. [IR007999, Email
Correspondence between Eric Benson and Camron Harry ("'Holly's North Flare was applicable
and compliant with 40 CFR 60 Subpart A & J upon startup.").]
5.

A consent decree entered in 2008 between Holly and EPA required that Holly

bring the North Flare into compliance with applicable NSPS standards. [See IR004800-4801,
Consent Decree (requiring flaring devices to become NSPS compliant).]
6.

As of December 2008, Holly reported to the EPA that its North Flare was. in

compliance with NSPS. [See IR007946, IR00795 l, Semi-Annual Progress Report to EPA and
UDAQ re Consent Decree (reporting that "Performance tests for both North and South Flares
[were] conducted December 10, 2008" and "[the] North Flare [was] subject to NSPS as of date
of [Consent Decree] entry, eliminate all routinely-generated gas" and compliance status was
"Complete .... [N]o routinely-generated gas sent to the flare.").]
7.

In connection with its independent review of the entire Holly AO, the EPA made

no comments about the North Flare or Subpart Ja, compliance with the Consent Decree, or any
of the other related issues raised by Petitioners here. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter;
IR007840-784 l, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
8.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second
Comment Letter.]
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C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

9.

Petitioners' argument that the Director reversed his position relative to the North

Flare is a question of fact and the Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate that the Director's
decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was an abuse of discretion.
I 0.

Petitioners, in their briefing, failed to marshal all of the evidence that supported

the Director's ultimate conclusion that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare and that Holly was
in compliance with this Subpart. By contrast, Holly did marshal all of the evidence in its
briefing.
11.

Nothing in the record supports the assertion that the Director changed his mind

about the applicability of Subpart Ja. From the beginning of the project, all parties agreed that
this NSPS provision applied to the Holly Refinery.
12.

Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
14.

The legislative intent of a permit review adjudicative process is to allow for an

evolving understanding of a project before any final decisions are made. The Director may, at
the beginning of a project, take a position in light of the information in the record at the time but
later reverse that position based on additional information presented during the public comment
period or otherwise, such as information provided by the source upon request. The question that
must be answered in this permit review adjudication proceeding is whether the Director's final
decision to issue the Holly AO is supported by substantial evidence in the record. This question
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remains the same whether or not the Director may have changed his mind during the permitting
process. In fact, the entire point of the permitting process as defined by the Utah Legislature is
to allow for well-informed administrative decisionmaking. To the extent that the Director may
have reached a different view on any given point suggests that the process is working as
intended.
15.

In this case, the Petitioners do not present any evidence that there was a reversal

of position with respect to the applicability of Subpart Jato the North Flare. To the contrary, all
of the evidence in the record supports the position that the Director ultimately took, which was
that Subpart Ja applied to the North Flare.
16.

Petitioners argue that the North Flare was modified when all gases from the South

Flare were routed to the North Flare and this modification triggered NSPS Subpart Ja
applicability. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 13.]
17.

Regardless of whether the North Flare was modified, the record evidence

demonstrates that Holly and the Director agreed that Subpart Ja applied for this project.
[IR009 I 83; IR009 I 83; IR004800-480 I; IR007946, IR00795 I.] Therefore, any evidence that a
modification may have occurred on the North Flare would only be superfluous, not
contradictory.
18.

The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's

handling of Subpart Ja. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-784 I, EPA
Second Comment Letter.]
19.

The substantial weight of the evidence supports the Director's ultimate

determination that Subpart Ja applies to Holly's North Flare and Petitioners' arguments that the
Director contradicted himself should be dismissed with prejudice.
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III.

A BACT Analysis Was Not Required for the North Flare.
1.

Petitioners argue that UDAQ erred in failing to perform or require a BACT

analysis for the North Flare. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 15-16]. For the reasons set forth
below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

Holly did not propose any physical modification of the North Flare as part of the

project approved in the Holly AO. [IR009183, Response to Comments Memo (''The North Flare
is not being modified as part of the project proposed by Holly Refinery in its NOi, so it is outside
the scope of this permit action. NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally
and to both the North and South Flares."); IR009l 89, Response to Comments Memo ("Because
neither the North Flare nor the SRU will undergo any physical change or experience an increase
in emissions as a result of Holly Refinery's proposed project, the 'emission units' are not subject
to the BACT analysis requirements in the PSD rules.").]
3.

UDAQ did not anticipate any increase in overall flare emissions as a result of the

project. [IR00856 I, Source Plan Review ("there is no reason to assume that upset condition
emissions will be any greater after the project is complete than before the project.").]
4.

The North Flare is already subject to and in compliance with NSPS requirements.

[IR009183, Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross
refinery generally and to both the North and South Flares.").]
5.

UDAQ determined that BACT for flares was compliance with Subpart Ja.

[IR0085 l 6-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control options for emissions
of all pollutants from flares are: (I) equipment design specifications and good combustion work
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practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends compliance with the
requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT.").]
6.

According to the record, prior to the authorization of this project, all of the flare

gases were being routed to the North Flare. [IR08200, Holly's first revised netting analysis
("'currently all gases are routed to the north flare").]
7.

The EPA raised no procedural or substantive comments regarding UDAQ's

analysis regarding BACT for the North Flare. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter;
IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
8.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR007858, IR007864, Petitioners' Second
Comment Letter.]
~

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
9.

Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in failing to perform a BACT analysis on the

North Flare is a mixed question of law and fact. There is also a dispute regarding the correct
interpretation of the regulations that trigger BACT, which is a question oflaw reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard. The application of that law to the facts in this case triggers the mixed
question standard of review in which the ALJ reviews the Director's determination for
reasonableness.

I 0.

Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence related to their claim.

11.

Specifically. Petitioners failed to cite UDAQ's finding that BACT for flares is

compliance with Subpart Ja and that the North Flare is already subject to NSPS requirements.
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12.

Accordingly, Petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof on this claim and it

can be dismissed on this basis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
14.

In the briefing on this issue, Petitioners erroneously conflate the same definition

of modification they cite in their NSPS arguments. However, a "modification" that triggers a
BACT analysis is different than what is required to trigger NSPS applicability. See, e.g., Envt '/

Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561,577 (2007) ("The 1980 PSD regulations on
'modification' simply cannot be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the
NSPS.").
15.

A modification for purposes of BACT applicability occurs when a person

"intend[s] to make modifications or relocate an existing installation which will or might
reasonably be expected to increase the amount or change the effect of, or the character of, air
contaminants discharged." Utah Admin. Code R307-401-3( I )(a) (emphasis added). An
"installation" is defined as "a discrete process with identifiable emissions which may be part of a
larger industrial plant" and a "modification" is defined as "any planned change in a source which
results in a potential increase of emission." Id. R307-100-2.
16.

Accordingly, for there to be a "modification" triggering BACT applicability, there

must be (I) a planned change in an emissions unit that (2) is reasonably expected to increase the
amount or character of the emissions. The federal regulations contain similar requirements. See
40 C.F.R. § 52.210)(3) (BACT is required on units that experience a net emissions increase "as a
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· result of a physical change or change in the method of operation in the unit."); 71 Fed. Reg.
54,235, 54,240 (Sept. 14, 2006) C·We further note that our current rules do not require BACT or
LAER at unchanged units .... "); Letter from Robert B. Miller, Chief of the Permits and Grants
Section of the EPA to Lloyd Eagan, Director of the Bureau of Air Management in Wisconsin
(Feb. 8, 2000) ("[W]here an emissions unit has not undergone a physical or operational change,
BACT does not apply.").
17.

Here, UDAQ specifically found that Holly was not proposing any changes to its

North Flare as part of the project. A shift of emissions from one flare to the other does not result
in increased emissions, only redistributed emissions. In its NSPS regulations, the EPA discussed
the analogous situation of two interconnected flares, stating "'that interconnections between flares
will not alter the cumulative amount of gas being flared (i.e., interconnecting two flares does not
result in an emissions increase relative to the two single flares prior to interconnection) ....
Considering this, we agree that the interconnection of two flares does not necessarily result in a
modification of the flare and we have specifically excluded flare interconnections from the
modification provisions.... [W]e agree that connections that do not increase the emissions from
the flare should not trigger a modification .... " 77 Fed. Reg. 56,422, 56,438 (Sept. 12, 2012).
Petitioners' argument is not the law.
18.

Moreover, to the extent Petitioners are arguing that the re-route of gases to the

North Flare constitutes a change in operation, such a change occurred well before Holly initiated
the current black wax crude project. This is evidenced by the language Petitioners themselves
quote which reflects that "currently all gases are routed to the north flare." [IR08200, Holly's
first revised netting analysis (emphasis added).]
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19.

Without a change in operation or an increase in emissions for the North Flare,

Petitioners' argument (that a "modification" of the North Flare was part of this project triggering
a BACT analysis for the North Flare) is not supported by the record and should be rejected.
20.

Even if Petitioners could demonstrate by substantial evidence that Holly proposed

to modify the North Flare, conducting a BACT analysis on the North Flare would be superfluous
because the North Flare is already subject to Subpart Ja, which itself constitutes BACT for
Holly's flares. [See IR008516-17, Source Plan Review ("The only technically feasible control
options for emissions of all pollutants from flares are: (1) equipment design specifications and
good combustion work practices ... ; and (2) flare gas recovery systems ... DAQ NSR recommends
compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR 60 Subpart Ja as BACT."); see also IR009183,
Response to Comments Memo ("NSPS Subpart Ja applies to the Woods Cross refinery generally
and to both the North and South Flares.").] Petitioners' argument fails for this independent

G

reason as well.
21.

Finally, the record suggests that Petitioners' argument is ultimately moot because

Holly is required by the recently-adopted PM2 s SIP to install flare gas recovery technology at the
9

Refinery, which Petitioners do not contest is the most stringent pollution control device
currently available for flares.

10

[See IR0085 I 6, Source Plan Review (referring to flare gas

recover as "the top control technology").] This requirement is binding on Holly regardless of
whether it is explicitly stated in the Holly AO. As such, even if Petitioners' argument were

9

The Utah PM 2.5 SIP requires "all major source petroleum refineries in or affecting a designated
PM 2.s non-attainment area within the State shall install and operate a flare gas recovery system."
See Utah PM2.s SIP, Section IX, Part H, p. 43.

°Flare gas recovery is a system that captures gases that would otherwise be combusted in the

1

flare and redirects those gases as fuel sources for other refinery operations. This reduces the
emissions associated with flaring and is an economic use of excess fuel gas.
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correct, there is no need for a remand regarding control technology on the North Flare because
there are no additional pollution controls that could be required of Holly.
22.

Accordingly, Petitioners have failed to demonstrate with substantial evidence in

the record as a whole that UDAQ erred in not performing a BACT analysis on the North Flare
and this claim should be dismissed with prejudice on the merits.
IV.

Emissions From Holly's Flares Were Properly Calculated and Are Regulated in
Accordance With the Unavoidable Breakdown Rule.
1.

Petitioners next argue that the emissions from the flares have not been properly

calculated and that UDAQ has not been appropriately regulating the flares in accordance with the
Unavoidable Breakdown Rule ("UBR"). [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 16-22.] For the reasons
stated below, this argument should be rejected.
A. Findings of Fact
2.

In the Holly AO, UDAQ imposed a number of emission limits that included

emissions from the flares, thereby limiting the routine emissions from the flares. [See IR009225,
Holly AO (''Previous exclusions from the AO emission caps will be removed therefore the AO
emission caps will be source wide caps."); IR009240, Holly AO ("PM 10 Combustion Emissions
Cap Sources ... Flares."); IR009247, Holly AO ('"PM 10 emissions from all combustion sources
shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.13 tpd."); IR009245, Holly AO ("The
emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround maintenance
emissions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per day.");
IR009245, Holly AO ("Emissions of SO2 shall be limited as follows ... All other sources 0.21
(tpd) 74.9 (tpy)."); IR009245, Holly AO ("For all the above listed emission points a CEM shall
be used to determine compliance as outlined in Il.B.3.e."); IR009247-48, Holly AO ("Total 24hour PM 10 emissions for the sources shall be calculated by adding the daily results of the above
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PM 1o emissions equations for natural gas, plant gas, and fuel oil combustion. Results shall be
tabulated for every day, and records shall be kept."); IR008568, Source Plan Review (discussion
of inclusion of flares into SO2 and PM emission caps).]
3.

In response to Petitioners' comments that the emission estimates for the flares

were inaccurate because they did not include upset emissions, UDAQ explained that Holly's
emissions were capped and any exceedance due to an upset would constitute an exceedance of
the cap. [IR009 l 87, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter is correct that there are no
limits on the flares. This is because the flares are in place as control device[s] for upset
conditions. However Holly Refinery does have to comply with the requirements of 40 CFR 60
Subpart Ja. The Commenter is incorrect that 'upset' conditions are not addressed ... 'the
refineries were allowed maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PM 10 • SO2, NOx based on
the apparent variability. Emissions were capped at these maximum levels from the sources that
could have their emissions metered by fuel metering/and calculations and from the other sources
that would be stack tested every 1-3 years."' (quoting Utah SIP§ IX.A.6.c.(2) (1991)).]
4.

The assumption in determining the PTE for the flares was that upset emissions

would be zero because they are not part of normal refinery operation. [IR002852, July 2012 NOi
("PM 10 and PM 2.s emissions for the Woods cross refinery flares were assumed to be zero."); see
also IR002857, July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be

zero.").]
5.

According to the evidence in the record, the PTE for the flares was calculated

based on the purge gas flowing through the flare and planned startups and shutdowns, but did not
include calculations for upset emissions. [IR003 I 75-76, July 2012 NOi (recognizing emissions
from the flares of SO2 were estimated based on the assumption of 1700 scfh non-upset
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throughput to the flare. This is the '"purge gas" amount that must run to the flare to keep it from
backdrafting); IR009 I 96, Response to Comments ("'startup and shutdown emissions were
included in the analysis"); IR008560-856 I, Source Plan Review ('"to be conservative and
representative of potential increases in emissions from SU and SD, UDAQ and Holly Refinery
have agreed to include these emissions in Step 1 of the PSD and NNSR applicability analysis");
IR008522, Source Plan Review ("To ensure proper flare operation, Holly Refinery will install
flow meters and gas combustion monitors on the flare gas line."); IR0092 I 1 ("The combustion
of flue gas through the pilot flame is accounted for in the emission calculations.").]
6.

According to the record, upset emissions from flares are unpredictable and

uncontrollable because the flare is the safety valve for excess refinery gases generated in a period
of malfunction. [IR0085 I 6, Source Plan Review ("The flare system at Holly Refinery provides
for the safe disposal of hydrocarbon gases which are vented automatically from process units
through pressure relief valves, control valves or are manually vented."); IR00856 l, Source Plan
Review ('"Section 3.6 of the July 2012 NOi lists upset conditions for both the North and South
Flares. These upset conditions (malfunctions) do not include normal process flow combustion at
the flares and there is no reason to assume that upset condition emissions will be any greater
after the project is complete than before the project. Although these emissions have not been
included in the netting analysis, they are noted below for reference.").]
7.

The Holly AO does not contain exceptions for emissions due to malfunctions at

the refinery; such excess emissions are subject to the UBR. [IR009 I 96, Response to Comments
Memo ("All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup, shutdown
and malfunction. The IT A contains no exclusion for these events."); IR0092 I I ("Flare
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emissions during malfunction/upset conditions are regulated through R307-107 (ITA Condition

II .3).").]

8.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA raised no

procedural or substantive comments regarding with UDAQ's regulation of the Refinery Flares,
including the UBR. [See IR00400 I, EPA First Comment Letter~ IR007840-7841, EPA Second
Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
9.

Petitioners have partially preserved this argument in accordance with Section 19-

1-301.5(4). In their comments, Petitioners challenged the calculation of the PTE for the flares
but said nothing about misapplication or noncompliance with the UBR. [See IR009056-9057,
Sagady second comment letter.]

I 0.

Petitioners could have reasonably ascertained this issue as the UBR was

specifically referenced in the IT A. [See IR008453.]
11.

The argument that the issue is preserved because UDAQ referenced the UBR in

the Response to Comments Memo is misplaced. In the responses, UDAQ simply referenced the
UBR in response to an entirely unrelated comment. [See IR0092 I 0-9211, Response to
Comments Memo (referring to R307- I 07 in response to the comment that "nothing provided by
the applicant's final revised notice of intent justifies the claimed 98% control efficiency claimed
for VOC, HAP and CO Destruction efficiency from Applicant's open air flares").]
12.

UDAQ's unrelated response does not save Petitioners from the requirement to

raise their issues and arguments in a way that gives UDAQ notice of the substance of the issue.
13.

To the extent Petitioners argue that the UBR has been violated by Holly or is not

being enforced by UDAQ, the argument is beyond the scope of what was raised during the
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comment period and is unpreserved pursuant to Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(4). Accordingly,
it should be dismissed.

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
14.

The claims Petitioners assert (both preserved and unpreserved) regarding the PTE

for the flares constitute mixed questions of law and fact. The questions of law involve the
interpretation of the UBR and the regulations and guidance relating to how PTE for flares should
be calculated-specifically, whether upset emissions must be included in such calculations. The
application of those laws to the facts of this case and the calculations performed by Holly create
a mixed question. Accordingly, a reasonableness standard ofreview shall apply.

15.

Petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proof for this claim because they

failed in their briefing to marshal all of the relevant evidence from the record.
16.

Petitioners ignore multiple pieces of evidence that explain how Holly calculated

the PTE for the flares in accordance with applicable guidance and the UBR.
17.

Having failed to meet their burden of proof, Petitioners' claim should be

dismissed on this basis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
18.

Even if Petitioners had properly preserved all of their arguments regarding the

PTE calculations of the flare emissions, and even had carried their burden of proof (or to the
extent marshaling is not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law)), Petitioners'
claims fail on the merits for the independent reasons discussed below.
i.

19.

UBR Application

Petitioners claim that the UBR requires emission limits on sources of malfunction

emissions. Nothing in the plain language of the UBR requires numeric limits on malfunction
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emissions. Nor is there any other authority in support of requiring such a limit as part of the
UBR. To the extent that Petitioners' arguments constitute a request for rulemaking, they must be
rejected in these perm it review proceedings.
20.

11

In any event, such limits are impossible for malfunction emissions because such

emissions are, by their very nature, unpredictable and uncontrollable. [See IR0085 I 6.]
21.

The UBR simply sets forth criteria that must be met in the event of excess

malfunction emissions to allow UDAQ the enforcement discretion to forgo monetary penalties.

See Utah Adm in. Code R307-107-1 to -3.
22.

Stated differently, the UBR assumes that malfunction emissions are violations of

an applicable approval order but affords to UDAQ enforcement discretion regarding the
imposition of fines and penalties if a source is otherwise in compliance with the other
requirements of the rule, including monitoring and good combustion practices. Utah Adm in.
Code R307-107-1 to -3 (requiring reporting of breakdown emissions and giving UDAQ
enforcement discretion).
23.

The limit in the Holly AO for malfunction emissions from the flare is zero tpy,

which is accounted for in the overall SO2 and PM emission caps. [See IR002857, July 2012 NOi
("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] Any violation of those
limits due to an upset or malfunction subjects Holly to the enforcement discretion of UDAQ
under the· UBR.

11

Petitioners may not advocate for a rulemaking change in a permit review adjudicative
proceeding. [See In the Matter of: South Davis Sewer District, Order (Remand to ALI with
Directions on Determining Whether There is a Basis to Grant Friends Standing to Intervene),
March 29, 2011, p. 11 ("a permitting proceeding is not the appropriate forum in which to
advance adoption of new rules or challenge existing ones").] Such a request is only proper in a
rulemaking proceeding under Utah Code Section 63G-3-10 I et seq.
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24.

Any enforcement action by UDAQ, however, would be an independent

proceeding separate from this adjudication and not a valid basis to remand the AO.

ii.
25.

Flare PTE

Petitioners challenge the PTE calculations of SO2 and PM from the flares by

arguing that the PTE inappropriately excluded upset and malfunction emissions. This argument
fai Is for three reasons.
26.

First, the law does not require the inclusion of upset emissions in a PTE

calculation for flares because such upset emissions are not considered part of normal operation.

See Sierra Club v. Wyoming Dep 't of Envtl. Quality, 251 P.3d 310, 314 (Wyo. 2011) (holding
that "hypothesizing the worst possible emissions from the worst possible operation is the wrong
way to calculate potential to emit. .. PTE includes only emissions that occur during normal
operations" thus "cold start" emissions and "malfunctions" were properly excluded from the
plant's PTE); see also Alabama Power Co. v. Cost/e, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United

States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 682 F. Supp. 1141, 1158 (D. Colo. 1988) C"[P]otential to emit
does not refer to the maximum emissions that can be generated by a source hypothesizing the
worst conceivable operation. Rather, the concept contemplates the maximum emissions that can
be generated while operating the source as it is intended to be operated and as it is normally
operated.").
27.

Holly excluded malfunction emissions from its PTE calculations for the flares

and, instead, calculated emissions based on the ··average non-upset throughput to [the] flare" and
appropriate emissions factors. [See IR 003175.]
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28.

Second, Petitioners' arguments challenging the PTE calculations for the flares

also fail because federally enforceable permit conditions in the Holly AO limit malfunction
emissions to zero tons per year from the flares.
29.

PTE is defined as:

the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted,
stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable.
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-I O1-2 (same definition).
30.

Holly assumed a limit of zero tpy for malfunction emissions, which it factored

into its emissions totals for the SO2 and PM 10 emission caps in the Holly AO. [See IR002857,
July 2012 NOi ("Startup, shutdown, malfunction events were considered to be zero.").] The SO2
and PM 10 emission caps, which include emissions from all combustion sources including flares,
are federally enforceable operational limitations. [See IR009245, Holly AO (Section II.B.6.a,
"The emission of SO2 into the atmosphere from all sources (excluding routine turnaround
maintenance sessions) shall not exceed 110.3 tons per rolling 12-month period or 0.31 tons per
day."); see also IR009247, Holly AO (Section II.B.7.a "'PM 10 emissions from all combustion
sources shall not exceed 47.5 tons per rolling 12-month period.").]
31.

If Holly exceeds its emission caps due to an upset or malfunction, Holly will be in

violation of its permit and subject to enforcement by UDAQ. [See IR009 I 96, Response to
Comments Memo ('"All limits of the permit apply at all times, which include periods of startup,
shutdown and malfunction.").] The UBR was put in place to deal with these very kinds of
emissions.
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32.

Finally, the 240 tpy that Petitioners contend will be emitted every year as a result

of upset emissions was a conservative estimate of what malfunctions could be-not what they
actually are. [See IR003780.]
33.

In fact, the emission calculation documentation in the record demonstrates that

actual recorded historic malfunction emissions from the flare averaged only 34 tpy of SO2 from
both flares combined.
34.

12

[Id.]

An addition of 34 tpy of SO2 from the flares, even if such emissions were required

for purposes of calculating PTE, would not have changed the conclusions of the netting analysis
or made this project major for SO2 given that the netting analysis demonstrated a 150.69 tpy
overall emission reduction in SO2. [See IR007574-7575.]
35.

For all of these independent reasons, Petitioners' arguments regarding the PTE for

the flares fail on the merits and should be dismissed.
iii.
36.

Reporting Requirements for the Flares

Petitioners' final argument relating to the flares is that the Holly AO lacks limits

or enforceable reporting requirements for its flares. The substantial weight of record evidence
shows that this contention is unfounded.

12

The prediction for malfunction emissions utilized three standard deviations of the average
actual malfunction emissions to come up with the 120 ton per flare figure. [See IR003780] The
actual total of SO2 emitted from the North and South Flares combined was:
12.7 tons of SO2 in 2009
25.5 tons of SO2 in 2008
91.0 tons of SO2 in 2007
19.7 tons of SO2 in 2006
20.8 tons of SO2 in 2005
Id. Accordingly, contrary to Petitioners· contention that 240 tons of SO2 from the flares will be
emitted on a yearly basis, the highest emissions in any one given year was only 91 tons and the
lowest was 12. 7 tpy.
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37.

Holly is required to perform continuous emissions monitoring ("CEM") of SO2

emissions on all sources of SO2 , including flares. [IR009245, Holly AO, ("For all the above
listed emission points a CEM shall be used to determine compliance as outlined in II.8.3.e.").]
38.

Holly also is required to install ''flow meters and gas combustion monitors" on the

South Flare gas line "to monitor flare combustion efficiency" [IR00925 l, Holly AO]; and Holly
is required to calculate PM emissions from all PM sources based on the amount of fuel
combusted, the totals of which are then added into Holly's emission cap for PM and reported to
the state. [IR009245-47, Holly AO.]
39.

Finally, Subpart la-applicable to all Holly Flares-contains requirements for

monitoring and recordkeeping. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.107a(a)(2) (requiring owners or operators of
flares to install a continuous monitoring device to measure H2S in the fuel gases going to the
flare); see also 40 C.F.R. § 60.108a (record keeping and reporting requirements).
40.

These multip.le record keeping and reporting requirements all apply to Holly's

flares. Accordingly, Petitioners arguments regarding the flares all fail and should be dismissed
with prejudice on the merits.

V.

The Record Demonstrates That Holly's Emissions Will Not Cause or Contribute
to an Exceedance of the NAAOS.
I.

Petitioners next argue, at some length, that the Holly AO is insufficient to protect

the short term National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") because it does not contain
short term emission limits on all of Holly's emission sources. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 2234.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

UDAQ determined that its regulations did not require short term emission limits

when there was no risk of exceedance of the NAAQS. [IR009 I 86, Response to Comments
48
ADJ011583

Memo ("Where it is clear that a source would not cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation,
there is no free-standing regulation requiring short-term emissions limits.").]
3.

Based on modeling information provided by Holly and reviewed by UDAQ's

modeling staff, UDAQ determined there was no risk of any exceedance of the NAAQS from
Holly's proposed project. [IR009190-9 I, Response to Comments Memo ("Holly Refinery's
October 9, 2012 memo ... was based on a request by UDAQ for Holly Refinery to submit an
initial impact analysis based on the July 2012 NOi. This analysis showed no impact on the
NAAQS CO, PM 10, NO2, or SO2."); IR009209, Response to Comments Memo (""This modeling
analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much
lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3").]
4.

Holly submitted its plans for modeling to UDAQ and those plans were approved

by UDAQ's modeling staff. [IR0003 l-48, Modeling Protocol (prepared by MSI setting forth the
plan for the modeling); IR00 1153-54, Letter from UDAQ to Holly (approving of the Modeling
Protocol submitted for emissions impact modeling); IR00359 l-97, Tom Orth Memo (analyzing
Holly's modeling and agreeing with results).]

5.

Holly's emission modeling analysis contemplated the maximum emissions that

Holly could generate on a lb/hr basis, thereby ensuring that any short-term spikes in emissions
were accounted for in the modeling and would not cause exceedances. [IR002993-96, July 2012
NOi (explaining that emissions input for the modeling were measured in lb/hr); IR009209,
Response to Comments Memo ('"This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour
SO2, concentrations would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3").]
6.

Malfunction emissions were not considered in the modeling analysis because

federal and state guidance exclude malfunction emissions from the modeling protocols.
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[IR0092 l 4, Response to Comments Memo (explaining the application of Appendix W and that
malfunction emissions need not be included in modeling).]
7.

The results of Holly's modeling efforts clearly demonstrated there would be no

exceedance of the NAAQS, including short-term NAAQS. [IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 615) (demonstrating no exceedance ofNAAQS).]
8.

UDAQ determined that Holly's permit application was complete in an email sent

on July 19, 2014. [See IR003767, email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012
("I am notifying you that I have now determined Holly Refinery's NOi is administratively
complete.").]

9.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding short-term
NAAQS protection or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over
the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure to protect the short-term NAAQS. [See
IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
10.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR00786l-7863, Petitioners' Second Comment
Letter.]

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
11.

Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proof for this argument because they

have failed to marshal all of the evidence that demonstrates the NAAQS will not be exceeded.
12.

While Petitioners cite some of UDAQ's reasoning in the response to comments,

they failed to marshal the actual modeling evidence showing that short term emissions were
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calculated on a lb/hr basis. This evidence supports UDAQ's determination that the short-term
NAAQS were being protected regardless of whether there are short term emission limits in the
Holly AO.
13.

Having failed to provide any contradictory evidence in the record, Petitioners

cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their claims regarding the NAAQS fail.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
14.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.

i.

15.

Short-Term Emission Limits Are Not Required for Minor
Modifications

Petitioners contend that short-term emission limits are always required to ensure

protection of the short-term NAAQS. However, the one-hour NO 2 and SO2 guidance documents
Petitioners rely upon for this contention, [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-24], by their terms apply
only to ''major" modifications. See Memorandum from Anne Marie Wood, Air Quality Policy
Division, to EPA Regional Directors, General Guidance for Implementing the I-hour SO2
National Ambient Air Quality Standard in Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits, at 6
(Aug. 23, 2010) ("We are issuing the following guidance to explain and clarify the procedures
that may be followed by applicants for Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permits."
(emphasis added)).

16.

Moreover, the guidance expressly states that it does not bind state permitting

authorities. See Memorandum from Stephen D. Page, Office of Air Quality Planning and
Standards, to Regional Air Division Directors, at 2 (Aug. 23, 2010) (''This guidance does not
bind state and local governments and permit applicants as a matter of law.").
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17~

According to UDEQ's analysis, Holly'~ proposed project fell into the "major"

category for CO and GHG emissions, not for NOx, SO2 , or PM. [IR009186, Response to
Comments Memo.]
18.

Whether a modification is ''major" is determined on a pollutant-by-pollutant

basis:
Applicability of the major NSR program must be determined in advance of
construction and is pollutant-specific. In cases involving existing sources, this
requires a pollutant-by-pollutant determination of the emissions change, if any,
that will result from the physical or operational change .... Once a modification
is determined to be major, the PSD requirements apply only to those specific
pollutants for which there would be a significant net emissions increase.
67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,188 & n. 5 (Dec. 31, 2002). Because the project is not major for NOx,
SO2 , or PM, the Director, as a matter of law, was not required to adhere to federal guidance or
impose short-term emissions limits for these pollutants. 13

13

Petitioners claim that the Utah Supreme Court has "·held that BACT emission limits must
protect short term NAAQS," citing Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board, 2009 UT 76, 226 P.3d 719.
[Petitioners' Opening Br. at 23-27.] Petitioners incorrectly interpret the Court's holding. In that
case, the court simply observed in dicta ""the EPA has described the goals of BACT emission
limitations in three-parts: (1) to achieve the lowest percent reduction, (2) to protect short-term
ambient standards, and (3) to be enforceable as a practical matter." Id at 734. The court never
evaluated or held this was a correct interpretation of the relevant regulations. Moreover, the fact
that a goal ofBACT is to protect the short-term NAAQS does not mean that short-term limits
must invariably be imposed as part of a BACT determination regardless of whether the project
involves a major modification or poses any actual risk of an exceedance. EPA guidance
indicates that while any BACT emissions limits are to be considered in determining whether the
source will cause or contribute to a NAAQS violation, the BACT requirement is not an
independent basis for imposing additional short-term emissions limits. See Memorandum from
Anne Marie Wood, Acting Director Air Quality Policy Division to Regional Air Division
Directors, at 7 (Aug. 23, 20 I 0) ("Once a level of control is determined by the PSD applicant via
the Best Available Control Technology (BACT) top-down process, the applicant must model the
proposed source's emissions at the BACT emissions rate(s) to demonstrate that those emissions
will not cause or contribute to a violation of any NAAQS or PSD increment.").
52
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19.

Petitioners' reliance on In re: Mississippi Lime, PSD Appeal No. I 1-01 (Aug. 9,

2011) as an alternate basis for the requirement for imposition of short-term emission limits in the
Holly AO is also misplaced. The decision is inapplicable for two reasons.
20.

First, in Mississippi Lime, the permit applicant proposed to construct a facility

that, unlike Holly's proposed expansion, would emit SO2 and NOx in quantities well above the
significance thresholds so as to render the proposed facility subject to the PSD requirements for
those pollutants. See IEPA, Project Summary at 4 (2010) (noting that '"Mississippi Lime's
proposed lime manufacturing plant is subject to PSD for emissions of SO2, NOx and CO because
the potential emissions of the plant are more than 100 tons/year"), available at
http://www.epa.state.il.us/public-notices/20l 0/mississippi-lime-pdr/project-summary.pdf; see

also Mississippi Lime, slip op. at l (noting that Mississippi Lime sought to construct a new lime
manufacturing plant).
21.

Second, as the Director explained in his response to comments-which

Petitioners do not contest-in Mississippi Lime, the permit was remanded to the state permitting
authority "not simply because it failed to establish a limit, but because IEPA failed to provide ·a
coherent, well-reasoned explanation of the decision' not to impose such a limit." [IR009 I 86,
Response to Comments Memo.]
22.

By contrast, UDAQ has a well-reasoned explanation for why it did not impose the

short-term limits requested by Petitioners-the modeling demonstrated there would be no
exceedance of the short-term NAAQS. [IR0030l 7, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15) (demonstrating
no exceedance ofNAAQS).]
23.

Accordingly, Petitioners' argument that short-term limits were required in the

Holly AO fails on the merits and should be rejected.
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ii.

24.

Ho/Iv's Modeling Constitutes Substantial Evidence That the
NAAOS Will Be Protected

Although UDAQ and Holly were not required to conduct modeling to

demonstrate compliance with the NAAQS because Holly proposed only a minor modification for
NOx, SO 2, and PM, see 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(ii) ('"The requirements of paragraphs G) through
(r) of this section apply to ... the major modification of any existing major stationary source."), 14
in an effort to be thorough, Holly conducted the modeling anyway.
25.

Before conducting any modeling, Meteorological Solutions Inc. ("MST"), Holly's

technical consultant, developed a modeling protocol setting forth the procedure that MST would
use to demonstrate that there were would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short
term NAAQS. This protocol was sent to the modeling staff at UDAQ, who approved of the
protocol. [See IR00031-48, Modeling Protocol; IR00 1153; IR003593, Orth Modeling Memo
("The applicant had an approved modeling protocol for using AERMOD in PSD modeling
protocols.").] MST used the PTE calculations of all SO2 and NOx emission sources at the
refinery for input into the model for the short-term modeling. [See IR000038 ("Maximum
hourly potential to emit (PTE) emissions for existing and proposed sources will be input to the
model."); IR00004 I (same).]
26.

PTE is defined as "the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a

pollutant under its physical and operational design," taking into account enforceable emissions
limits. 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.21(b)(4), 51.165(a)(l)(iii), 51.166(b)(4). Using the maximum capacity
of each unit, MST determined the total emissions the refinery could generate in one hour of
operation measured in terms of lbs/hr. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOi.] Because PTE is

14

See also Utah Adm in. Code R307-403-3 ("Every ... major modification must be reviewed by
the director to determine if a source will cause or contribute to a violation of the NAAQS.")
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based on maximum capacity, this calculation represented the maximum emissions that could be
produced at the refinery in a one-hour period. These values were used in the model and, once the
background concentrations were combined with the PTE emissions, the modeling results showed
that there would be no exceedance of the NAAQS, including the short-term NAAQS. [See
IR003017, July 2012 NOi (Table 6-15); IR003596. Tom Orth Memo (Table 3); see also
IR009209 ('This modeling analysis demonstrates that the predicted I-hour SO2, concentrations
would be 50.4 µg/m 3, much lower than the NAAQS of 195 µg/m 3 .•• Accordingly there is no need
to impose 1 or 24-hour SO2 limits to protect the SO2 NAAQS.").]
27.

UDAQ's Orth Memorandum specifically found that "the proposed project's

impacts, when combined with other industrial sources and ambient background, would comply
with federal standards," including the one-hour NOx and SO2 NAAQS. In light of all of this
record evidence, it was reasonable for UDAQ not to include any additional short-term emission
limits in the Holly AO.
28.

Petitioners do not dispute that the modeling results showed no exceedance of the

NAAQS. Instead Petitioners challenge the modeling itself. These challenges do not undermine
UDAQ's approval of and reliance on the modeling analysis, particularly given the deference that
UDAQ is due with respect to technical issues such as air quality modeling: "[Q]uestions
pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates and other inputs to air quality models raise
scientific and technical concerns that generally are best left to the specialized expertise and
reasoned judgment of the permitting authority." In re: N. Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant,
PSD Appeal No. 08-02, at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009).
29.

First, Petitioners argue that DAQ's Orth Memorandum is unreliable because it

states that "[t]his report outlines the methodology used in the dispersion modeling analysis of
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emissions of criteria and HAP proposed in the NOi and the subsequent modeling results. It
makes no determination with respect to compliance with the NAAQS or UDAQ- Toxic
Screening Levels for HAPs or compliance thereof.'' [IR003591-92, Tom Orth Memo.] However,
that language simply indicates that the Orth Memorandum, by itself, did not constitute a
determination as to compliance with the NAAQS, as illustrated by the fact that the memorandum
made only a "recommendation" as to what further steps to take. [IR003597, Tom Orth Memo.]

It does not mean that the Director may not consider the Orth Memorandum in determining
compliance with the NAAQS and whether short-term limits are required, as the Director did in
the Response to Comments Memorandum. [See IR009190-9 I, IR009209, Response to
Comments Memo.]
30.

Second, Petitioners assert that the modeling analysis cannot be used because the

modeling must be ''based on short term limits specified in the AO," and may not "merely
estimate short term emission rates." [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 29-31.] However, the modeling
done here was based on the maximum possible hourly emissions level based on the maximum
capacity of each emissions unit as explained above, not an estimate of average short-term
emission rates. [See IR002993-96, July 2012 NOi.] UDAQ acted within its discretion when it
relied upon this modeling analysis.
31.

Third, Petitioners argue that the modeling is inadequate to demonstrate

compliance with the short-term NAAQS because the modeling does not include upset emissions
from the flares. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 31-33.] In support of this argument, Petitioners rely
on 40 C.F.R. § 51, Appendix W. for the proposition that such emissions must be modeled.
Petitioners are incorrect. As UDAQ specifically explained in rejecting Petitioner's argument:
The commenter references 40 CFR 51 Appendix W, Section 8. I .2(a) as reference
that malfunction/upset emissions should be included in the modeling analysis.
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However, the commenter neglected to include the following footnote from that
same section: "'Malfunctions which may result in excess emissions are not
considered to be a normal operating condition. They generally should not be
considered in determining allowable emissions. However, if the excess emissions
are the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable
conditions, it may be necessary to consider them in determining source impact."
[IR009214, Response to Comments Memo (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, App'x W, § II.B.7.a. I .2(a)
n.a).] UDAQ's explanation has not been rebutted by Petitioners.
32.

UDAQ' s interpretation of Appendix W is supported by a 2011 EPA guidance

document providing additional clarification of the modeling requirements under Appendix W.

See Memorandum from Tyler Fox, Leader Air Quality Modeling Group to Regional Air Division
Directors, Additional Clarification Regarding Application ofAppendix W Modeling Guidance

for the I-hour N02 National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Mar. I, 2011 ). There, EPA stated
that modeling for compliance with the I-hour NAAQS should only
address emission scenarios that can logically be assumed to be relatively
continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly to the
annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations based on existing
modeling guidelines, which provide sufficient discretion for reviewing authorities
to not include intermittent emissions from emergency generators or
startup/shutdown operations from compliance demonstrations for the I-hour NO 2
standard under appropriate circumstances.

Id. at 2. 15
33.

In an attempt to fit within the language of Appendix W, Petitioners contend that

Holly's malfunction emissions must be the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or

15

EPA further clarified that "'we are concerned that assuming continuous operations for
intermittent emissions would effectively impose an additional level of stringency beyond that
intended by the level of the standard itself. As a result, we feel that it would be inappropriate to
implement the I-hour NO 2 standard in such a manner and recommend that compliance
demonstrations for the I-hour NO 2 NAAQS be based on emission scenarios that can logically be
assumed to be relatively continuous or which occur frequently enough to contribute significantly
to the annual distribution of daily maximum I-hour concentrations." Id at 9. The same logic
applies to the I-hour SO 2 standard.
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other preventable conditions, and therefore should have been included in the modeling analysis.
Petitioners argue that because EPA 's NSPS regulations relating to flares require a root cause
analysis where a flare emits more than 500 pounds of SO2 in a 24-hour period, emissions over
that level are necessarily the result of poor maintenance, careless operation, or other preventable
conditions. [Petitioners' Opening Br. at 33.] However, Petitioners cite no authority suggesting
that the separate requirement to conduct a root cause analysis contained in the NSPS regulations
somehow amounts to a determination that as a matter of law all upsets emitting more than 500
pounds of SO2 are necessarily caused by preventable conditions for purposes of Appendix W.
Petitioners cite no reason to conclude that, just because an investigation into the cause of all
emission events over a certain size is required, all such emission events are necessarily caused by
preventable conditions. Indeed, EPA recognizes that "the probability of successfully identifying
a means to avoid future emissions from each root cause analysis performed is certainly less than
100 percent," 72 Fed. Reg. 27,178, 27,197 (May 14, 2007), indicating that far from all emissions
that trigger a root cause analysis would be caused by preventable conditions. [Petitioners'
Opening Br. at 32-33.] Petitioners' argument finds no support in the record. The record
evidence is to the contrary, recognizing that
if SO2 modeling would have been required, then the malfunction emissions for
SO2 would not have been included because they do not represent normal,
controlled operations. The 120 tpy of SO2 from the flares due to malfunctions, as
documented in the SPR Reviewer Note 5 (pp8 l-82), are based on Holly
Refinery's historical data and do not predict future malfunctions. Nor do they
result from poor maintenance or careless operation of the flare.
[IR009214- l 5, Response to Comments Memo.]
34.

In light ofUDAQ's technical conclusion, it was well within UDAQ's discretion

to determine that the malfunction emissions should not be included in the modeling analysis.
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iii.

35.

Hollv Was Not Required to Model for PMz 5

Petitioners raise one final challenge to Holly's modeling. Specifically, Petitioners

argue the modeling did not address the revision of the annual PM2.s NAAQS that took place in
January 2013. This argument does not relate to any purported need for short-term emissions
limits but rather is a separate attack on the modeling analysis.
36.

For the same reasons as stated above, Holly's modification was not determined to

be ""major" for PM 2.s and therefore Holly was not required to do any modeling for PM regardless
of whether the NAAQS were amended. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(k)-(m)~ see also Utah Admin.
Code R307-4 I 0-4.
37.

Additionally, Holly's application fell within the grandfathering provision of the

revised PM2.s NAAQS and so did not need to be updated to address the revised NAAQS. In
finalizing the PM 2_5 NAAQS, EPA explained:
To facilitate timely implementation of the PSD requirements resulting from the
revised NAAQS, which would otherwise become applicable to all PSD permit
applications upon the effective date of this final PM NAAQS rule, the EPA is
finalizing a grandfathering provision for pending permit applications. This final
rule incorporates revisions to the PSD regulations that provide for grandfathering
of PSD permit applications that have been determined to be complete on or before
December I 4, 2012 or for which public notice of a draft permit or preliminary
determination has been published as of the effective date of today's revised PM 2.5
NAAQS. Accordingly, for projects eligible under the grandfathering provision,
sources must meet the requirements associated with the prior primary annual
PM2.s NAAQS rather than the revised primary annual PM 25 NAAQS.
78 Fed. Reg. 3,086, 3,249 (Jan. I 5, 2013).
38.

Holly's application was determined to be administratively complete on July I 9,

2012, long before the PM2.s NAAQS modeling requirements became effective. [See IR003767,
email from Camron Harry to Eric Benson, dated July 19, 2012 ("I am notifying you that I have
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now determined Holly Refinery's NOi is administratively complete.").] Therefore, no additional
modeling was required.
39.

In short, none of Petitioners' challenges to the modeling analysis itself succeed.

Petitioners have failed to provide any evidence that would undermine the significant evidence in
the record demonstrating there would not be an exceedance of the NAAQS. The modeling
analysis demonstrated that Holly's project would not cause or contribute to any NAAQS
violation, including the short-term NAAQS. EPA raised no comments about any of the
foregoing issues in connection with its independent technical and legal review of the Holly AO.
Therefore Petitioners' arguments fail on the merits and should be dismissed.

Holly and the Director Properly Calculated PM Emissions from the FCC Units.

VI.
I.

Petitioners next argue that the Director erred in failing to require Holly to count

condensable emissions in determining compliance with the emission limits on the FCC Units.
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 34-36.] For the reasons stated below, this argument should ~e
rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

UDAQ determined that condensable particle emissions would not be counted for

compliance with FCC Unit limits, but would be included in inventory calculations. [IR009243,
Holly AO ("The condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration,
but shall be used for inventory purposes.").]
3.

The Utah PM 10 SIP, approved by EPA in 1994 (64 Fed. Reg. 68031 (July 8,

1994)), excluded condensable PM emissions from compliance demonstration with the PM 10
emission caps in the SIP. [IR007826, PM 10 SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment
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Letter, ("The back half condensibles ar:e required for inventory purposes and shall be determined
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary.").]
4.

UDAQ recognized that the language in the PM ,0 SIP controlled for purposes of

drafting the Holly AO and excluded condensable emissions from all compliance limits for all
PM 10 SIP cap sources-including the FCC Unit 25. [IR008569, Source Plan Review ('"Holly
Refinery is listed in the PM 10 SIP. That document established several emission limitations, one
of which is a cap on PM 10 emissions. At the time the SIP was written the cap on PM 10 emissions
was established using only the filterable PM 10 emissions captured during stack testing. This
limitation was then included in the AO (and subsequent revisions) issued to Holly Refinery.
UDAQ has since agreed that all future particulate (PM 10 and PM2.s) limitations at all sources will
also include the condensable fraction of particulate emissions (such as those found in the back
half of a particulate sampling train or by reference test method 202). However, any limitation
which is derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP.
Therefore, those limitations on SIP-listed sources will continue to retain the original ·filterable
emissions only' language, with the condensable emissions being used only for inventory
purposes. Such is the case with Holly Refinery's PM 10 cap emission limit. It is the intent of the
Division to update these types of conditions once new SIP limitations are established in the
PM2.s SIP.").]
5.

UDAQ specifically determined that it would not set PM 2 _5 limits on the new FCC

Unit 25 because source wide limits of PM2.s were being set for Holly in the new PM2.s SIP that
was being developed at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO. [IR009 l 83, Response to
Comments Memo ("UDAQ has not set a condensable limit on the FCC Unit 25 in this permitting
action because UDAQ is currently developing a SIP for PM 2 5• In this SIP, the contribution of
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Holly Refinery to the valley airshed will be part of that evaluation and condensable limitations
will be addressed."); IR009206, Response to Comments Memo ("PM 2_5 condensable emissions
will be addressed in the PM2.s SIP.").]
6.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding condensable
emissions in determining compliance with the PM emission limits on the FCC Units or otherwise
exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or
perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
7.

During the public comment period, Petitioners' comments were limited to

challenging the PTE calculations for the new FCC Unit 25 and whether such calculations
properly included condensable emissions. [See IR007857, WRA Second Comment Letter
("Holly's Permit Application Underestimates the Increase in PM Emissions from the new
FCCU").]
8.

Petitioners' challenge to the FCC Unit 25 emission limit and the exclusion of

condensables was never raised in the comments notwithstanding the fact that this issue was
reasonably ascertainable as the limit was included in. the ITA. [See IR008469, ITA
("Condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be
used for inventory purposes").]

9.

Petitioners also appear to argue in their Opening Brief that the BACT analysis for

the FCC Unit 25 was invalid because it did not address condensables. Petitioners failed to raise
this argument during the comment period and therefore it was not preserved.

62
ADJ011597

10.

Because, Petitioners failed to preserve both of these arguments as required by

Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5(4), they should be dismissed.

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
11.

Even if Petitioners had preserved their claims, Petitioners have failed to meet their

burden of proof.
I 2.

Whether condensable emissions are required to be included for purposes of

compliance with emission limits is a question of law. Because this question of law is one with
which UDAQ has been charged to administer, the ALJ must apply a clearly erroneous standard
ofreview.
13.

Petitioners do not acknowledge the requirements of the PM 10 SIP. Although this

is not an instance where marshaling is required, Petitioners' disregard of the PM 10 SIP
requirements is fatal to their claim that condensable emissions must be included for compliance
with the FCC Unit's limits.
14.

Petitioners have failed to point to any valid legal basis that undermines UDAQ's

conclusion that the PM 10 SIP does not require condensables to be included for compliance with
the PM emission limits in the Holly AO.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
15.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
16.

The PM 1o SIP imposes a cap on all PM 10 sources at the Holly refinery including

the new FCC Unit 25 but does not require condensable PM emissions to be calculated for
compliance with that cap. [IR007826, PM 1o SIP (attached as Exhibit L to Holly's Comment
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Letter ('The back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes and shall be determined
using the method specified by the Executive Secretary."); IR009243, Holly AO ('"The
condensable particle emissions shall not be used for compliance demonstration, but shall be used
for inventory purposes."); IR008569, Source Plan Review (recognizing the PM10 SIP cap).]
17.

At the time the Holly AO was being considered, the PM 10 SIP was the only

applicable PM SIP and any provisions in the Holly AO that conflicted with that SIP would have
required a SIP amendment. [See IR008569, Source Plan Review ("any limitation which is
derived directly from the PM 10 SIP cannot be altered without similarly altering the SIP");
IR007826; Attachment L to Holly's second comment letter (excerpt from PM 10 SIP stating '"[t]he
back half condensibles are required for inventory purposes ... (t]he PM 10 captured in the front
half... shall be considered for compliance purposes").]
18.

Although the recently adopted PM 2 .s SIP now requires condensable PM emissions

to be calculated for compliance purposes, such a requirement was not in place prior to the
issuance of the Holly AO. Utah law is clear that permits are only required to incorporate
regulatory requirements that exist at the time of permit issuance. [See, e.g., In the Matter of
Petroleum Processing Plant Emery Refining, LLC, Order Returning Recommended Order Re
Motions to Stay to Administrative Law Judge for Further Action, April 8, 2014 ("Emery Order")
at 4 (limiting ALJ's review to the record before her and prohibiting consideration of a separate
NOi that could be granted or denied sometime in the future.).]
19.

Petitioners' references to Federal Register notices and guidance requiring PM

condensable emissions for compliance purposes are misplaced because such requirements had
not yet become binding on Holly. See 73 Fed. Reg. 28321, 28334 (May 16, 2008) (describing a
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transition period for incorporation of condensable requirements into state implementation plans
but only requiring such inclusion on major NSR projects).
20.

If EPA believed UDAQ erred in its handling of condensables in the Holly AO, it

had the jurisdiction and obligation to raise that issue in connection with its independent review of
the Holly AO. EPA declined to do so. [See IR007840-7841, EPA comment letter (raising no
issues about permit limits or the inclusion of condensables for compliance purposes).]
2 I.

Petitioners also appear to argue that the BACT analysis for the new FCC Unit 25

is invalid because it does not account for condensable emissions. This argument fails not only
because Petitioners did not preserve it during the comment period but also because any emission
control technology that reduces filterable emissions will necessarily control for condensable
emissions, both being post-control components of Holly's emission sources. Petitioners do not
present any evidence that an alternative emission control technology would more effectively
control condensable emissions beyond that which Holly is already required to install.
22.

All of Petitioners' arguments regarding UDAQ's treatment of condensable PM

emissions in the Holly AO fail on the merits and should be dismissed with prejudice.

VII.

I.

Holly Properly Calculated and Included in its Netting Analysis VOC Emissions
Reductions From its Cooling Towers.
Petitioners next argue that Holly improperly claimed a 39.28 tpy VOC emission

reduction from its cooling towers in the netting analysis it submitted to UDAQ. [Petitioners'
Opening Brief at 36-41.] For the reasons set forth below, this argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact

2.

In 2009, Holly implemented a voluntary monitoring program in which it

identified leaks in its cooling tower operation and fixed those leaks, thereby reducing emissions
of VOCs from its cooling towers. [IR009203. Response to Comments Memo ('·The reduction in
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VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed,
thereby reducing its VOC emissions.").]
3.

This monitoring program was made mandatory in the Holly AO on a going

forward basis to ensure that the emission reductions Holly experienced by fixing its equipment
remained at the reduced level. [IR007236, email from Mike Astin (environmental manager for
Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling
towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for volatile organics using the Texas
El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening methods to identify the leaking
heat exchanger and repair it."); IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that ''all cooling towers
implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring repair of any leaks
detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the
leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").]
4.

Prior to implementing the leak detection and monitoring program, Holly utilized

an "uncontrolled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers. [IR009203,
Response to Comments Memo ('·Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC
'uncontrolled' emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").]

5.

After implementation of the monitoring program made mandatory by the Holly

AO, Holly utilized a "controlled" emission factor to calculate emissions from its cooling towers.
[IR008558, Source Plan Review (""VOC emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were
previously estimated using the uncontrolled emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6
lb/I 0"6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program
to detect VOC leaks into cooling water and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring
Q
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method was replaced with monthly monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued
use of regular monitoring, it is proposed to utilize the ·controlled' emission factor of 0. 7 lb/10"6
gallons cooling water in AP-42 Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling
towers 10 and 1 I .").]

6.

It is the difference between the calculations with the "uncontrolled" and

"controlled" emission factor that makes up the emission reduction that Holly included in its
netting analysis. [Id.]
7.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR0078407841, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more
information regarding "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by converting from gas
fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840], the EPA raised no concerns about the
netting issues raised by Petitioners here. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information
on this issue was satisfied in UDAQ's response to comments.

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation
8.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

the issue during the public comment period. [See IR004214-42 I 6, Mark Hall First Comment
,::,

Letter.]

\&I

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
9.

Petitioners' claim that Holly incorrectly included a VOC emission reduction from

its cooling towers is a mixed question of law and fact. The correct interpretation of the
regulations governing when a source can utilize an emission reduction in a netting analysis is a
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question of law. However, the application of those regulations to the facts in this case presents a
mixed question to which the AU must apply a reasonableness standard ofreview.
10.

Because this is a mixed question of law and fact, Petitioners had the burden to

marshal the relevant factual evidence that pertained to this claim.
11.

Petitioners failed to meet this burden by failing to reference the requirements in

the Holly AO that make monitoring and leak repairs for the cooling towers enforceable permit
conditions. This evidence undermines Petitioners' argument that the cooling tower emission
reductions are not enforceable or creditable.
12.

Having failed to marshal this and other relevant evidence, Petitioners cannot

satisfy their burden to prove that UDAQ acted unreasonably in accepting Holly's netting
analysis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
13.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
C:,

14.

Petitioners challenge the creditability and enforceability of the VOC emission

reduction from the cooling towers because they claim it resulted from a voluntary monitoring
program and therefore was unenforceable. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )(3) (requiring decreases in
actual emissions be creditable and enforceable in order to be included in a netting analysis); [see
also Petitioners' Opening Br. at 36-37]. Petitioners also claim that Holly was precluded from

including the emission reduction in its netting analysis because the State of Utah arguably relied
upon the emission reduction for demonstration of attainment of the PM2s SIP. [Id] Both
arguments fail on the merits.
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i.
15.

Creditahilitv ofthe VOC emission reduction

The UDAQ reasonably found that Holly's VOC emission reduction to be

creditable because it resulted from a physical change to refinery equipment and will be
maintained through an enforceable pennit condition in the Holly AO. [See (R009230; Holly AO
(requiring that "all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); fR009244, Holly
AO (requiring repair of any leaks detected ··as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after
identifying the leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").]
16.

Under applicable law, an emission reduction is creditable if ""(a) the old level of

actual emissions exceeds the new level of actual emissions; (b) it is enforceable as a practical
matter; [and] (c) it has approximately the same qualitative significance for public health and
welfare as that attributed to the increase from the particular change." 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (vi)(a)(c ). The VOC emission reduction Holly claimed satisfies each of these three requirements.
17.

First, Holly's VOC cooling tower emissions were higher prior to Holly's physical

repairs to the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to Comments Memo ("The reduction in
VOC emissions reported in Holly Refinery's NOi was a result of a voluntary monitoring
program of the cooling towers that identified leaks from the towers that Holly Refinery fixed,
thereby reducing its VOC emissions.") (emphasis added); see also IR007236, email from Mike
Astin (environmental manager for Holly) to Camron Harry (permit writer for UDAQ), dated
March 26, 2013 ("For the cooling towers, we monitor the cooling water return lines monthly for
volatile organics using the Texas El Paso method. If any leaks are identified, we use screening
methods to identify the leaking heat exchanger and repair it.").]

I 8.

Petitioners argue that these emissions are merely estimated from emission factors

and do not represent actual emission reductions, and therefore are not credible. Contrary to
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Petitioners' arguments, however, the applicable regulations contemplate the calculation of
emissions through emission factors. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(2 l )(i) (providing that emissions
""shall be calculated"). The EPA-drafted preamble to the relevant regulation explains that
emission factors may be used in calculating ""actual emissions." 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,195
(Dec. 31, 2002) ('"When you calculate the baseline actual emissions for an existing emissions
unit.. .you may select any consecutive 24 months of source operation within the past l O years.
Using the relevant source records for that 24-month period, including such information as the
utilization rate of the equipment, fuels and raw materials used in the operation of the equipment,

and applicable emissionfactors, you must be able to calculate an average annual emissions rate,
in tpy, for each pollutant emitted by the emissions unit that is modified, or is affected by the
modification." (emphasis added)).
19.

1 find that a '"calculation" of emissions from cooling towers would necessarily be

an estimate based on operating hours, production rates, and types of materials. Holly's VOC
calculation was based on these same factors. [See IR008558, Source Plan Review (noting that
Holly used the "controlled' emission factor of 0.7 lb/l 0/\6 gallons cooling water as described in
AP-42 Section 5. l )]; See also AP-42 5.1 Petroleum Refining emission calculation descriptions,
available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie l /ap42/ch05/final/c05s0 l .pdf (including in the emission
calculation for cooling tower emissions the cooling water rate and refinery feed rate).]
20.

Prior to Holly's voluntary monitoring program and physical changes to its cooling

towers to reduce and eliminate VOC leaks, Holly utilized the ""uncontrolled" AP-42 emission
factor to calculate the VOC emissions from the cooling towers. [See IR009203, Response to
Comments Memo ('"Prior to using the Modified El Paso Method, the AP-42 VOC "uncontrolled'
emissions were the basis for refineries to report cooling tower VOC emissions.").]
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21.

After the units were repaired, Holly used the AP-42 "'controlled" emission factor

which resulted in a calculated emission reduction. [IR008558, Source Plan Review ("VOe
emissions from cooling towers 4 through 8 were previously estimated using the uncontrolled
emission factor listed in AP-42 Section 5.1 of 6 lb/I QA6 gal cooling water. In 2009, Holly
Refinery began a voluntary daily monitoring program to detect voe leaks into cooling water
and to eliminate those leaks. In 2012, the monitoring method was replaced with monthly
monitoring using the Texas El Paso method. With continued use of regular monitoring, it is
proposed to utilize the 'controlled' emission factor of0.7 lb/JQA6 gallons cooling water in AP-42
Section 5.1. This method will also be implemented for cooling towers 10 and 11.").]
22.

Where actual emissions are not easily measured-such as voe emissions leaking

from cooling towers-calculation estimates can provide reliable information to satisfy 40 e.F.R.
§ 52.21 (vi)(a)-(c). See 74 Fed. Reg. 55,670 55,679 (Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that certain historical

inventory data based on the AP-42 factors and "the AP--42 emission factors are the best available
data by which to estimate cooling tower emissions").
23.

Second, the voe emission reduction from the cooling towers is enforceable

because it was the result of a physical change to the refinery equipment, which must be
monitored and maintained under the terms of the HollyAO. [IR009224, Holly AO (condition
II.B.4.a Id; see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 I (b)(3)(vi)(b) (reduction is creditable if it is enforceable "at
and after the time that actual construction on the particular change begins").]
24.

Holly is required, pursuant to the terms of the Holly AO, to continue monitoring

for leaks from the cooling towers and must fix any discovered leaks in order to maintain the
lower voe emission levels from the cooling towers. [See IR009230; Holly AO (requiring that
"all cooling towers implement the Modified El Paso Method."); IR009244, Holly AO (requiring
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repair of any leaks detected "as soon as practicable, but no later than 45 days after identifying the
leak ... [v]erification of the repair shall be done through additional testing").] Any failure to do so
subjects Holly to enforcement action by UDAQ-making these requirements, and the associated
emission reduction, enforceable.
25.

Third, Holly has satisfied the qualitative significance requirement that Petitioners

claim has been violated. EPA's NSR Manual states that ''[c]urrent EPA policy is to assume that

an emissions decrease will have approximately tlie same qualitative significance for public
health and welfare as that attributed to an increase" unless the state has reason to believe
otherwise. [Petitioners' Reply Brief at 34 (emphasis added) (quoting EPA NSR Workshop
Manual, 1990, A-38-39).]
26.

Holly's modeling demonstrates that there will be no violation of any NAAQS or

PSD increments and overall, VOC emissions will be reduced. [See IR002980-3021, Holly's
NOi, section 6.0; see also IR003591-3597, Tom Orth Memorandum; IR007575, UDAQ
information sheet (indicating a -17.02 overall
27.

voe emission decrease from the project).]

Consequently, UDAQ had no reason to believe that the qualitative presumption

would not be met in this case, and Petitioners have not identified any contrary evidence. See,

e.g., In re Inter-Power ofN. Y, Inc., No. 92-8, 5 E.A.D. 130, 153-54 (EAB Mar. 16, 2014)
(rejecting the argument that EPA should have conducted a health assessment to demonstrate that
the qualitative significance of emissions was approximately the same, and holding that the
burden was on the petitioner to '·document[] that [the source's] fuel change has increased its
heavy metals emissions or created any health concerns. Accordingly, [petitioner] has not pointed
to any record evidence" that indicates that this provision was not satisfied). Holly's inclusion of
the

voe emission reductions from the cooling towers therefore was proper.
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28.

Petitioners also argue that the 52.95 tpy VOC emission baseline referenced in the

July 2012 NOi is inflated and, therefore, the emission reduction of 39.28 tons of VOC is inflated.
Petitioners overlook that the emission spreadsheet they cite indicates that if 52.95 tpy was the
VOC baseline, the associated emission reduction would have been 48.08 tons-not 39.28.
(IR003059, July 2012 NOL] Holly had two different baseline calculations for VOC emissions
because at different points in !he application process it used different baseline years for its
netting calculations. [Compare IR003059, July 2012 NOi, with IR007300, Revised NOL] In its
Revised NOi, Holly used 44.15 tpy as a baseline for VOC emissions, which resulted in the
reduction of 39.28 tons ofVOC. [IR007300.] Had it used the higher baseline, the emission
reduction would have also been higher, which means Holly's netted VOC reduction is
conservatively low. All of these baseline totals are derived from emission inventory reports that
Holly submitted to DAQ, and they were all calculated with AP-42 emission factors. [IR003059,
July 2012 NOi (citing "VOC Baseline 2008-2009" inventory years; IR007300, Revised NOi
(citing "VOC baseline 2008-2009" inventory years").]

ii.

29.

Ho/Iv Was Not Required to Adiust Downward its Baseline VOC
Emission Calculations

Petitioners also challenge the VOC emission reduction on the basis that Holly

should have adjusted downward its baseline VOC emission calculations because the El Paso
monitoring method is required by a Maximum Achievable Control Technology ('"MACT")
requirement under a National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants and has been
relied upon by UDAQ as a Reasonably Available Control Technology ("RACT") requirement in
the PM 2_5 SIP to demonstrate attainment.
30.

Any requirements that are otherwise required to be imposed as MACT standards

under section 112 of the Clean Air Act that result in emission reductions can still be used for
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netting purposes unless the state has specifically relied upon the emission reduction in
demonstrating attainment ofa NAAQS in a SIP. See 40 CFR § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(b) & (c) ("[I]f
an emission limitation is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard ... , the
baseline actual emissions need only be adjusted if the State has taken credit for such emissions
reductions in an attainment demonstration or maintenance plan."); see also Memorandum from
John S. Seitz, Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, t<? Bob Hannesschlager,
Acting Director, Multimedia Planning and Permitting Division, Region VI (Nov. 12, 1997)
("'Since the MACT program is not designed to limit criteria or other pollutants regulated by NSR
programs of parts C and D of title I of the Act, EPA 's policy is that actual emissions reductions
of hazardous or other air pollutants that result from complying with MACT regulations codified
at 40 CFR part 63 may be considered 'surplus' for purposes ofNSR netting and are not
precluded from NSR netting as long as the reductions are otherwise creditable under NSR.").
31.

Petitioners argue that UDAQ relied upon the MACT standard of the Texas El

Paso Method in the PM 2.s SIP to demonstrate compliance. However, that assertion is misplaced
because the PM 2.5 SIP had not been formally adopted at the time UDAQ issued the Holly AO.
Petitioners overlook that the regulation upon which they rely for this assertion provides only that
emissions must be adjusted downward where such emissions "would have exceeded an
emissions limitation with which the major stationary source must currently comply," with
"currently comply" referring to the time of permit issuance. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(48)(ii)(c)
(emphasis added).

32.

That Holly may have been on notice that the El Paso Method might subsequently

be required as a RACT standard is irrelevant in this analysis and Petitioners cite no authority
holding otherwise.
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33.

Accordingly, UDAQ acted reasonably in accepting Holly's netting analysis with

the VOC emission reductions included therein. Petitioners' claims to the contrary should be
dismissed with prejudice on the merits.

VIII. The FCC Unit 25's PTE Was Accurate and its Emission Limits Are Adequate.

I.

Petitioners challenge the accuracy of Holly's PTE calculations for the FCC Unit

25, arguing that the Holly AO is insufficient because it does not impose specific PM emission
limits on the unit. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 41-46.] For the reasons stated below, this
argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact

2.

The emissions from the FCC Unit 25 are limited by the maximum capacity of the

unit of8500 barrels per day ("bpd"). [IR00281 I, July 2012 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking
Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day will be constructed along with a
45 MMBtu/hr feed heater. Emissions from the FCCU will be controlled by a wet gas
scrubber."); IR002820, July 20 J 2 NOi ('"A Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU) from an idled
New Mexico refinery will be relocated to the Woods Cross Refinery. This unit is capable of
processing 8500 barrels of gas oil per day and is similar in size to the existing FCCU.");
IR003078, July 2012 NOi ("'FCC Capacity Limit based on Equipment Specifications 8500
bbls/day."); IR003 I 60, July 20 J2 NOi ("New FCCU ... Capacity ... 8500 bbpd."); IR00849 J,
Source Plan Review ("To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24),
an additional Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ('FCCU Unit 25') with a capacity of processing 8500
barrels per day will be constructed."); IR009227, Holly AO ("Unit 4: Fluid Catalytic Cracking
Unit (FCCU) 8,880 bpd annual average capacity"); IR009229, Holly AO ("Unit 25: FCCU 8,500
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bpd annual average capacity"); IR009192, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why
the FCC Unit 25 em'issions are limited by the operational capacity of the unit).]
3.

The information relating to the capacity of the FCC Unit 25 contained in Holly's

NOi was certified as accurate by the Plant Manager, Mike Wright. [IR007836, certification
signature page (Mike Wright certified that the information provided for the approval order was
accurate and complete.).]
4.

UDAQ determined that a coke bum rate of 6200 lb/hr was reasonable based on

the data Holly provided. [IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (""Based on UDAQ's
technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that "the 6200 lb/hr value is a fair and
reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke bum in FCC Unit 25."); IR008052, November 7,
2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).]
5.

UDAQ also determined that Holly was subject to a PM emission cap that included

the FCC Unit 25, and that any exceedance of the PTE calculated for the unit would subject Holly
to enforcement for exceedance of the emission cap. [IR009208, Response to Comments Memo
('"regardless of maximum throughput rates, the emissions are limited at the values established in

IT A"); IR009219, Response to Comments Memo (explanation for why the PTE for the FCC Unit
#25 was correct because the unit is subject to the PM emission cap and any exceedance of that
cap would be a violation).]
6.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding UDAQ's PTE
calculations for any FCCU or otherwise exercise EPA's broad oversight or enforcement
discretion over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See
IR00400l, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

7.

In their public comments, Petitioners only challenged the accuracy of the PTE

calculations for Holly's FCC Unit 25. Specifically, Petitioners argued there was insufficient
evidence to support the 6200 lbs/hr coke burn rate calculation, and that as a result, additional
limits were needed for the unit. [See IR008598-8599, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]
8.

In response to this comment, UDAQ requested that Holly provide additional

documentation and calculations to support the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate. [IR00802 I.]
9.

Holly responded by providing the calculations it used to determine the coke burn

rate. [IR8022-8023; IR008052.]

I 0.

Petitioners argued differently in their Motion for Stay, that the 6200 lb/hr figure

would not effectively limit PM emissions because emissions would increase if more coke was
burned.

11.

In Petitioners' briefing on the merits, Petitioners challenge for the first time the

accuracy of the maximum capacity of the FCC Unit 25, claiming that there was no evidence in
the record to support the 8500 bpd figure.
12.

This maximum capacity was expressly stated in multiple places in the NOi and

ITA. Any concern with the accuracy of the number was therefore reasonably ascertainable
during the public comment period. [IR0028 I I, July 20 I 2 NOi ("A Fluid Catalytic Cracking
.~.JI

\W

Unit (FCCU) with a capacity of processing 8500 barrels per day"); IR00849 I, Source Plan
Review (""To process the additional bottom cut from the new crude unit (Unit 24), an additional
Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit ("FCCU Unit 25') with a cap9city of processing 8500 barrels per
day will be constructed.").]
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13.

Accordingly, the only issue that has been adequately preserved by Petitioners is

their challenge to the 6200 lb/hr coke burn rate and their assertion that additional limits are
required for the FCC Unit 25. Their most recent challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd
capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25 has not been preserved in accordance with Utah Code Section
19-1-301.5(4) and should be dismissed for the reasons described above.

C. Findings and Conclusion on Burden of Proof
14.

Even if Petitioners had preserved their challenge to the accuracy of the 8500 bpd

capacity limit on the FCC Unit 25, Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof.
15.

Whether the PTE emission calculations for the FCC Unit 25 are supported in the

record is a highly technical factual issue that requires this tribunal to give deference to UDAQ in
its review of the issue. Petitioners must demonstrate that UDAQ lacked substantial evidence in
the record to support its decision that the PTE was calculated correctly.
16.

Accordingly, Petitioners carry a heavy burden of proof to marshal the evidence

relating to this issue to allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate and weigh the evidence relating
to the claims at issue.
17.

Petitioners have failed to meet their burden here by ignoring the relevant evidence

in Holly's NOi explaining how Holly calculated the emissions that would be generated by the
FCC Unit 25. Petitioners also provide no evidence contradicting Holly's certification that all of
the numbers contained in the NOi were accurate.
18.

DAQ invited commenters, including Petitioners here, during the public comment

period to provide technical evidence of alternate coke burn rates that commenters argued would
be more appropriate. Neither Petitioners nor other commenters responded to DAQ's request.
[IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo ("The commenter makes general reference to the
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'UOP yield estimates' and 'other more generic publications,' but provided no documents or
primary data to support or detail to which estimate, if any, was used to derive the suggested
range of coke burn estimates. Based on UDAQ's technical experience and expertise, the 6200
lb/hr value is a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25. The
commenter has not provided any specific technical information to UDAQ that would suggest a
higher value is more appropriate.")
I 9.

Failing to carry their burden of proof on this highly technical issue, Petitioners'

claims fail.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
20.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
21.

The question of whether Holly and UDAQ correctly calculated the potential

emissions for the FCC Unit 25 is a highly technical issue that requires this tribunal and any
reviewing court to give deference to the agency because the agency, in its technical expertise, is
in the best position to evaluate these issues.
22.

Holly based its conclusion that the new FCC Unit 25 would burn coke at a rate of

6200 lb/hr on empirical data it obtained from the FCC Unit 4 that was in current operation at the
refinery. [IR008052.] UDAQ requested and reviewed Holly's calculation information and was
satisfied that it justified the coke burn rate. [IR0092 I 9, Response to Comments Memo (""Based
on UDAQ's technical expertise and experience," UDAQ determined that ··the 6200 lb/hr value is
a fair and reasonable estimate of the quantity of coke burn in FCC Unit 25."); IR008052,
November 7, 2013 letter (Holly's emission calculations for PTE of the FCC Unit 25).]
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23.

The 6200 lb/hr figure was a conservative estimate. The original calculations

showed a rate of 5653.964 lb/hr, and the FCC Unit 4 is a larger unit than the new FCC Unit 25.
[IR008052; see also Holly AO at IR009227-009229 (The FCC Unit 4 processes 8,880 barrels per
day ("bpd") while the proposed FCC Unit 25 can only process 8,500 bpd).]
24.

Petitioners are incorrect in their assumption that because the rate is not included

as a limit in the Holly AO that Holly will exceed the PM limit of 0.301b/1000 lbs of coke burned.
The FCC Unit 25 emissions will not exceed the PTE because there is a finite capacity limit on
the FCC Unit 25 that acts as a physical limitation on the amount of PM that can be emitted.
25.

Even were this not the case, the refinery is limited to an overall PM 10 emission

cap of 47.5 tpy and O. l 3 tpd for combustion sources. [See IR0092 l 9, Response to Comments
Memo.] "If these limitations are not met, the refinery will be out of compliance until it remedies
the problem with additional control equipment or redesign of the system until it meets these
limits." [/d.]
26.

Gi,;j

Petitioners have failed to point to any evidence in the record that undermines the

reasonableness of UDAQ's reliance on the calculations Holly provided.
27.

Petitioners' only challenge to the PM cap that limits emissions from the FCC Unit

25 is the contention that EPA generally disfavors source wide cap limits. This assertion is
without merit.
28.

In the PM1o SIP that EPA approved, UDAQ specifically noted that due to the

significant variability of emission sources at a refinery, emission caps are appropriate. [See
IR07768, PM 1o SIP language attached to Holly Comment letter as Exhibit I, (because ~·there was
significant variability from day to day and from year to year ... the refineries were allowed
maximum never-to-be exceeded daily limits of PMIO, SO2, NOx based on the apparent
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variability").] This is true even though EPA generally disfavors source wide caps. In this case,
EPA recognized an exception to the general approach in approving such caps in the PM'° SIP.
29.

In light of the highly technical nature of this issue, UDAQ must be afforded the

greatest degree of deference in its conclusions regarding the evidence in the record supporting
the FCC Unit 25's PTE calculations. See Utah Code§ 19-1-301.5(14). Lacking any evidence
that would undermine UDAQ's conclusions,

16

Petitioners' challenge to the PM emission

calculations fail.

IX.

Holly is in Compliance with Title V.
l.

Petitioners next argue that the Holly AO may not be issued if Holly is not in

compliance with Title V of the Clean Air Act. Petitioners make three distinct arguments related
to this claim: (I) Holly's Title V application is not complete because the AO and Source Plan
review lack certain Title V requirements; (2) Holly has not adequately supplemented its Title V
application; and (3) not all applicable parts of Subpart Ja are included in the Holly AO in
violation of Title V regulations. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 46-5 l .] For the reasons stated
below. these arguments should be rejected.

16

For the first time in their Reply Brief, Petitioners appear to suggest that that the Holly AO is
purportedly deficient because the Director's use of PM 10 modeling as a surrogate for PM 2.s
modeling was invalid. Specifically, Petitioners assert that the FCC Unit 25 must contain a
separate PM 2_5 limit to ensure its emissions will not contribute to a NAAQS violation.
[Petitioners' Reply Brief at 42.] Even were it permissible to raise a new argument in a Reply
Brief, Petitioners never raised any concerns about this alleged surrogate policy in their comment
letters; thus the issue is not preserved. Moreover, Holly is now subject to a source wide emission
cap in the PM2.s SIP that will limit its PM2 s emissions. [Utah PM2.s SIP, January 8, 2014, p. 21
(setting a source wide PM 2 .s limit of 47.6 tons per rolling 12-month period).] UDAQ was
reasonable in determining that its regulation of Holly's PM2 s sources in the PM2.s SIP would
limit Holly's emissions and that a separate limit in the Holly AO was unnecessary.
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A. Findings of Fact

2.

Holly's predecessor-in-interest received a letter from UDAQ in 1995 that stated

Holly's operating permit application was administratively complete, which provides Holly with
an application shield from Title V enforcement action. [IR007725, Letter from UDAQ to the
Phillips 66 Company, Holly's predecessor in interest (stating that "the Operating Permit
application for Phillips Refinery (application #47) has been reviewed and determined to be
complete in accordance with Utah Administrative Code (UAC) R307-15-5( 1)(b)," that "the
above site is shielded from enforcement action for operating without a permit until a permit is
issued," and that additional information would be requested if needed).]
3.

UDAQ recognized that Ho11y had a Title V application shield letter in its response

to Petitioners' comments regarding Title V. [IR009175, Response to Comments Memo (Holly
submitted at UDAQ's request "a July 29, 1995 letter from UDAQ indicating that a complete
Title V Permit application had been received [and it] has been included in the record.");
IR009184, Response to Comments Memo C"ln any event...Holly Refinery is operating under an
application shield ... [t]he Title V application is currently pending.").]

4.

UDAQ also recognized that Petitioners pointed to no statute or regulation that

would preclude Holly from receiving an approval order without first obtaining a final Title V
permit. [IR009184, Response to Comments Memo ("UDAQ does agree that Holly Refinery is a
major source and is thus bound by R307-415, but the commenter has not referenced regulations
that prevent a major source without a Title V permit from obtaining an AO, nor is UDAQ aware
of such a regulation.").]
5.

UDAQ determined that Holly was still subject to all applicable federal regulations

regardless of whether Holly was in receipt of a final Title V permit. [IR008571, Source Plan
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Review ("Title V of the Clean Air Act of 1990 applies to Holly Refinery as a major source. The
absence of a Title V permit does not negate the requirements of Holly Refinery, it is still subject
to all AO conditions and federal regulations that would be included in the Title V permit.").]
6.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, the EPA submitted

two separate comment letters to UDAQ but did not raise any comments regarding noncompliance with Title V or otherwise exercise EPA 's broad oversight or enforcement discretion
over the final Holly AO for any real or perceived failure regarding the same. [See IR00400 I,
EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840-7841, EPA Second Comment Letter.]

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

7.

Petitioners did raise a Title V issue during the comment period that focused on the

allegation that Holly was illegally operating without a Title V permit. [See IR007860-786 I,
Petitioners' Second Comment Letter ("Holly Refinery is illegally operating and will continue to
do so until it receives a valid Title V permit.").]
8.

However, this is a much different claim than what Petitioners advocate in their

briefing on the merits-that somehow Holly's approval order and supporting documentation
turned into a Title V application that is insufficient, leaving Holly in violation of Title V of the
Clean Air Act.
9.

This new argument was also not raised by Petitioners in their RAA even though

the source plan review signature page they rely upon in the briefing was available for Petitioners
to review. [See IR007834-7835 (attached to Holly's Second Comment Letter).]

IO.

The relief requested in the RAA was simply that the Director must issue a Title V

permit for Holly prior to authorizing the expansion project-not that Holly's Title V application
was incomplete or insufficient. [See RAA at 38.]
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11.

To the extent Petitioners' arguments extend beyond their initial contention that

Holly is allegedly illegally operating without a valid Title V permit, such arguments have not
been adequately preserved and should be dismissed on this basis.

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof

12.

The question of whether Holly is in compliance with Title V and whether UDAQ

properly interpreted the Title V statute and rules to allow UDAQ to issue the Holly AO presents
a mixed question of law and fact. The questions regarding interpretation of the Title V rules and
regulations are questions of law. The application of that law to th is specific case presents a
mixed question of fact and law that must be reviewed under a reasonableness standard.
13.

Petitioners are required to marshal all of the relevant evidence on this issue to

allow this tribunal to adequately evaluate whether there is substantial evidence in the record to
support UDAQ's decision to issue the Holly AO.
14.

Petitioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proof for this claim. In fact,

Petitioners' fail to reference the only piece of record evidence related to Title V compliance:
UDAQ's letter to Holly's predecessor expressly stating that the refinery is in compliance with
Title V. [See IR007725.]
15.

Petitioners also fail to identify any final determination on Holly's pending Title V

application that would restrict UDAQ's ability to issue Holly its approval order.
16.

Lacking this evidence, Petitioners cannot satisfy their burden of proof and their

claims regarding Title V must fail.

(:,";;

~
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D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
17.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
18.

Petitioners argue that before the Director may issue Holly an approval order, he

must purportedly determine whether Holly is in compliance with Title V. See Utah Admin.
Code R307-401-8(1 )(b)(x) (an approval order may only be issued if"the proposed installation
will meet the applicable requirements of... all other provisions of R307"); [see also Petitioners'
Opening Br. at 47].
19.

Petitioners assert that Holly is in violation of Title V because its Title V

application is not complete and it has violated its duty to supplement its application ··as
necessary to address any requirements that become applicable to the source." Utah Admin. Code
R307-415-5b. In support of this assertion, Petitioners rely on the fact that, as part of Holly's
approval order application, Holly signed an optional signature page allowing the information in
the Source Plan Review to be included in Holly's pending operating permit application. [See
IR007836, SPR signature page.] Because this signature page signifies that the AO application is
an update to Holly's Title V application but lacks certain Title V requirements, Petitioners argue
that Holly's Title V application is legally deficient.
20.

Petitioners similarly argue that by omitting the Subpart Ja requirements in the

Holly AO, Holly also has violated the application requirements under Title V. On these bases,
Petitioners assert that UDAQ may not issue an approval order to Holly while it is in violation of
the Title V permit application requirements.
21.

These arguments fail for four reasons.
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22.

First, any arguments related to Title V compliance or the sufficiency of Holly's

Title V application is outside of this tribunal's jurisdiction. The Executive Director of DEQ has
made clear that an ALJ's jurisdiction is limited to the administrative record before him or her and
the particular permit under review. [See Emery Order (limiting ALJ's jurisdiction to the record
before her and prohibiting consideration of an NOi application that could be granted or denied at
some point in the future.).] Any other permits or applications for permits that Holly may have
submitted-all of which involve separate administrative records-are beyond the scope of these
proceedings. Id. More important, Petitioners do not point to any final Title V permit decision
that could be reviewed by this tribunal even if it had jurisdiction to do so.
23.

Second, even if I had jurisdiction, it is clear from this record that Petitioners have

not presented any evidence or authority that renders invalid the application shield letter issued to
Holly's predecessor-in-interest. [See IR007725.] This shield remains in place until the
permitting authority takes action on the entire Title V permit application, which it appears has
not yet occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 766 lc(d) ("if a part 70 source submits a timely and complete
application for permit issuance (including for renewal), the source's failure to have a part 70
permit is not a violation of this part until the permitting authority takes final action on the permit
application"); see also 40 C. F .R. § 70. 7(b) (same); see also Utah Adm in. Code. R307-4 I 55a(3 )(e) (same). This means every approval order that Holly has received is an update to its Title
V permit application. The Holly AO is no exception and does not independently give rise to a
cause of action under Title V's separate rules or regulations.
24.

Third, even if I had jurisdiction, this argument fails as a matter of law: Nothing in

the Title V statute or applicable regulations contains any time period for supplementation of the
Title V application. See Utah Admin. Code R307-415-5b. That Holly continues to provide
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information to EPA and UDAQ regarding NSPS compliance (which is a Title V requirement)
effectively evidences that Holly's Title V permit application is being updated on an ongoing
basis. [See IR004 l 38-59, Exhibit 7 to Petitioners' first comment letter (containing a compliance
report, sent to the EPA and UDAQ, including compliance demonstration for NSPS
requirements).] Thus, Petitioners' reliance on the signature page as evidence of an incomplete
Title V application is without merit.
25.

Fourth, even if I had jurisdiction, Petitioners' argument that UDAQ's failure to

recite the entire Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO violates Title V is incorrect. [Petitioners'
Br. at 10-11.] As previously explained, UDAQ is not required to recite the entire 43-page
Subpart Ja regulation in the Holly AO. In any event, the record demonstrates that Subpart Ja

does apply and that Holly is in compliance with all federal requirements. [See IR007725.]
26.

For all of these reasons, Petitioners' claims regarding Title V fail on the merits

and should be dismissed with prejudice.

X.

The Record Supports the Use of the NEI Emission Factors in Holly's Emission
Calculations.
1.

Petitioners next argue that the Director erred when he authorized the use of the

NEI emission factors to calculate PM emissions from certain of Holly's heaters and boilers.
[Petitioners' Opening Brief at 51-58.] For the reasons discussed below, this argument should be
rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

Holly submitted to UDAQ two independent expert reports explaining why the

NEI emission factors were more accurate and better predictors of emissions than the AP-42
emission factors-namely, because of the newer dilution testing methodology that was used to
develop the NEI emission factors. [IR007238-58, First Glen England Report ('~England I")
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(explaining why the NEI emission factors more accurately predict PM 2.s emissions from gas
fired heaters and boilers); IR008024-44, Second Glen England Report ("England II") (same).]
3.

Because the NEI emission factors were untested at the Holly refinery, UDAQ

imposed stack testing requirements to verify the accuracy of the emission factor calculations.
[IR0092 l 5-l 6, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that UDAQ imposed stack testing
requirements to verify the accuracy of the NEI emission factors, reviewed the Glen England
Reports and maintained the original conclusion that use of the NEI emission factors was
appropriate); IR0092 l 7, Response to Comments Memo (explaining that Holly was subject to a
stringent emission limit for its heaters and boilers that matched the NEI emission factor
calculations and that Holly is subject to stack testing requirements to verify compliance).]
4.

UDAQ also imposed an emission limit of 0.0005 l lb/MMBtu in Section 11.B.7.a.2

of the Holly AO. [IR009248, Holly AO.]
5.

UDAQ only imposed this limit on Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. [IR008558-

59, Source Plan Review (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources); IR009218,
Response to Comments Memo (explaining use ofNEI emission factors for NSPS sources).]
6.

Presumably at the request of Mark Hall, a commenter on the draft Holly AO, EPA

staff members sent emails to an undisclosed Gmail account discussing the accuracy of the NEI
emission factors and the ability of EPA to approve new emission factors generally. [IR0089118922; IR009043.] Neither the attachments to these emails nor the complete emails were
included with the comments. [Jd.]
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B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

7.

Petitioners preserved some aspects of their argument regarding their challenge to

the NEI emission factors in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising the issue during the public
comment period. [See IR008584-8595, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]

8.

Petitioners did not, however, preserve the argument that§ 7430 of the Clean Air

Act precluded the use of the NEI emission factors.
9.

Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act was not cited anywhere in the comments

submitted during the public comment period but was reasonably ascertainable because it was
codified in the U.S. Code during the public comment period.

IO.

Petitioners did not raise this substantive argument until their briefing on their

request for a stay in this proceeding.
11.

Accordingly, any arguments relating to§ 7430 of the Clean Air Act are

unpreserved and should be dismissed.
12.

In their Reply Brief, Petitioners, argued for the first time that the § 7430 claim

was made in response to additional information submitted to UDAQ after the close of the public
comment period and was therefore not barred by the preservation rules found in Utah Code
Section 19-1-301.5(4). Petitioners asserted than any prohibition to their ability to address
information submitted after the close of the public comment period would be a violation of their
due process rights.
13.

Petitioners' due process argument relating to their ability to assert the § 7430

claim was not briefed until the Reply. Issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are rejected
in appellate contexts. See e.g., Coleman ex rel. Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, ,r 9, 17 P.3d
1122 (refusing to consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief). Accordingly, this
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tribunal will not entertain Petitioners' due process arguments briefed for the first time in their

GJ

Reply Brief.
14.

Additionally, even if such an argument were properly before this tribunal, the

only information Holly submitted after the close of the public comment period relating to the
NEI emission factors was the second Glen England Report, in which Mr. England-expanded on
his prior report (submitted before the public comment period) explaining why the NEI emission
factors were the most representative factor for determining emissions from Holly's new heaters
and boilers. [See IR008024-44.]
15.

Petitioners' § 7430 argument is not directed at this second Glen England report

and does not address any of the technical findings contained therein. Instead, as Petitioners
admit, the § 7430 argument is purely a legal argument relating to whether UDAQ could use
emission factors other than the AP-42 factors, officially approved by EPA.
16.

Therefore, in light of the fact that the § 7430 argument has nothing to do with the

Glen England Report and is a purely legal argument that was reasonably ascertainable during the
public comment period, the claim has not been adequately preserved, and no due process rights
have been infringed.

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
17.

Even if Petitioners' claims had all been adequately preserved, they have failed to

meet their burden of proof.
18.

Petitioners' claim that UDAQ erred in relying on the NEI emission factors to

calculate the PTE for Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers presents a mixed question of law and
fact. Whether UDAQ is legally authorized to use an emission factor other than AP-42 is a
question of law and UDAQ has been given discretion to interpret this law, requiring the
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application of a clearly erroneous standard of review. The question of whether UDAQ was
reasonable in accepting the NEI emission factor data is a highly technical mixed question of law
and fact that is reviewed for reasonableness.
19.

Although Petitioners reference, in a footnote, the Glen England Reports, they do

not analyze any of the information contained in those reports. Instead, Petitioners focus on a
paper that Glen England published in 2004, which discusses generally the NEI emission factors
as well as several emails from EPA staff discussing the adequacy of the NEI emission factors.
20.

Petitioners also focus their argument on the assertion that UDAQ is prohibited by

Section 7430 of the Clean Air Act from using any emission factors not specifically approved by
EPA.
21.

Petitioners have failed to adequately marshal all of the relevant evidence for this

highly complicated issue. Accordingly, they have not satisfied their burden of proof to challenge
Holly's use of and UDAQ's acceptance of the NET emission factors.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
22.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
23.

Petitioners advance multiple arguments as to why the use of the NEI emission

factors to calculate emissions from Holly's heater and boilers was improper. Each of these
arguments fails for the reasons discussed in detail below.
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i.

24.

There is No Legal Requirement that UDAO use AP-42 Emission
Factors

Petitioners argue that the law mandates UDAQ use AP-42 emission factors to

calculate PM emissions from Holly's NSPS heaters and boilers. This argument fails for three
reasons.
25.

First, nothing in Utah's minor source permitting regulations and nothing in the

federal PSD/NSR regulations requires the use of AP-42 emission factors. In fact, those
regulations do not mention the AP-42 factors at all.
26.

While EPA has identified the AP-42 factors as one method of estimating potential

emissions under the PSD/NSR program, the AP-42 factors are not the only authorized method.
EPA also has sanctioned numerous other methods, including "emissions from technical
literature." [EPA New Source Review Workshop Manual, Prevention of Significant
Deterioration and Nonattainment Area Permitting, draft dated October 1990 ("EPA
Puzzlebook"). The NEI emission factors are "emissions from technical literature" that Holly
used to calculate potential PM 2_5 emissions from its gas fired heaters and boilers.
27.

Moreover, the AP-42 factors themselves caution that they are not to be

mechanically applied, but may be superseded by more specific or appropriate technical
information. As EPA has advised:
Before simply applying AP-42 emission factors to predict emissions from new or
proposed sources, or to make other source-specific emission assessments, the user
should review the latest literature and technology to be aware of circumstances
that might cause such sources to exhibit emission characteristics different from
those of other, typical existing sources. Care should be taken to assure that the
subject source type and design, controls, and raw material input are those of the
source(s) analyzed to produce the emission factor. This fact should be
considered, as well as the age of the information and the user's knowledge of
technology advances.

©
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EPA, Introduction to AP-42, 4 (Jan. 1995), available at www.epa.gov/ttnchie I /ap42/c00s00.pdf.
In this fashion, EPA delegates to the relevant permitting authority discretion to detennine how to
calculate emission rates.
28.

Second, Petitioners' argument that the NSPS regulations mandate the use of AP-

42 is also misplaced because the NSPS program is entirely separate from the PSD program and
regulations from one program cannot dictate action in the other. See, e.g, Envtl. Defense v. Duke

Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 577 (2007) (recognizing the definitions of "modification" under the
PSD and NSPS programs are distinct and the ""PSD regulations on 'modification' simply cannot
be taken to track the Agency's regulatory definition under the NSPS").
29.

Finally, Petitioners' argument that 42 U.S.C. § 7430 prohibits the use of the NEI

emission factors because EPA has not specifically approved such factors also fails.
30.

The plain language of this statute contradicts Petitioners' argument because

Section 7430 applies only to emission factors used "to estimate the quantity of emissions of

carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and oxides of nitrogen from sources of such air
pollutions." 17 42 U.S.C. § 7430 (emphasis added). The statute says nothing about the use of
emission factors to estimate the quantity of PM 2_5 and PM 10-the only emissions for which Holly
used NEI factors to estimate emissions from its heaters and boilers.
31.

In any event, Section 7430 does not dictate that UDAQ use any specific emission

factors in a permitting proceeding, but requires EPA to update emission factors, saying nothing

17

Consistent with the plain language of the statute, EPA has repeatedly explained that this
provision applies only to "the emission factors used to estimate emissions of volatile organic
compounds (VOC), carbon monoxide (CO), and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) from area and mobile
sources," not to emission factors for PM 2_5 and PM 10 • 67 Fed. Reg. 56289 (Sept. 3, 2002); 62
Fed. Reg. 45802 (Aug. 29, 1997).
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about when such factors must be used. UDAQ retains discretion to decide which emission
factors are appropriate, in its expert technical opinion.
32.

As EPA has explained in evaluating the use of emission factors generated under

Section 7430:
These procedures are not a means for individual facilities to obtain EPA approval
of a site-specific emission factor or to determine the appropriateness of applying a
published EPA factor to a specific facility. EPA does not approve site-specific
factors or judge the appropriateness of its factors for specific facilities. The
responsibility for such decisions continues to be that of the State or local
regulating authority, as well as the facility operators themselves.
EPA's published emission factors are intended to provide an affordable method of
estimating emissions where no better data are available. They are best used to
characterize the total emissions loading of a large geographic area containing
many individual facilities. Therefore, these factors attempt to represent a typical
or average facility or process in a given industry. EPA recognizes that other
methods of obtaining emissions estimates may be more accurate than industryaverage emission factors, and encourages the use of better methods whenever the
source and/or the State or local regulating authority is able to support those
methods.
Public Participation Procedures for EPA Emission Estimation Guidance Materials, at 2 (May
1997) (second and third emphasis added). 18
33.

EPA has specifically recognized that state permitting authorities may use other

methods without obtaining approval under§ 7430, so long as the permitting authority "is able to
support these methods." Id.
34.

UDAQ had substantial evidence in the record to support its decision to use the

NEI emission factors as set forth in section ii. below.

18

Available at http://tinyurl.com/EPA-guidance.
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35.

Petitioners have failed to establish any valid legal basis mandating the use of AP-

42 emission factors for estimating PTE for pennitting purposes. Therefore this claim fails on the
merits.

ii.

36.

It Was Reasonable for UDAOtoAccept Holly's Use ofthe NE/
Emission Factors

UDAQ did not abuse its discretion by following EPA 's instruction and looking to

alternative methods of calculating emissions in this case. As noted above, the determination of
which emission factors to use falls squarely within the discretion ofUDAQ. That determination
is entitled to substantial deference, particularly given its technical nature. See, e.g., Utah Code
§ 19-1-301.5(13)(b); accord In re: N Mich. Univ. Ripley Heating Plant, PSD Appeal No. 08-02,

at 53 (EAB Feb. 18, 2009) ('·[Q]uestions pertaining to the appropriate pollutant emissions rates
and other inputs to air quality models raise scientific and technical concerns that generally are
best left to the specialized expertise and reasoned judgment of the permitting authority."); In re:

Newmont Nev. Energy Inv., LLC, TS Power Plant, 12 E.A.D. 429, 444 (EAB 2005) ("[W]e
accord broad deference to permitting authorities with respect to issues requiring the exercise of
technical judgment and expertise."); Utah Dep 't ofAdmin. Servs. v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 658
P.2d 60 I, 610 (Utah 1983) (""[A] court should afford great deference to the technical expertise or
more extensive experience of the responsible agency.").

37.

Before explaining why UDAQ's acceptance of the NEI emissions factors is

reasonable, supported by substantial evidence, and does not constitute an abuse of discretion, it is
necessary to provide some brief background regarding PM and emission factors generally.
38.

Particulate matter (PM) is comprised of a complex mixture of extremely small

particles and liquid droplets. [Utah PM 2_5 State Implementation Plan, adopted December 4. 2013
(4"2013 SIP"), § 1.1.] PM 10 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 microns or
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less. 40 C.F.R. § 51.50. PM 2 _5 is particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter of 2.5
microns or less. Id.
39.

There are two types of PM emissions: primary and secondary. The type on which

Petitioners focus in their challenge, primary PM, is comprised of particles that are directly
emitted from a source as a solid or liquid ("filterable PM") or vapor that immediately condenses
after discharge to form solid or liquid PM ('"condensable PM"). See 40 C.F .R. § 51.50.
According to EPA's AP-42 emission factors, condensable PM accounts for 75% of PM
emissions from the type of natural gas combustion sources at issue here. [See AP-42
Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors (1998); see also England II at IR008029.]
40.

An emission factor attempts to estimate the quantity of a pollutant released into

the atmosphere with an activity associated with the release of that pollutant. 47 Fed. Reg.
52723-01, 52724 (Oct. 14, 2009). EPA's AP-42 emission factors were "initially developed for
emission inventory purposes only"-i.e., to assist national, regional, state, and local regulatory
authorities with making air quality management decisions and developing emission control
strategies. Id. at 52723, 52725. Since then, however, EPA has recognized the AP-42 emission
factors have been "used for many other air pollution control activities for which they were not
designed," including permitting and enforcement. Id.
41.

Various testing methods have been developed for calculating primary PM 2 _5

emissions (both filterable and condensable). The AP-42 factors on which Petitioners rely were
originally developed almost twenty years ago using a ''stack test impinger method," which draws
a gas sample through a heated filter and then a series of iced '"impingers." [England I at
IR007240.] As explained in the England Reports, the problem with this method is that cooling
the sample with chilled water causes emissions-and particularly SO2 emissions-to condense
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and particulate out as "pseudo-particulate" matter. Although the gas emissions would not
condense to form particulate matter under normal operating conditions, the AP-42 factors
nevertheless measure this pseudo-particulate matter as primary PM 2_5• [England II at IR0080278029; England I at IR007240, IR007242.]
42.

EPA has recognized this same problem with the stack test impinger method. EPA

has observed, for example, that "sulfur dioxide (S02 ) gas (a typical component of emissions
from several types of stationary sources) can be absorbed partially in the impinger solutions and
can react chemically to form sulfuric acid. This sulfuric acid 'artifact' is not related to the
primary emission of [condensable particulate matter] from the source, but may be counted
erroneously as [condensable particulate matter]." 75 Fed. Reg. 80,118, 80,121 (Dec. 21, 2010).
EPA also has acknowledged "that S02 in particular, and perhaps other gaseous compounds, can
react with the collecting liquids used in the [stack test impinger] method to form materials
(artifacts) that would not otherwise be solid or liquid or would not condense upon exiting the
stack." 72 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25, 2007).
43.

The Glen England Reports explain that this problem is particularly acute for gas-

fired sources. EPA developed its test methods for sources such as coal-fired boilers, which emit
PM concentrations at much higher levels than gas-fired sources, and EPA has never evaluated
the performance of these methods for gas-fired sources. [England II at IR008029, IR008034.]
These measurement errors caused by the hot filter/iced impinger methods "are so significant
when applied to gas-fired boilers and heaters ... that they partially or completely obscure the true
emission level." 19 [England II at IR008029.]

19

In addition to being based on flawed test methods which measure artifacts that do not actually
constitute particulate matter, the relevant AP-42 PM 2.s factors are based on limited data. The
AP-42 PM2.s factors are based on only 11 tests of four emissions units for condensable
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44.

The NEI factors, by contrast, were developed using a newer ''dilution method."

Unlike the old stack test methods, dilution-based testing does not create artificial pseudoparticulate matter because the gas sample is cooled with filtered air, similar to what happens to
emissions in the course of actual operations. According to the England Reports, this results in
much more representative and accurate PM2.s measurements. [England II at IROO8O27,
IROO8O3O-8O32; England I at IROO7241.]
45.

EPA has recognized the benefits of this newer testing method, observing ''that a

dilution sampling method for measuring direct PM 2.5 eliminates essentially all artifact formation

and provides the most accurate emissions quantification." 12 Fed. Reg. 20,586, 20,653 (Apr. 25,
2007) (emphasis added). In fact, EPA has expressly identified certain applications "where
dilution sampling provides advantages over the standard test methods," and actively

"encourage{dl sources that encounter these situations to request that the regulatory authority ...
use this method to approve the use of dilution sampling as an alternative to the test method
specified for determining compliance." 75 Fed. Reg. 80118-01, 80132 (emphasis added).
46.

In this case, EPA raised no objection to use of the NEI emission factors during the

public comment period. 20 [See Response to Comments at 43 (noting that "during the public
comment period, EPA did not object to the use of(the NEI] emission factors").] Nor has EPA
particulate matter (which forms the majority of PM 2_5 emissions). [England II at IROO8O39.]
These tests were not performed by EPA, but by contractors on behalf of individual facilities or
industry trade associations. [England II at IROO8O35.] Moreover, the measurement uncertainty
of the AP-42 PM2.s factors for gas-fired sources is greater than the average estimate of emissions.
[England II at 4.] The England Reports describe these and a number of other flaws with the AP42 PM2.s factors that are not reiterated in detail here. [See England II at 3.]
20
While EPA did ask for more information as to the basis for the reduction of PM 10 and PM 2 _5
potential-to-emit numbers in Holly's second netting analysis, [see IROO784O-7841 ], UDAQ
addressed this inquiry in its Response to Comments, explaining that the calculations were "based
on the 2006 EPA-published National Emissions Inventory (NEI) Information." [IROO9l 76]
Subsequent to this direct identification of the use ofNEI emission factors, EPA has raised no
further questions concerning the netting analysis or otherwise challenged Holly's AO.
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challenged the issuance of the AO. EPA also has raised no objection to UDAQ's recent
authorization of the NEI factors for purposes of calculating PM 2_5 under UDAQ's PM2.s State
Implementation Plan. [See Utah SIP § I.X.H.11 (k)(i), dated January 8, 2014 ("SIP Part H") at
60.]
47.

In arguing that UDAQ must use the AP-42 emission factors, Petitioners do not

defend the accuracy of the AP-42 factors on a technical basis. Nor do they address any of the
criticisms, expressed by both EPA and the England Reports, about the inaccuracies of the stack
test impinger methods on which the AP-42 factors are based.
48.

The fact that AP-42 factors have been used in the past does not mean that UDAQ

must continue to rely on those same factors for the Holly AO. UDAQ's determinationsincluding the "technical" and "scientific" questions such as what emission factors are to be
used-are to be made on the basis of the evidence provided to UDAQ and placed in the
administrative record in a particular permitting action. Utah Code § 19-1-301.5( 13)(b). Holly
provided UDAQ with data regarding the flaws in the AP-42 PM 2_5 factors and outlining the
superior accuracy of the NEI PM 2_5 factors. UDAQ evaluated this evidence and "determined that
the NEI emission factors can be used." [IR0092 I 6, Response to Comments Memo.] Prior use of
the AP-42 PM 2_5 factors does not undermine this conclusion. 21

21

Petitioners' claim that the May 2011 RTI International Emission Estimation Protocol for
Petroleum Refineries endorses the use of the AP-42 emission factors and does not identify the
NEI PM 2_5 data. [See IR008661, attachment F to Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.] However,
the purpose of the protocol was not to identify the absolute level of PM 2 _5 emissions from each
refinery, but to require the tested refineries to use the same emissions factor so that their relative
emissions could be compared. In responding to comments on the protocol, EPA explained that
"it is important that default emission factors are consistent between different reporters so we can
properly compare the results." [Summary of Comments and Responses, EPA-HQ-OAR-20100682 (Feb. 2, 201 I), Appx. V of Holly's Opposition to Motion for Stay, also available at
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=EPA-HO-OAR-20 I 0-0682-0028.] In any event, the
protocol itself states that the ··emission factors in AP-42 are the recommended default emission
99
ADJ011634

49.

Based on the substantial evidence in the record providing technical support for

UDAQ's decision to accept use of the NEI emission factors and the emission calculations based
on those factors, and given the lack of contradictory technical evidence, Petitioners cannot meet
their burden to demonstrate that UDAQ acted unreasonably.
iii.

50.

The NEI PM2_ 5 Emission Factors are Based on Sound Technical
Data and Petitioners' Reference to Other Information Does Not
Undermine the Data.

The majority of the technical data supporting the NEI emission factors is found

in the England Reports, which state that "[t]he NEI PM2.5 emission factors were derived by
EPA staff from data contained in GE EER's comprehensive test reports published from 20022004," along with ··detailed supporting test data." [England II at IR008032.]
51.

Q

This testing program "included extensive quality assurance measures," and more

comprehensive data than is provided in the compliance tests used to developed the AP-42
factors. [England II at IR008034-8035.] These results have been subject to peer review and
have been corroborated by other independent scientific studies. [England II at IR008032.] The
NEI test data is also quantitatively superior when it comes to condensable particulate matter
emissions, which form the majority of PM2.s emissions: the AP-42 factors were based on 11 test
runs of four units, while the NEI factors were based on 20 test runs of six units. [England II at
IR008039, IR00804 l .]
52.

The cautionary statements regarding the NEI emission factors upon which

Petitioners rely ''do not suggest in any way that those factors are insufficiently supported by data
or should not be used." [England II at IR008033.] The AP-42 PM emission factors are
accompanied by similar language explaining that the emission factors are based on limited data
factors," not that the AP-42 factors are the only permissible emission factors. [IR008715
(emphasis added).]
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and may not be accurate. [England II at IR008029-8030.] Such cautionary language is generally
found in all instances where emission factors are used.
53.

The boiler sampling data and performance guarantees from the John Zink

Company are an incomplete compilation of data that is not explained, nor relatable to Holly's gas
fired heaters and boilers. The boiler standards were provided to UDAQ on a one-page sheet of
test results, without the full test reports or any explanation as to the testing methodology or
nature of the emissions sources. [See IR008586, Mark Hall Second Comment Letter.]
Additionally, two of the four boilers did not bum natural gas during their tests and so are not
analogous to the gas-fired sources at issue here. [England II at IR008030 n.1.] The emissions
from the remaining two sources vary widely, resulting in "very low" confidence in the average.
[England II at IR008040.] Accordingly, this data does not undermine use of the NEI emission
factors.
54.

The Zink guarantees were similarly provided without context or explanation.

Without the testing data, it is impossible to verify that these factors were not based on the same
flawed test methods as the AP-42 factors. Moreover, the Zink guarantees are not emission
factors or estimates, but rather guarantees provided by a commercial manufacturer that emissions
will not exceed a certain level. Equipment manufacturers have an incentive to guarantee
emissions that are conservatively high so that the commercial risk associated with failing to meet
the guarantee is low. [England II at IR008034 ("'If PM guarantees are not met during
performance tests on a new unit, tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in customer payments
may be at stake.").]
55.

In weighing the evidence in the record, as this tribunal must do in accordance

with Utah Code Section 19-1-301.5, it is clear that the use of the NEI emission factors is
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supported by the majority of sound scientific evidence in the record and UDAQ was therefore
reasonable in its acceptance of the NET factors.

iv.

56.

UDA O Was Reasonable in its Reliance on Enforceable Emissions
Limits in the Holly AO in Determining the Potential to Emit for
Ho/Iv's Heaters and Boilers.

Petitioners argue that emission limits on Holly's heaters and boilers cannot be

used to limit the facility's potential to emit and so UDAQ erred in its determination that Holly's
project was minor for PM 25 • This tribunal disagrees.
57.

The AO imposes an enforceable limit on PM 2.5 emissions from each of the

emissions units for which the NET emission factors were used in an amount equal to the NET
emission factors. [IR009248, Holly AO (providing that ·~[t]he emissions of PM 10 from the
following NSPS Boilers and heaters shall not exceed 0.0005 l lb/MMBtu").]
58.

The methodology used in this case to determine whether the proposed

modification was "major" for PSD/NSR purposes was a comparison of the refinery's potential to
emit after the expansion project versus its baseline actual emissions before the expansion. See 40
C.F .R. § 52.21 (a)(2)(iv)(d). [See also TR008560, Source Plan Review (noting that Holly has
used the potential to emit methodology to determine the projected increases from the expansion
project).] Under this method, the estimated potential emissions are compared to the baseline
emissions; if the difference between the two exceeds a certain quantity, the modification is
deemed "major" for that pollutant.
59.

"'Potential to emit" is defined as

the maximum capacity of a stationary source to emit a pollutant under its physical
and operational design. Any physical or operational limitation on the capacity of
the source to emit a pollutant, including air pollution control equipment and
restrictions on hours of operation or on the type or amount of material combusted,
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stored, or processed, shall be treated as part of its design if the limitation or the
effect it would have on emissions is federally enforceable. 22
40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (b)(4) (emphasis added); Utah Adm in. Code R307-l O1-2 (same definition). 23
60.

The emissions limit imposed on the NSPS boilers and heaters is an enforceable

limitation in the Holly AO. [See IR0092 l 8, Response to Comments Memo C'If the stack testing
indicates that Holly Refinery cannot comply with these emission factors, it would be out of
compliance with its AO .... ")]; see also 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80, 190-91 (Dec. 31, 2002)
(explaining when an emissions limitation is enforceable). Accordingly, the potential to emit of
these emissions units was properly limited to 0.00051 lb/MMBtu - the same level as established
by the NEI emission factors.
61.

UDAQ was reasonable in relying on this limiting factor in its determination that

Holly's project would only be a minor modification for PM.
62.

Ultimately, none of Petitioners' arguments challenging Holly's use of the NEI

emission factors undermines' UDAQ's reasonable decision to accept Holly's emission
calculations based on those factors. Petitioners' arguments on this claim all fail on the merits
and should be dismissed with prejudice.

XI.

The Emission Reductions From the Decommissioning of the Propane Pit Flare
Were Properly Included in Holly's Netting Analysis.

22

The term "federally" in this definition is interpreted as meaning "practically enforceable" by a
federal, state, or local entity. 67 Fed. Reg. 80,186, 80,191 (Dec. 31, 2002). [See also
Memorandum from John S. Seitz re: Release of Interim Policy on Federal Enforceability of
Limitations on Potential to Emit, at 3 (Jan. 22, 1996).]
23

Petitioners suggest that the NSPS regulations provide a definition for calculating ''potential to
emit." This is incorrect. The NSPS rules nowhere use the concept of "potential to emit" to
determine whether a modification has taken place. Instead, the NSPS definition of modification
is based on whether there has been a change in the hourly emissions rate, while the PSD
regulations are based on total annual emissions. See Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. at 577-78.
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1.

Petitioners final argument is that Holly inaccurately calculated the emission

reductions from its decommissioning of the propane pit flare and should not have included such
emissions in its netting analysis. [Petitioners' Opening Brief at 60-61 ]. For the reasons stated
below, this final argument should be rejected.

A. Findings of Fact
2.

The emission reductions that Holly claimed from its decommissioning of the

propane pit flare came from actual emission inventory information submitted to UDAQ in 2008
and 2009 and were not re-calculated specifically for purposes of this project. [IR0092 t 8,
Response to Comments Memo ("flare emissions came from the UDAQ inventory record for
reported actual emissions from 2008-2009 based on 259 MMBtu/hr and actual throughput
data").]
3.

The historic modifications to the propane pit flare to bring it into compliance with

NSPS did not affect the baseline calculations or the AP-42 emission factor calculations.
[IR007337, Revised NOi ('~Compliance with NSPS affects neither the AP-42 emission factor
calculation, which is based on the amount of propane used, nor the baseline calculations.").]
4.

None of Holly's modifications to the Propane Pit Flare affected overall emissions.

Therefore Holly was free to take credit for the emission reductions when the flare was
decommissioned. [IR009182, Response to Comments Memo ("Because compliance with 40
CFR 60 Subparts A & J did not affect emissions, reductions from the removal of this propane pit
flare are creditable reductions.").]
5.

In connection with its independent review of the Holly AO, EPA submitted two

separate comment letters to UDAQ. [See IR004001, EPA First Comment Letter; IR007840784 I, EPA Second Comment Letter.] While the Second Comment Letter requested more
104
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information regarding (a) "the basis for the estimate of emissions reduced by converting from
gas fired to electric motors for the compressors" [IR007840] and (b) the netting calculations
relating to the new benzene saturation unit #23 and applying a boiler #5 NOx limit [IR00784 I],
the EPA raised no concerns about the netting issues raised by Petitioners in their final argument
on appeal. Moreover, EPA's request for supplemental information on this issue was satisfied in
UDAQ's response to comments.

,

B. Findings and Conclusions on Preservation

6.

Petitioners preserved this argument in accordance with 19-1-301.5(4) by raising

this issue during the public comment period. [See IR007857 Petitioners' Second Comment
Letter.]

C. Findings and Conclusions on Burden of Proof
7.

The issue of whether Holly accurately estimated reduction of PM emissions from

the removal of its propane pit flare presents highly technical factual questions. It also presents
legal questions about what data may be used for reduction purposes in a netting analysis.
Accordingly, this issue is a mixed question of law and fact and UDAQ's decision to include the
emission reductions in the netting analysis will be analyzed under a reasonableness standard.
8.

Petitioners failed to marshal all of the evidence pertaining to this issue-namely

the 2008 and 2009 emission inventory data. Petitioners merely question the final calculations
without presenting any conflicting evidence or analyzing the evidence in the record.

9.

Accordingly, Petitioners have not met their burden of proof on this claim and it

fails on that basis.

D. Conclusions of Law on the Merits
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I 0.

Even if Petitioners had carried their burden of proof, or to the extent marshaling is

not properly applied to this claim (being a question of law), Petitioners' claims fail on the merits
for the independent reasons discussed below.
11.

Petitioners argue that the propane pit flare emissions were overestimated based on

Holly's use of AP-42 emission factors. Petitioners contend the emission reduction must be
overestimated because based on the calculated reduction, the propane pit flare would have been
burning every day of the year.
12.

Petitioners submit no evidence in support of this contention. Specifically,

Petitioners do not address the fact that the emission reduction was based on the 2008 and 2009
historic emission inventory data that Holly submitted to UDAQ as required by Utah Admin.
Code R307- l 50.
13.

Part of this calculation involved the use of AP-42 emission factors to calculate the

emissions from the flares because emission factors are necessary where emissions are generated
from an open flame. [See IR007337, Revised NOT, (""Baseline emissions for the flare at the
propane pit were calculated based on the AP-42 emission factors for flares.'').]
14.

For purposes of netting, the regulations expressly provide that the historical

inventory information may be used as a baseline for calculating emissions increases and
decreases. See 40 C.F .R. § 52.21 (b )(48)(ii).
15.

That Holly used NEI emission factors to calculate emissions from its heaters and

boilers is irrelevant to the question of whether the flare emissions were properly calculated with
AP-42 factors. Petitioners have pointed to no statute or regulation that would require Holly or
UDAQ to re-calculate historic inventory information every time new emission factors are
developed.
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16.

Petitioners' claim that there is no evidence in the record to support these historic

emission calculations also fails because all parties, including Petitioners, agreed to exclude the
emission inventory calculations from the record given the volume of those files. [See Holly's
Surreply at 28; see also UDAQ's Surreply at 33.] If Petitioners thought there was an error in the
calculations, the information could have been made available to them for their review.
Petitioners may not now argue, without having asked to review the calculations, that the lack of
such evidence supports their claim.
17.

Petitioners have failed to present any evidence that would undermine the

significant deference afforded to UDAQ in its review of highly technical emission calculations
and review of netting analyses. Moreover, Petitioners have presented no technical evidence that
undermines the accuracy of the historical inventory information. Accordingly, Petitioners'
challenge to the propane pit flare emission calculations fails on the merits and should be
dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED ORDER
I.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioners have not met their burden to demonstrate that

UDAQ erred in issuing the Holly AO.
2.

Further based on the foregoing and having satisfied my charge to undertake a

permit review adjudicative proceeding in connection with this matter in accordance with Utah
law, I recommend that the Executive Director deny Petitioners' Request for Agency Action and
affirm UDAQ's issuance of the Holly AO.
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th

DATED this 1 I day of March, 2015.

BRET F. RANDALL
Administrative Law Judge

r::.\
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the•l I th day of March 2015, I served the foregoing

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
REGARDING THE MERITS via email on the following:

Administrative Proceedings Record Officer
deqapro@utah.gov
Joro Walker
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr.
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES

ioro. walker@westemresources.org
rob.dubuc@westemresources.org
Christian C. Stephens
Veronique Jarrell-King
Marina V. Thomas
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL

cstephens@utah.gov
vi arre IIkin g@utah.gov
marinathomas@utah.gov
Steven J. Christiansen
David Reyman
Cheylynn Hayman
Megan Houdeshel
PARR BROWN GEE &LOVELESS, P.C.

185 S. State Street, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 841 I I
schristiansen@parrbrown.com
dreymann@parrbrown.com
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com
chayman@parrbrown.com

Isl Bret F. Randall, ALJ
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APPENDIX A
Table of Waived Claims Petitioners Raised in Their RAA But Failed to Brief on the Merits
RAAPage
Number
27-29

Description of Waived Claim
"The AO Does Not Adequately Address Co Emissions and CO
BACT"

Claim# in
Briefs
8

29-30

"The Director Failed to Respond to Public Comments as Required by
Law"

9

43-44

"It is Impossible to Verify the Facility's SO 2 Potential to Emit"

17

47-48

"The BACT for the South Flare is Inadequate"

20

50

"The AO Does Not Comply with the Federally Enforceable PM 1o
SIP"

24

51

"There is No Adequate Basis in the Record for the AO as the Record
Does Not Reflect Independent Analysis of the Assertions and
Calculations Made in the NOi"

25

51-52

"There is Insufficient Information and Analysis in the Record to
Support the AO"

26

53

"The Netting Analysis is Insufficient and Does Not Support the
Finding that the Expansion Project is a Minor Modification"

28

53-55

"The Holly Refining NOi is Incomplete for its Failure to address
Hydrogen Sulfide, Total Reduced Sulfur and Sulfuric Acid Aerosal
as Required NSR-Regulated Pollutants"

29

55-57

"The AO is Not Based on PM Emissions During Emission
Characterization, Project Related Emission Increases, Netting and
Net Increase Calculations and in the Required BACT
Determinations; the Refinery Onsite Road Network is an Emission
Unit Not Listed in the AO Approved Installations and Holly
Refining Plans to Increase Site-Road-Related PM, PM IO & PM2.5
Emissions Through a Physical Change or Change in the Method of
Operation of this Emission Unit"

30

59-60

"Table 3-4 and 3-5 NO 2 Reference [is incorrect]"

32
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60-61

"'Facility Configuration and Operations in Compliance with Holly
Refining's Notice of Intent"

33

61-62

"Holly Refining's NOi Contains Significant Errors on the Matter of
the Specific Start of the Contemporaneous Period"

34

62-63

"The AO is Based on an Improper Characterization of the
Contemporaneous Period"

35

63-65

"The AO is Unlawful Because the Director Failed to Require and
Base his Permitting Analysis on the Necessary Process Flow
Diagrams and New Source Review Forms"

36

65-67

"The Evaluation and Characterization of Contemporaneous Emission
Increases is Inadequate"

37

67-69

"The Section 2.3.1 "Fuel Gas" Process Support Group Analysis and
Related Section 3 Emission Tables Do Not Show an Adequate 40
C.F.R. §52.21 (b)(3)(i)(b) Determination of Contemporaneous
Creditable Emission Increases and Decreases"

38

69-70

"The Section 2.3.2 Disclosure of Cooling Tower Changes Fails to
Provide Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous
Creditable Emission Increases from Non-Modified Portions of
Existing Cooling Towers"

39

70

"The Section 2.3.3 Disclosure Concerning Flares Does Not Provide
Sufficient Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable
Emission Increases at Non-Modified Flare Emission Units"

40

70-71

"The Section 2.3.6 Discussion of Wastewater Treatment and the
Refinery Wastewater Sewer System Does Not Provide Sufficient
Information to Determine Contemporaneous Creditable Emission
Increases"

41

74-75

"Holly Refining's Section 3 Emission Increase and Net Emission
Increase Tables Contain Erroneous Specification of Volatile Organic
Compound and Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Cooling
Tower #11"

43

76-77

"'VOC Emissions and Waxy Crude Handling, Transfer and Storage"

45

78

"'Holly Refining Erroneously Claimed VOC Emission Reduction
from Removal of a Floating Roof'

46

,.
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79-81

"The Director Fails to Enforce Notice of Intent and Compliance
Report Certification by Holly Refining"

48

81

"Condition II.B. I .b in the AO is Too Vague to be Enforceable"

49

81

'"The AO Production Rates During Compliance Stack Tests Are
Insufficient"

50

81-82

'The AO Fails to Contain a Section Addressing the Regulatory
Status, Method of Emission Control and Monitoring-InspectionRecordkeeping-Reporting Requirements for Tank Sources ofVOC
and HAP"

51

83-84

"The AO Fails to Enforce Specific Requirements of the July, 2008
EPA Consent Decree Covering PM Emission Limitations for FCCU
Unit 4 and Fails to Require Sufficient Monitoring Necessary to
Assure Compliance with PM Emission Requirements from FCCU
Units 5 and 25"

53

84-86

"The AO Fails to Provide a Best Available Control Technology
Emission Limitation for PM, PM 10 or PM2.5 to Control Emissions
from FCC Unit 4"

54

86-87

"Setting NOx Emission Limitations for 4FCCU and 25FCCU
Catalyst Regenerator Exhaust Must be Explained and Justified on the
Record to Eliminate Error and Ambiguity"

55

87-88

"The AO Omits Oxygen Corrections for NOx and SO2 Emission
Limitations that are Stack Flue Gas Concentration Limits"

56

91-93

"The Record Does Not Include Maximum Potential to Emit for Short
Term SO2 Emissions from the FCC Unit 25 Wet Scrubber Exhaust
Vent Compliance Determination Point that are Associated with
Sulfur Recovery Unit/SRU Incinerator Outages"

59

93-94

"The AO Fails to Contain Oxygen Monitoring and Wet Scrubber Outlet
Volumetric Flow Rate Determination at FCC Units 4 & 25 Wet
Scrubber Controlled Vent Stacks"

60

95-96

''The Director Eliminated a Previously Established PM Limits for
FCC Unit 4 Without Replacing Such a Limit with a Revised BACT
Determination"

62

96-97

"Holly Refining Has Not Demonstrated that the 15% Opacity Limit
for 25 FCCU Constitutes a BACT Visible Emission Limitation"

63
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97-98

"The Director Must Regulate the FCC 34" Flue Gas Bypass"

65

98-99

"Nothing Provided by Holly Refining's Final Revised Notice of
Intent Justifies the Claimed 98% Control Efficiency Claimed for
VOC, HAP and CO Destruction Efficiency from the Open Air
Flares"

66

99-100

"The Record Fails to Address All Parts of the Existing and Proposed
Flare Gas System and Failed to Carry Out a "Top Down" Best
Available Control Technology Analysis"

67

100-102

"The AO May Not Dismiss Flare Gas Recovery Systems as a BACT
Requirement Without Considering Prevailing Industry Practice in
Favor of Such Systems at Larger Refineries"

68

104-105

''Flare Opacity Limitation is Not a BACT Limitation"

71

106-107

"The AO Fails to Adequately Address the SRU Incinerator"

73

107

"The AO Fails to Adequately Address the Controlled Refinery
Process Wastewater Sewers"

74

107-108

"Neither the Approval Order Nor Holly Refining's Final Revised
Notice of Intent Contain Any Limitation on Cooling Tower Water
Total Dissolved Solids"

75

108-109

"The AO Fails to Incorporate a VOC BACT Determination and Fails
to Address EPA Consent Decree Requirements for LOAR Programs
at Holly Refining's Facility"

76

109-110

"Condition 11.B.l.d Should Require Continuous Total Sulfur
Analyzer"

77

111-112

"The Director Must Address the Heater/Boiler NOx CEM
Requirement"

79

115

"Utah Physicians Reserves the Right to Respond to Any Argument
Data and/or Analysis Which Was Not Available at the Beginning of
the Public Comment Period"

81
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ADDENDUME
Order Adopting Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommended Order on the Merits

BEFORE THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
DIVISION OF WATER QUALITY

In the Matter of:
Approval Order No. DAQE-AN101230041-13
Holly Refining & Marketing Company Woods Cross, LLC
Heavy Crude Processing Project
Project No. N10123-0041

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON THE MERITS

Date: March 31, 2015

On March 11, 2015, the administrative law judge issued a Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law, and Recommended Order on the Merits (proposed dispositlve action) in the above
referenced Division of Air Quality permit review adjudicative proceeding, conducted in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §19-1-301.5 and Utah Admin. Coder. 305-7. When an
administrative law judge submits a proposed dispositive action, I may adopt, adopt with
modifications, or reject the proposed dispositive action; or return the proposed dispositive
action to the administrative law judge for further action as required. Utah Code Ann.§ 19-1301.5(13)(a). I am required to uphold all factual, technical, and scientific agency determinations
that are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a whole. Utah Code Ann. §
19-1-301.5(13)(b).
Having reviewed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order on

the Merits and the accompanying record, I am satisfied that the factual, technical, and scientific
agency determinations are supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as a
whole.
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WHEREFORE, I adopt the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order

on the Merits. For the reasons stated therein, I affirm the Division of Air Quality's decision to
issue the approval order described above and I order the dismissal with prejudice of each of the
Petitioners' arguments.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Judicial review of this final order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals in
accordance with Sections 636-4-401, 63G-4-403, and 636-4-405 of the Utah Code Ann. and the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by filing a proper petition within thirty days after the date of
this order.

DATED this~ day of71kt--tcl;

, 2015.

AMANDA SMITH
Executive Director
Utah Department of Environmental Quality
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CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE
st

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 31 day of March 2015, I served the foregoing

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
ON THE MERITS via email on the following:

Administrative Proceedings Record Officer deqapro@utah.gov
Joro Walker
Charles R. Dubuc, Jr.
WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES
joro.walker@westernresources.org
rob.dubuc@westernresources.org
Christian C. Stephens
Marina V. Thomas
ASSISTANT UTAH ATTORNEYS GENERAL
cstephens@utah.gov
marinathomas@utah.gov

•

Steven J. Christiansen
David Reyman
Megan Houdeshel
Cheylynn Hayman
PARR BROWN GEE &LOVELESS, P.C.
185 S. State Street, Suite 800 Salt
Lake City, UT 84111
schristiansen@parrbrown.com
dreymann@parrbrown.com
mhoudeshel@parrbrown.com
chayman@parrbrown.com
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Shane R. Bekkemellom,
Administrative Legal Secretary
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